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This thesis examines the impact of closing price manipulation (“marking the close”) on 
several dimensions of equity market quality, including both the efficiency and integrity 
of equity markets. Marking the close is an illegal practice that involves attempting to 
influence the closing price of a stock by aggressively executing orders at or near the end 
of the trading day. Although this practice affects a security’s market price over only a 
short period of time, often seconds before the close of business, it has significant harmful 
consequences because of the importance and widespread use of equity closing prices. For 
example, many financial institutions use the closing price as a reference price to calculate 
investment fund performance over a given time frame, or to determine fund manager 
compensation, or to determine the price or payoff to a derivative security. 
Current understanding of marking the close manipulation is poor due to the scarcity 
of data relating to demonstrated cases of manipulation. This thesis describes the curation 
of a dataset containing all prosecuted closing price manipulation cases reported by the 
U.S. Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) for the period 1995 to 2018.  This dataset 
is subsequently used to characterise manipulation, investigate how manipulation affects 
trading, and investigate the overall motivation(s) for manipulation. The results show that 
the majority of prosecuted and confirmed cases of manipulation were relatively illiquid 
small companies with manipulation often occurring to satisfy requirements to remain 
listed on an exchange and/or to avoid margin calls.  
Following the characterisation of market manipulation, this thesis investigates the 
impact of regulation on market quality in both liquid (U.S.) and comparatively illiquid 
(New Zealand) markets.  
In U.S. equity markets, a natural experiment was performed to investigate the 
impact of the 2011 SEC naked-access ban (Rule 15c3-5) on high-frequency trading 
(HFT) participation, market efficiency, and market integrity. The resulting insights shed 
new light on previous understanding of HFT as one of the largest drivers of efficiency 
and integrity of the U.S. equity market. The results dispel concerns that HFTs harm 
market quality by creating an uneven playing field and potential for market manipulation. 
On the contrary, higher HFT participation in the U.S. markets appears to lead to overall 
higher market integrity and more efficient markets. HFT activities, especially arbitrage 
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strategies of trading against manipulators, increase the cost of manipulation by providing 
liquidity, minimising their trade impact in the market, and significantly decreasing 
adverse selection. 
To contrast the behaviour of the liquid U.S. markets, the thesis examined the New 
Zealand Stock Exchange (NZX) trading characteristics and liquidity over the period 
2007-2018. This analysis has shown some important, and possibly unique, characteristics 
of the NZX and the possibility of closing price manipulation associated with large 
negotiated off-market trades. The thesis highlights that approximately two-thirds of the 
total dollar turnover of the NZX in the past 10 years is negotiated off-market trades and 
that it is common for off-market trades to be executed at the closing auction price once 
that price is determined. Off-market volume is not typically part of the closing auction 
mechanism and, in many cases, the volume of off-market trades executed just after 
market close is much larger – sometimes 100 times larger – than the volume absorbed by 
the closing auction. Therefore, an off-market trader who wants to trade a large volume at 
the closing auction price could plausibly manipulate the thin pre-close auction using 
relatively low volume so that their large-volume off-market order is executed at the 
manipulated closing price just after the close. 
To measure the possibility and breadth of this kind of closing price manipulation, 
a rule-based manipulation index was developed based on the Financial Markets Authority 
(FMA) v Warminger judgment report (New Zealand’s first and, at present, only 
manipulation case to come to trial). The Warminger judgment report provides detailed 
insights regarding the machinery of the exchange surveillance systems and the 
regulators’ investigation process in the New Zealand context. This information became 
available to the public for the first time as a result of this case. Using the proposed 
manipulation index, trading in the S&P/NZX 50 component stocks over a two-year 
period was analysed to measure the possibility and breadth of this type of manipulation 
on the NZX.  This study presents the first detailed empirical analysis of stock price 
manipulation in New Zealand markets. Feedback from both the NZX and the FMA 
suggests that the approach used in this thesis is based on the rational assumptions, 
effective in terms of structure, and arguably the best possible method for replicating a 
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“The greatest comedy is played at the Exchange. There,… the speculators excel in tricks, 
they do business and find excuses wherein hiding places, concealment of facts, quarrels, 
provocations, mockery, idle talk, violent desires, collusion, artful deceptions, betrayals, 
cheatings, and even tragic end are to be found” (De la Vega 1688) [quoted in Fridson 
(1995) p. 169]. 
1.1  Overview 
Based on the Efficient Market Hypothesis (Fama 1970, 1991), all available information 
about a stock should be reflected in the closing prices and investors should pay a fair 
price.1 Sometimes, however, prices rise systematically at the close of trading in the 
absence of new information (Harris 1989; Aitken et al. 2018). Empirical evidence has 
shown that some traders try to affect market prices by making last-minute trades or orders 
that are not intended to be executed (Felixson and Pelli 1999; Aitken et al. 2009). These 
strategies are one type of “market manipulation”, which results in loss of normal traders’ 
faith in stock trading and harms market efficiency (Aggarwal and Wu 2006). The use of 
trading strategies to mislead other market participants in stock markets dates back 
centuries (De la Vega 1688) and is still a major concern today (Withanawasam et al. 
2013). Despite its importance, our understanding of market manipulation characteristics 
remains limited (Putniņš 2012). 
                                                 
1 Note that taxes, transaction costs, and risk aversion all impede a trader’s ability to trade based on 
information. So, prices might deviate from fair value because of these, but that is not considered a breach 
of the efficient market hypothesis. 
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As defined by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), “marking the 
close” (or closing price manipulation) means executing buy or sell orders in an attempt 
to influence the closing price of a listed security at or near the close of the market 
(Kocherhans 1995). Based on Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2014), approximately 1% of 
market closing prices of stocks traded on the U.S. and Canadian stock markets are 
manipulated, but only a small portion of them are prosecuted and reported by market 
regulators. 
This thesis describes the characteristics of closing price manipulation by analysing 
all reported prosecuted manipulation cases in the U.S. stock market from 1995 to 2018. 
The SEC’s arguments in judgment reports reveals how the regulators investigate 
suspicious manipulative trades and collect evidence. The factors that the SEC used as an 
indication for manipulative behaviours are used in many studies in the literature. For 
example, Aitken et al. (2018) and Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2011a) developed 
indices as measures for the frequency and severity of marking the close manipulation. 
The Aitken et al. (2018) manipulation index compares the price changes in the last 15 
minutes before market close for each given day with the distribution of average price 
changes in the past 30 trading days. The Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2011a) 
manipulation index is more complex, with suspicious manipulation instances determined 
based on sudden increases in returns, trading frequency, bid-ask spreads before market 
close, and reversion to fair prices in the morning of the next trading day. These 
characteristics for manipulated stocks are also in line with several other studies (Carhart 
et al. 2002; Hillion and Suominen 2004; Branch and Evans 2011). 
Automation of trading on securities exchanges and the alternative trading system 
(ATS) has changed the relationship between broker-dealers and their customers as 
agents. It has also increased the popularity of sponsored and direct market access 
arrangements as a requirement for high-frequency trading (HFT) (Aitken et al. 2015a). 
Based on the SEC (2010a), HFT is “one of the most significant market structure 
developments in recent years”. It is estimated that around 70% of the dollar volume of 
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trades in the U.S. equities market in 2009 were executed by HFTs (Brogaard 2010).2 
Based on the SEC (2010b), all of these orders submitted to the market through sponsored 
access (also referred to as “unfiltered” or “naked” access) had little or no substantive 
intermediation by broker-dealers. Naked access can lead to various financial and 
regulatory compliance risks because of the lack of appropriate and effective risk 
management control for all regulatory requirements by broker-dealers (SEC 2010b).  
During 2009 and 2010, the SEC reviewed U.S. market structure practices based on 
new developments in trading technology and strategies and proposed new rules, 
including Rule 15c3-5 (“the Rule”), to address specific vulnerabilities based on current 
market structure. The rise of HFTs attracted attention from market regulators, analysts 
and journalists, particularly when it emerged that HFTs had participated in the May 6, 
2010 Flash Crash by withdrawing liquidity and exacerbating market volatility (Easley et 
al. 2011; Kirilenko et al. 2017).  
There are disagreements about the impact of HFT on market quality. Some studies 
have suggested that automated electronic trading has dramatically reduced intermediary 
costs (SEC 2010b; Hendershott et al. 2011). HFT technology can reduce the costs and 
friction of trading and has the potential to make prices more efficient (Hendershott et al. 
2011). By increasing market liquidity, HFTs reduce price volatility, as they help assets 
remain consistently priced (Chaboud et al. 2014). On the other hand, Harris (2013) 
believes that HFT access to low-latency news feeds and trading tools causes information 
to be reflected in prices more quickly than it does for any other market participants. Other 
traders lose to HFTs, as they cannot modify or cancel their limit orders in the order book 
as quickly as HFTs. Historically, traders lost out to better-informed competitors, but now 
they lose simply because they cannot react as quickly as HFTs. Zhang (2012) found that 
although aggressive HFTs improve price discovery in short time frames (less than 10 
seconds), non-HFTs contribute more to price discovery in the long run (more than two 
minutes).  
                                                 
2 It is also important to note that HFT participation in the U.S. markets declined in recent years as HFT 
profits are generally shrinking because of heightened competition between HFT firms (Serbera and 
Paumard 2016; Miller and Shorter 2016). 
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In order to determine whether HFTs harm market quality by creating an uneven 
playing field or whether they are one of the drivers of efficiency and integrity of the 
equity markets, this thesis sought to investigate the impact of the Rule (which bans naked 
access in the U.S. markets) and HFT participation on both aspects of market quality 
including market efficiency and market integrity. 
This thesis investigated the impact of regulation on market quality not only in liquid 
markets (such as the US) but also in the less liquid New Zealand market. New Zealand 
has a relatively low market capitalisation per GDP (43%) compared to other Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries (NZX 2018b). There 
has been a long debate (Potter 1995; Rosborough et al. 2015), with mixed views, 
regarding the New Zealand Stock Exchange’s (NZX) level of liquidity and the 
consequences of this due to the exchange’s unique characteristics. The present study also 
focuses on the changes in NZX characteristics and its level of liquidity in the past 10 
years from 2007 to 2018. 
Another important issue, which has been a major concern for both market 
participants and regulators in New Zealand, is the level of NZX pre-trade transparency 
(NZX 2018b). In the NZX, direct participation by retail investors is very low and the 
majority of trades have been executed by international or domestic institutional investors. 
This is a major concern as the majority of institutional traders prefer to trade manually 
through private transactions outside of the formal stock exchange (that is, off-market). 
These negotiated off-market trades are conducted outside of the NZX electronic limit-
order book with no pre-trade transparency. 
Hatheway et al. (2017) examined the impact of dark venues on market quality. 
They found that except for execution of large orders, dark-venues damage market quality 
as dark traders are less informed and contribute less to price discovery than lit markets. 
While a large portion of the off-market trades on the NZX are relatively small, there is 
no minimum size for off-market execution to limit negotiated off-market trading and 
move these small off-market trades to the market.  
To address these issues and promote more liquidity, in April 2018 the NZX 
released a consultation paper related to its NZX Participant Rule and possible rule 
changing to increase on-market trading and limit off-market trades by setting a minimum 
trade size of $50,000 for all off-market crossings (NZX 2018b). Although a $50,000 
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threshold for trading off‐market in New Zealand is considerably lower than the ASX 
thresholds which range between $200,000 and $1,000,000 depending on the liquidity of 
the stock, these changes in the NZX pricing and rule structure are in line with ASX’s 
current trading rules. As mentioned in the consultation report, new proposed changes are 
consistent with global best practice to increase market liquidity. This thesis investigates 
the impact that this potential amendment to the NZX Participant Rule may have on NZX 
on-market liquidity by analysing all executed on-market and off-market trades for the 
NZX’s 50 largest stocks in terms of market capitalisation. 
In the New Zealand context, the number of litigation releases by the Financial 
Markets Authority (FMA) related to market manipulation is very limited. The first trade-
based manipulation case that came to trial in New Zealand was the Warminger case in 
2017. On 3 March 2017, Mark Warminger (a fund manager at Milford Asset 
Management) was convicted in the High Court of New Zealand for multiple instances of 
manipulation, including marking the close, in the price of listed securities on the NZX.  
The Warminger judgment report provides valuable details and insights related to 
the machinery of NZX surveillance systems and the FMA’s investigation process in the 
New Zealand jurisdiction, which became available to the public for the first time through 
this case. This information enabled academics and market practitioners to study this kind 
of manipulative behaviour by setting out and clarifying the central elements and 
characteristics of this specific form of manipulation in the New Zealand context.  
This thesis investigates the characteristics of closing price manipulation in New 
Zealand in the light of the Warminger case. The Warminger manipulation scenario 
mainly involved trading on-market for a relatively small volume to set the market price 
followed by larger off-market trades in the opposite direction in order to profit from the 
selling of large volumes at the elevated price. It is common for off-market trades to be 
executed at the closing auction price once they are determined and the volume of off-
market trades executed just after market close is much higher than the volume absorbed 
by the closing auction. This means the closing price has the highest impact on setting an 
off-market trade price. Therefore, an off-market trader who wants to trade a large volume 
at the closing auction price might manipulate the thin pre-close auction using relatively 
low volume so that their large-volume off-market order is executed at the manipulated 
closing price just after the close. 
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The key area of concern is the practice of taking smaller positions on one side and 
then executing a large order on the other side (where the small positions have effects such 
as price support or moving the spread to enable the larger trade/crossing). This study 
focuses on plausible trade-based manipulative scenarios in relation to negotiated off-
market trades. To do this, a rule-based index is proposed to measure the possibility and 
breadth of closing-price-manipulation on the NZX. This index is then used to analyse 
trading in the S&P/NZX 50 components stocks over a two-year period from 2015 to 2017 
to measure the possibility and breadth of this kind of manipulation on the NZX. To the 
best of my knowledge, this analysis is the first empirical study of trade-based market 
manipulation on the NZX. 
1.2   Objectives 
The main objective of this thesis is to empirically investigate the impact of closing price 
manipulation on different aspects of market quality in both liquid (U.S.) and 
comparatively illiquid (New Zealand) markets. This study investigated manipulation 
characteristics in terms of how it harms efficiency and integrity of markets and how it 
affects other market participants. It also investigated the overall motivation(s) for 
manipulation.  
Market regulators introduce rules and regulations in order to promote fair and 
efficient markets. This thesis investigated the impact of these rule-changes on both 
aspects of market quality, including the efficiency and integrity of equity markets. 
Based on the prosecuted and reported closing price manipulation cases, this thesis 
has attempted to address the following questions: 
 What are the main characteristics of marking the close manipulation? What 
factors are used by market regulators as indications of manipulative trades? 
 What are the motivations for manipulation? What are the reasons behind 
manipulative trades? 
 When is manipulation most likely to happen?  
 What are the typical characteristics of manipulated stocks? In which stocks 
(firms) is manipulation more likely to happen? 
 How common is marking the close manipulation? What portion of closing prices 
in New Zealand and U.S. exchanges are likely to be manipulated? 
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 What was the impact of market regulation: 
On HFT participation, market efficiency, and market integrity in the U.S. equity 
markets? 
On the NZX level of on-market liquidity and promoting fair and efficient 
markets? 
1.3  Motivation 
There are many motivations for some market participants to manipulate the closing price 
of a stock. For example, Carhart et al. (2002) found that last-minute purchases by some 
fund managers to inflate the prices of their own stocks have caused quarter-end and 
especially year-end prices for mutual fund equities to be abnormally high. The closing 
prices of stocks in a mutual fund are usually used to calculate fund net asset value per 
share (NAV) and manager performance. These determine a fund’s ranking compared 
with other competitors and also determine fund manager remuneration, respectively. 
Some studies have examined the abnormal price movements around executive 
stock option grants and found evidence that CEOs and other executives manipulate the 
company’s stock price prior to their option grant date (Cicero 2009; Balsam et al. 2003). 
Chauvin and Shenoy (2001) described executive stock option grants as an opportunity 
for CEOs to manipulate the market without engaging in insider trading. Another reason 
for closing price manipulation is satisfying exchange listing requirements to either 
facilitate a company’s listing on an exchange or to keep the stock listed on an exchange, 
mostly to get access to more liquidity and improve the companies’ public profiles (Harris 
et al. 2008). 
A company’s major shareholders could manipulate closing prices to benefit 
indirectly from price fluctuations (for example, avoiding margin calls). For example, 
Christopherson and Gregoriou (2004) discuss a closing price manipulation scenario to 
avoid margin calls from a short-seller perspective. They argued that short-sellers might 
want to manipulate the closing price of the stock they shorted if they were wrong in their 
market direction prediction, in order to avoid financial loss. 
It is also important to note that closing price manipulation cases are difficult for 
market regulators to prove in court due to their complex nature (Berle 1938). For 
example, in ramping or pump-and-dump manipulation scenarios, the reason for the 
manipulation is to profit from selling shares at an artificially higher price. However, in 
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closing price manipulation, the profit is usually indirectly linked to the price of the 
security that was manipulated, which makes it difficult to discover the reason behind the 
trades. For example, as described in SEC v. Koch (2014), Koch Asset Management LLC 
(KAM) manipulated the closing prices of the securities held by their clients by 
purchasing shares on end-of-month trading days. KAM’s motivation for manipulation 
was to maintain its reputation as a skilled investment advisory firm and to profit 
financially by increasing the advisory fees paid by clients. Their suspicious trades were 
flagged by the NYSE surveillance team just four days after the manipulation occurred. 
However, it took more than four years for the SEC to investigate and collect all evidence, 
including emails, text messages, and telephone conversations, before commencing with 
the prosecution. 
The finding of this thesis could help market regulators make their operational 
model more efficient, risk-based and intelligence-led. By analysing all closing price 
manipulation cases in the US, this study enables market regulators to identify the level 
of risks of harm to other market participants across various markets characteristics and 
stocks characteristics and identify the areas that need more focus and immediate 
action/response. 
In terms of market structure, empirical studies on the effects of regulation on HFT 
activates are rare and mostly limited to the impact of the Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive (MiFID) in European major exchanges from November 2007 (Chlistalla et al. 
2011). By ending the concentration rule, MiFID fostered more competition between 
exchanges and trading venues by reducing trading fees in new tariff structures for 
investors and provided new services, such as co-location and low-latency execution, to 
contribute more in the Europe integrated financial markets (Chlistalla et al. 2011). 
Furthermore, understanding the impact of HFT on quality of equity markets is still 
in its infancy (Carrion 2013) and empirical evidence that presents the relationship 
between HFTs and market integrity is rare (Aitken et al. 2018). As mentioned earlier, 
market quality has two important aspects: efficiency and integrity. Although some 
studies have been conducted on the impact of dark venues on the efficiency aspects of 
market quality, the impact of dark trading on market integrity and market fairness remain 
rare (Aitken et al. 2018). In this regard, the present study investigated the impact of the 
high level of off-market trading on both aspects of market quality in the New Zealand 
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market. The research also considered the possible impacts of an NZX rule change 
regarding its fee structure and limiting off-market transactions on the NZX liquidity 
level. 
The NZX Participant Rules were issued in 2003 and, while the NZX has changed 
materially since then, the rules have not been meaningfully reviewed. While a large 
portion of the off-market trades on NZX are relatively small, there is no minimum size 
for off-market execution to limit negotiated off-market trading and move those small off-
market trades to the market. Also, the current NZX pricing structure, which has a fixed-
cost fee structure, is more in favour of institutional investors seeking off-market trades 
than retail investors who trade in multiple small trades on-market. Off-market trading is 
generally associated with a lower cost of trading for brokers and institutions compared 
to on-market trading (As an example, see (Gaynor 2016)). 
In April 2018, the NZX sought to address these issues and promote more liquidity 
by releasing a consultation paper related to its NZX Participant Rule and a possible rule 
change to increase on-market trading and limit off-market trades by setting a minimum 
trade size of $50,000 for all off-market crossings (NZX 2018b). These changes in the 
NZX pricing and rule structure are in line with the ASX’s current trading rules and, as 
mentioned in the consultation report, are consistent with global best practice to increase 
market liquidity. 
Based on NZX (2018b), around two-thirds of NZX’s overall dollar volume of 
trading is negotiated off-market trades with almost no pre-trade transparency. Some 
studies have suggested that a high level of off-market trading harms both the efficiency 
and integrity of the market (Comerton-Forde and Putniņš 2015). Although there is no 
official dark market in New Zealand, most institutional investors use the indication of 
interest (IOI) to find their potential trading counterparty and these are usually filled off-
market. 3 The portion of off-market trades in New Zealand is very high compared to other 
countries. For example, only around 30% of overall dollar turnover in 2011 in the U.S. 
and Australian markets are traded through off-exchange venues (O'Hara and Ye 2011; 
Berkman and Comerton‐Forde 2011). This study also investigated some possibly unique 
                                                 
3 IOIs are electronic communications between potential counterparties of a large trade (NZX 2017b). 
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characteristics of the NZX over a 10-year period from 2007 to 2017 compared to major 
exchanges around the world. 
The limited number of prosecuted manipulation cases in New Zealand makes 
empirical studies related to market manipulation in New Zealand very difficult. In March 
2017, the Mark Warminger vs FMA judgment report was published as New Zealand’s 
first trade-based manipulation case to come to trial. One useful aspect of the Warminger 
case is that although the case built by the FMA was based on 10 cause of actions, it 
reveals a pattern of manipulative practices based on the NZX’s unique trading 
characteristics in relation to its high level of off-market transactions.  
The Warminger manipulation scenario mainly involved trading on-market for a 
relatively small volume to set the market price, followed by larger off-market trades in 
the opposite direction in order to profit from selling large volumes at the elevated price. 
A manipulative practice pattern could be defined as a trader who wants to sell (buy) a 
large volume off-market seeking to manipulate the market prices by buying (selling) a 
relatively small volume on-market in order to affect the market price or moving the 
spread to enable the larger trade/crossing at higher (lower) price. This study investigated 
the possibility and breadth of this kind of manipulation pattern/scenario in the NZX by 
analysing trading in the S&P/NZX 50 components stocks over a two-year period from 
2015 to 2017. 
1.4  Contributions  
1.4.1  Marking the Close Characteristics 
One of the main contributions of the present study is to discuss closing price manipulation 
characteristics based on the prosecuted manipulation cases reported by the market 
regulator in the US. Although the reported prosecuted cases might constitute a fraction 
of all manipulations, as claimed by Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2014), the judgment 
reports still provide useful information about some key elements of real-world successful 
(and also unsuccessful) manipulation scenarios. 
It is also noteworthy that although each judgment report provides detailed 
information related to manipulation, it only covers the facts related to isolated instances 
of case subject matter. Therefore, a generalisation of the findings from a relatively small 
number of prosecuted manipulation cases might not make sense. To have a better 
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understanding of the general reasons behind closing price manipulation, a relatively large 
number of litigation releases needs to be analysed. 
As a result, this thesis describes the characteristics of closing price manipulation 
by analysing all reported prosecuted manipulation cases in the U.S. market from 1995 to 
2018. The reason why this study focused on the U.S. markets is that the SEC provides 
the largest number of litigation releases compared to all major market regulators 
worldwide from 1995 onward. To do this, a manually collected dataset was created from 
all prosecuted cases reported by the SEC and then assessed for any similarity and 
repeating patterns of behaviour. Following Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2011a), closing 
price manipulation cases were identified systematically from searches of the litigation 
releases on the SEC website.  
This dataset, with 306 instances of manipulation, provides a unique opportunity to 
experimentally analyse repeating patterns and similar manipulative behaviours of 
manipulation in the real market environment, to describe the characteristic of closing 
price manipulation and discuss possible manipulative scenarios and the prevalence of 
closing price manipulation. 
1.4.2  Impact of Market Regulation on HFT 
As mentioned in Chlistalla et al. (2011), empirical studies on the effects of regulation on 
HFT activates are rare. The present thesis sought to address this gap in the literature by 
analysing the impact of changes in market regulation on HFT participation in the U.S. 
equity markets. Current literature related to the effect of market regulation on HFTs is 
mostly limited to the impact of MiFID regulation in Europe (Chlistalla et al. 2011). 
MiFID regulation facilitated new services such as co-location and low-latency execution 
in the European major exchanges (Chlistalla et al. 2011), which mostly addressed the 
requirements of HFT (Gomber and Haferkorn 2015) and facilitated greater HFT 
participation in the market. 
The present study, by contrast, investigated the impact of the SEC’s naked access 
ban in the U.S. market. The SEC rule change banned direct market agreements, which 
Aitken et al. (2015a) described as one of the HFT’s requirements. Therefore, the present 
thesis studied the impact of a change in market regulation in a way that might harm HFTs 
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by increasing trading latency for all market participants including HFTs in the U.S. 
markets, which makes the current research distinct in the literature. 
By banning direct market access, the SEC asked brokers/dealers to check all the 
orders they received from their clients to ensure they were in compliance with regulatory 
requirements, in order to help prevent erroneous and manipulative orders from being 
routed to the markets. This was the SEC’s first significant rulemaking intended to address 
new market structure issues, such as the “flash crash” of May 2010. These regulatory 
requirements include monitoring manipulation and other illegal activities that are mainly 
designed for the new automated high-speed trading environment (SEC 2010b). 
To infer the impact of the Rule on HFT participation and market quality as my 
response metric of interest, we used a diffusion-regression state-space model proposed 
by Brodersen et al. (2015). This event study method predicted counterfactual market 
responses if there was no intervention, by constructing a Bayesian structural time-series 
model. We also include the FTSE 100 top five constituent stocks as instrumental 
variables (IV) in our control time series. Following Abadie et al. (2010), the method 
combined all control variables as a synthetic control, which is a robust approach in 
constructing counterfactual studies. 
1.4.3  Impact of HFT on Market Quality 
Current understanding of the impact of HFT on quality of equity markets is still in its 
infancy (Carrion 2013) and empirical evidence that presents the relationship between 
HFTs and market integrity is rare (Aitken et al. 2018). Therefore, the present study also 
investigated whether changes in the level of HFT activity affect different aspects of 
market quality, including both the efficiency and integrity of the equity market. The 
present thesis investigated whether changes in the level of HFT activity affect different 
aspects of market quality, including both the efficiency and integrity of the equity market. 
Our research sheds new light on our understanding of the impacts of HFT as one of the 
biggest market participants on the efficiency and integrity of the equity markets. 
As a proxy for market integrity, we used two indices developed by Aitken et al. 
(2018) and Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2011a) as measures for the frequency and 
severity of marking the close manipulation. Suspected manipulation cases are based on 
sudden increases in returns, frequency, and bid-ask spreads before market close and 
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reversion to true prices on the morning of the next trading day. These characteristics for 
manipulated stocks are also in line with the findings of several other researchers (Carhart 
et al. 2002; Hillion and Suominen 2004; Branch and Evans 2011). 
We used structural equation modelling (SEM) to determine the relationship 
between the Rule and changes in HFT participation and market quality. SEM is a 
generalised simultaneous equation model and is often used to determine whether or not 
a certain model is valid, in a confirmatory manner (Anderson and Gerbing 1988). In the 
present study, we extended SEM to find the relationships across variables and how they 
affected each other. One of SEM’s useful tools is its ability to include latent or abstract 
variables. We are especially interested in investigating latent variables (such as market 
efficiency), based on multiple observable measures (such as relative spread, volatility, 
trading volume, and turnover). To do this, we defined latent variables for HFT 
participation, market integrity, and market efficiency, respectively. Similar to three-stage 
least square (3SLS), SEM also handles measurement error bias and takes account of any 
endogeneity problem in latent variables with multiple indicators (Antonakis et al. 2014). 
1.4.4  NZX Market Characteristics 
Compared with major exchanges worldwide, the NZX has some unique characteristics 
that have not been discussed in detail in the literature. A small number of studies have 
investigated some aspects of NZX on-market liquidity (Pinfold and He 2012), price 
discovery in ASX-NZX cross-listed stocks (Frijns et al. 2014), and the NZX continuous 
disclosure regime (Poskitt and Yang 2006). However, to the best of my knowledge, there 
is no direct study of off-market trading in the New Zealand context. More than 60% of 
NZX’s overall dollar volume of trading is in negotiated off-market trades. This is 
significantly higher than other countries like U.S. and Australia, which are approximately 
30% (O'Hara and Ye 2011; Berkman and Comerton‐Forde 2011). In this regard, the 
present study is the first attempt to investigate the impact of such a high level of off-
market trading on both aspects of market quality in any market. 
There has been a long debate, with mixed views, about the NZX’s level of liquidity 
and the consequences of its low level of pre-trade transparency (Potter 1995; Rosborough 
et al. 2015). In this thesis, to investigate the changes in the NZX level liquidity, a time-
weighted relative bid-ask spread was used as the proxy for the NZX liquidity level 
(McInish and Wood 1992). Furthermore, in order to compare stocks with different price 
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levels, the relative bid-ask spread was calculated (i.e. bid-ask spread as a percentage of a 
stock’s price). 
Based on the NZX (2017c), approximately 10% of the overall dollar value of 
trading, including both on- and off-market trades, in NZX was associated with 
algorithmic trading (also referred to as “algo trading”). As only around one-third of the 
total dollar volume of trades are on-market trades and are involved in the price-setting 
process, algorithmic trading is an important and major player in setting/determining 
NZX-listed stocks price. Figure 1.1 shows the portion of on-market and off-market 
trades, along with the algorithmic trading and non-algorithmic trading breakdown in 
2017 based on the findings from Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
 
Figure 1.1: NZX overall trading by dollar volume in 2017 breakdown 
This Figure shows NZX overall trading by dollar volume in 2017 breakdown by price-setting 
and not price-setting based on the findings from Chapter 5 of this thesis. The majority of NZX 
transactions are off-market negotiated trades and are not involved in the price-setting process. 
Despite its importance, there are no direct studies related to the level of algorithmic 
trading and its possible impact on NZX liquidity. This thesis is the first study to 
investigate changes in algorithmic trading activities on the NZX over a 10-year period 
from 2007 till 2017. In order to measure algorithmic trading activity in the market, the 
order-to-trade-ratio (OTR) was used, calculated as the total volume of orders (the number 
of shares) divided by the overall number of executed orders. OTR is widely used as a 
measure for algorithmic trading activities worldwide, especially in European countries 
Off-market trading             
(not price-setting)
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to comply with MiFID II regulatory requirements (Gomber and Haferkorn 2015). 
Changes in average trade size in terms of dollar volume of traded shares and trading 
frequency, which can be correlated with the level of algorithmic trading, were also used 
as indicators of HFT. Higher algorithmic trading activity can lead to smaller trade size 
and higher trading frequency due to algorithmic trading strategies. 
1.4.5  Impact of NZX New Proposed Rule Change on NZX Liquidity 
Apart from a few studies related to the NZX disclosure rules, there are no studies related 
to NZX trading and participant rules. The NZX Participant Rules were issued in 2003 
and have not been meaningfully reviewed in accordance with new developments in 
trading technology (such as algorithmic trading) and strategies (such as negotiated off-
market trading). 
In April 2018, the NZX released a consultation paper related to its Participant Rule 
and potential amendments regarding limiting off-market trading and its trading fee 
structure. The proposed rule change includes setting a minimum trade size for all off-
market crossings similar to ASX’s current trading rules in order to increase market 
liquidity (NZX 2018b). The present thesis is the first study that has sought to investigate 
the potential impact and effectiveness of these amendments in the NZX Participant Rule 
on the NZX on-market liquidity by analysing all executed on-market and off-market 
trades for the NZX 50 largest stocks in terms of market capitalisation. 
1.4.6  Marking the Close Manipulation in the NZX 
There is no published empirical study of market manipulation in New Zealand. March 
2017 saw the publication of the Warminger v FMA judgment report, New Zealand’s first 
manipulation case to go to trial. The report clearly demonstrates what constitutes 
manipulation in the New Zealand context and discusses plausible trade-based 
manipulative scenarios in relation to negotiated off-market trades in New Zealand.  
The judgment report also provides important details related to the machinery of the 
NZX surveillance system and the FMA investigation processes, which became available 
to the public for the first time. An important aspect of the Warninger case, which might 
distinguish it from most of the manipulation cases analysed in this thesis, both in the U.S. 
and New Zealand, is that the case not only discussed the cause of actions in isolation but 
also reveals a pattern of manipulative practices based on the NZX’s unique trading 
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characteristics in relation to its high level of off-market transactions. As a result, the 
insights from the Warminger case enabled academics and market practitioners to study 
this kind of manipulative behaviour for the first time by clarifying the central elements 
and characteristics of this kind of trade-based market manipulation in the New Zealand 
context. 
Based on the Warminger manipulation characteristics, principal rules as the 
manipulation indication factors generated. Then a rule-based index created and applied 
it to analyse S&P/NZX 50 components stocks over a two-year period between 
2015−2017 to measure the possibility and breadth of this type of manipulation in New 
Zealand. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first empirical analysis of market 
manipulation on the NZX. 
1.5   Thesis Structure 
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows: 
 Chapter 2 provides an overview of the literature and the research background.  
 Chapter 3 describes the characteristics of closing price manipulation by analysing 
all reported prosecuted manipulation cases in the U.S. market. To do this, all 
instances of closing price manipulation in the U.S. from 1995 to 2018 were 
collected manually. This dataset provides a unique opportunity to experimentally 
analyse repeating patterns and similar manipulative behaviours related to the key 
elements of closing price manipulation. 
 Chapter 4 analysed the impact of changes in market regulation on HFT 
participation and market quality in the U.S. equity markets. In this chapter, a 
natural experiment was performed to investigate the impact of the SEC’s 2011 
naked-access ban (Rule 15c3-5) on HFT participation, market efficiency, and 
market integrity in the U.S. markets. 
 Chapter 5 focuses on the changes in NZX characteristics and its level of liquidity 
in the past 10 years from 2007 to 2017. The analysis in this chapter will show 
some important, and possibly unique, characteristics of the NZX. It also 
investigates the impact of potential change in the NZX participant rule on the 
NZX level of on-market liquidity and promoting fair and efficient markets. 
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 Chapter 6 investigates plausible closing price manipulation scenarios in relation 
to negotiated off-market trades in New Zealand in the light of Warminger 
manipulation case. A rule-based manipulation index is developed to measure the 
possibility and breadth of this kind of manipulation in the New Zealand context.  
 Finally, Chapter 7 summarise the findings and implications of this study and 







 Background and Related Work 
2.1  Market Manipulation 
Allen and Gale (1992) classified stock price manipulation into three different categories. 
The first of these, action-based manipulation, means that a stock’s value changes as a 
result of manipulative actions such as not bidding in an auction or closing down a firm. 
For example, a listed firm director might short his company’s stock then close the firm 
temporary to dampen the price, then close the short position, take the profit, and reopen 
the company. 
The second type of activity, information-based manipulation, happens when 
someone spread made-up news, information or rumours related to a firm in order to 
manipulate its stock prices. Two types of information-based manipulation are illegal 
insider trading and financial information manipulation4. In the former case, employees 
use material private information in order to make a profit. In the latter case, managers 
distort financial statement information to give a false impression of their firm’s financial 
situation (Öğüt et al. 2009).  
As Nick Kynoch, the FMA’s general counsel, noted, regulators use their powers to 
enforce the law against insider trading as it harms market integrity and erodes investors’ 
confidence (FMA 2017). New Zealand’s first insider trading case was decided on 13 June 
                                                 
4 Insider trading also has a legal conduct aspect which is when listed company directors trade their own 
company shares. All transactions by company insiders in the US must be reported to the SEC; in New 
Zealand they should be reported to the NZX. 
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2017 when Jeffrey Honey pleaded guilty to one charge of insider trading. While 
employed at Eroad (an NZX-listed company), he sent confidential material information 
related to the company’s poor performance in the U.S. to another individual. On 22 
September 2015, Honey sent a text to Hamish Sansom (an Eroad former director) 
including an executive sales summary: “US sales not doing [too well], time to sell up? 
Confidential obviously.” Then Sansom responded: “You’re a bad boy, but thanks” (FMA 
v. Honey 2017). 
The final category, trade-based manipulation, occurs when a market participant 
tries to affect stock prices through trading actions that are misinterpreted as meaningful 
by other market participants. 
2.1.1  Trade-Based Manipulation 
There are mixed views on the circumstances related to the profitability of trade-
based manipulation, and many studies of trade-based manipulation have been related to 
theoretical models of the possibility of profitable trade-based manipulation. Some 
researchers are opposed to the possibility of profitable manipulation by trading on market 
(Hanson and Oprea 2009). For example, based on Fischel and Ross (1991), successful 
manipulation in an efficient market is difficult because manipulation by buying stocks 
pushes the market price up and selling cumulated shares pushes the market price down. 
Therefore, by considering associated trading costs, trade-based manipulation could be 
unprofitable as the manipulator should buy high and then sell at a lower price. 
Jarrow (1992) argued that trade-based manipulation could be profitable in the 
presence of information asymmetry when market participants are unsure whether trades 
are executed by an informed trader or a manipulator. Allen and Gale (1992) stated that 
manipulation could be profitable as a result of information asymmetry as long as other 
market participants consider the manipulator to be an informed trader. It is this pooling 
that allows manipulation to be profitable. 
Aggarwal and Wu (2006) extended the Allen and Gale (1992) model by including 
information-seeking traders (like arbitrageurs). They found that more information 
seekers made manipulation easier and suggested that manipulation causes an increase in 
liquidity, return, and volatility. They also found that both prices and liquidity tend to be 
higher during a manipulation period. Manipulators buy at a relatively low price and sell 
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at a relatively high price when liquidity and volatility are higher. Kim and Sohn (2012) 
suggested that trade-based manipulation is more difficult to detect compared with action-
based and information-based manipulation due to its complex and diverse manipulation 
patterns. Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2011b) studied the effect of closing price 
manipulation in order to investigate possible social harm as a result of manipulation in 
an experimental market. Their study findings suggest that manipulation decreases price 
accuracy and liquidity. 
Theoretical studies of manipulation provide useful insights related to possible and 
profitable manipulation scenarios. However, real markets are too complex to be modelled 
by a single theoretical model due to the differences in trading mechanisms and market 
characteristics in different markets. Therefore, in the present thesis, a practical study was 
conducted by analysing prosecuted cases reported by regulators specifically in the U.S. 
and New Zealand markets. In so doing, this thesis provides insights into the possibility 
and intensity of manipulation in different markets and different stocks in a real-world 
situation. 
2.1.2  Pump and Dump Manipulation 
Pump and dump manipulation is when a manipulator buys stock and pushes the stock 
price to an artificial level with the intention to sell the shares at the inflated price. As 
discussed by Allen and Gale (1992), the key to this method is information asymmetry. In 
this strategy, other market participants are uncertain as to whether the buyer has inside 
information about the company’s future performance or is merely trying to manipulate 
the stock price by misleading them. The pump and dump strategy can be categorised as 
either trade-based or information-based manipulation.  
In trade-based pump and dump, which is also known as ramping, the manipulator 
places multiple buy orders at rising prices, misleading other market participants, 
including technical traders, by giving the appearance that the stock is undervalued. 
Technical traders demand and buy more shares, raising the price further to an artificial 
level. The manipulator then liquidates their holdings, causing the price to collapse 
(Withanawasam et al. 2011). 
In information-based pump and dump, which is more common, manipulators first 
buy some shares of a company, then try to push the price up by promoting false and 
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misleading statements related to that company, then they liquidate their holding at a 
higher price to take a profit. Based on the SEC and the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority (FINRA) joint investor alert (SEC 2013a), manipulators usually use large-scale 
spam emails, social media like Facebook and Twitter, bulletin boards, or boiler rooms to 
promote typically small and illiquid stocks (known as “microcap” companies), for 
example, see (SEC v. Luna 2016). For example in SEC v. ESWW (2002), manipulators 
pushed ESWW’s share price up by about 250%, from $2 to $7 per share, and collected 
around $15 million profit illegally. Figure 2.1 shows the price of ESWW stock around 
the manipulation period. 
   
 
Figure 2.1: The price of ESWW stock around the manipulation period 
This Figure shows ESWW price around the manipulation period (the prices shown on the Figure 
are adjusted and provided by The Financial Times). The manipulators pushed ESWW’s share 
price by about 250%, from $2 to $7 per share, resulting in approximately $15 million profit.  
2.1.3  Closing Price Manipulation  
In SEC terminology, “Marking the close is the practice of attempting to influence the 
closing price of a stock by executing purchase or sell orders at or near the close of the 
market (Kocherhans 1995).” Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2014) claimed that around 
1% of market closing prices in the U.S. and Canadian stock exchanges are manipulated, 
but only a small portion of these cases were prosecuted and reported by the SEC. 
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Marking the close usually refers to a dislocation in the closing price from the true 
price, which is formed by market participants’ supply and demand. This kind of 
manipulation can cause large distortions in stock prices (Ben-David et al. 2013). In most 
cases, manipulated prices last for just minutes before market close. However, because of 
the importance of closing prices and their widespread use, such manipulations have great 
consequences. They affect both price discovery and market liquidity, as two important 
aspects of equity market quality (Comerton-Forde and Putniņš 2011a). 
There are many reasons for manipulating a closing price. For example, Carhart et 
al. (2002) found that quarter-end prices are abnormally high for mutual fund equities 
because some fund managers use last-minute purchases to inflate the prices of their own 
stocks. Closing transaction prices of mutual fund holdings are often used to calculate 
manager performance and NAV per share, which determine a fund’s ranking compared 
with other competitors and also determine fund manager remuneration. There have been 
many prosecuted manipulation cases involving hedge fund managers indicted by the 
SEC; in most of these cases, they bought stocks at month-end (just minutes before market 
close) with the intention to inflate their performance (SEC 2008). It is plausibly argued 
that the main costs of marking the close manipulation for hedge funds include the trading 
costs and the risk of detection and prosecution by market regulators (Ben-David et al. 
2013). 
For example, as described by the Financial Services Authority (FSA)5 in FSA v. 
Goenka (2011), Rameshkumar Goenka, who at the time was one of India's richest 
businessmen (Russell 2011), bought a substantial number of Reliance Global Depository 
Receipts (GDRs), 6  which traded on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) on the 
International Order Book (IOB), during the final seconds of the LSE closing auction with 
the intention of increasing the closing price above a certain level (FSA v. Goenka 2011). 
At the time, he held an OTC structured product with a payout linked to the closing price 
of Reliance GDRs on that day. Goenka’s trades on 18 October 2010 artificially increased 
                                                 
5 Due to the financial crisis of 2007–2008, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) was abolished on 19 
December 2012 by royal assent. Its responsibilities were split between the Financial Conduct Authority 
(FCA), which was established on 1 April 2013, and the Prudential Regulation Authority of the Bank of 
England (Parker 2010). 
6 GDRs are parcels of a company’s shares that are listed separately on international exchanges. 
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the closing price of Reliance GDRs by 1.7%, which enabled Goenka to avoid a more than 
USD 3m loss in his linked structured product. 
Goenka received a penalty of USD 9.6m (£6.1m) for manipulating the closing price 
of Reliance GDRs on 18 October 2010. According to the Financial Times, it was the 
largest fine to an individual for market abuse at the time in the UK (Masters 2011).  
2.1.4  Market Manipulation in New Zealand 
In New Zealand, the NZX is the sole market operator and also a frontline regulator. They 
are responsible for monitoring all trades on NZX markets. As described in the NZX 
Participant Rules (2018c), reflecting genuine supply and demand and supporting accurate 
price discovery are fundamental components of a fair and transparent market.  
Section 265(a) of the Financial Markets Conduct Act (2013) (FMCA) describes 
market manipulation as “the act or omission that will have, or is likely to have, the effect 
of creating, or causing the creation of, a false or misleading appearance with respect to 
the extent of active trading in quoted financial products; or with respect to the supply of, 
demand for, price for trading in, or value of those financial products”. Rule 10.2.1 of the 
NZX Participant Rules has a similar definition for market manipulation and prohibits 
“the placing of an Order for, or dealing in, any Securities quoted on NZX markets either 
as Principal or for clients, which have the effect, or in the opinion of NZX are likely to 
have the effect, of creating a false or misleading appearance of active trading in any 
Securities or with respect to a market for, or price or yield, of any Securities”. 
The NZX Participant Rules and FMCA covers a variety of different types of 
manipulative conducts that can be categorised as follows: 
- Trading with no change in Beneficial Ownership 
NZX Participant Rule 10.14.9 and Section 267 of the FMCA prohibited trades 
with no change in beneficial ownership because this kind of trade could create a 






- Placing orders on both sides of the market 
Placing multiple orders on both buy and sell sides of the orderbook to maintain 
trading at a particular level to take more profit on a larger trade could be 
considered manipulative behaviour.  
For instance, a sell-side trader who wants to trade a large parcel of shares might 
also enter small buy orders on the bid-side of the orderbook to support market 
price and prevent the price falling as a result of their large sell order. 
A similar example is when a trader submits a large “market on Close” order and 
then enters small orders on the opposite side of orderbook with the intention of 
moving the price in favour of their large closing price orders. 
- Number of orders 
This is also known as layering and refers to a trader entering multiple orders at 
different price levels. Layering could be considered manipulative behaviour this 
attempts to create a misleading appearance of the depth of demand for a specific 
security and does not represent genuine supply and demand. An example could 
be a trader entering and amending multiple orders at various price levels on both 
sides of the orderbook but only trading on one side. 
- Placing non-genuine orders 
Also known as spoofing, this refers to when a trader enters many orders to the 
limit order book then withdraws those orders before they can be executed. Placing 
non-genuine orders is a manipulative behaviour as it creates fake supply and/or 
demand. 
- Placing orders around the close 
NZX requires that traders enter their orders during the pre-close session (closing 
auction period) as soon as possible to give enough time for other market 
participants to respond to changes in volume and price in the orderbook. Orders 
that are entered very close to the end of auction time and have an appearance of 




- Trading to affect volume-weighted average price (VWAP) 
Similar to marking the close, if a trader enters orders near the end of the pre-close 
session that have the appearance of affecting the VWAP, these are likely to be 
investigated by the NZX. 
- Trading for volume or unnecessary facilitation 
In New Zealand, it is common for fund managers to leave IOIs with their brokers 
(NZX Participants) rather than trade the market themselves (they probably have 
better things to do than watch for liquidity). Therefore, a broker might take 
different degrees of risk and use their balance sheet to facilitate institutional client 
orders. If an NZX Participant acts as an intermediary and trades between its 
institutional client, trades could be considered manipulative in terms of 
attempting to trade for volume. If an NZX participant receives two matching 
orders at the same price and almost at the same time, based on NZX rules, the 
NZX participant should report a crossing “immediately” as a single transaction 
and the institutional clients should receive their trade confirmation in a few 
seconds or a minute. However, if the NZX participant uses its principal account 
to buy shares from a client then sell them to another client, pocketing a spread, 
this could be considered as a breach of NZX trading rules. 
- Moving the spread 
Entering orders in the order book with the intention of moving the current best 
bid-ask spread for a listed entity to facilitate a trade at an elevated/dumped spread 
could be considered manipulative conduct. 
- Using price discovery to set the price for an off-market transaction 
Placing an order in the orderbook with the intention to set the market price to 
facilitate an off-market execution at a higher or lower desire price could be 
considered manipulative behaviour. It is very common for large off-market trades 
to be conducted at the last executed trade price or within the current bid-ask 
spread. If one of the parties enters some orders into the centralized limit order 
book to influence current market price to benefit from an elevated or dumped 
26 
 
price in the off-market trade, this harms price discovery as the party directly 
brought about the price “discovered”. 
- Index replication orders 
Passively managed funds such as most exchange-traded funds (ETFs) are 
becoming increasingly popular worldwide. Based on the SPIVA7, over the past 5 
years, only 24% of U.S. actively managed funds outperformed the S&P 500 
Index. As highlighted in the NZX participant guidance note (2017b), passive fund 
activities are increasing in popularity on the NZX and their activities have 
resulted in price movements on index rebalancing dates. Also, as passive funds 
usually enter “market-on-close” orders, their trading activities could result in 
upward or downward pressure on the closing price. NZX trading rules require 
that passive funds take extra care to ensure that their trading activities do not 
create a misleading price impact. 
- Abnormal client orders 
Along with NZX Participants Rules and FMCA, there are other rules in place to 
detect and prevent any suspicious manipulative trading activity; these include 
good broking practice for NZX participants. NZX participants should be cautious 
about their clients’ abnormal trading activities (comparing to the previous 
patterns of trading). 
- Trading to correct an error 
NZX participants can request NZX to cancel their trades if they submitted the 
orders as a result of an error, based on NZX Participant Rule 10.15. If the 
executed trade had a market impact by moving the price by 10% or more from 
the last traded price, the error should be reported to the NZX. If an NZX 
participant tries to correct the error and restore the impacted price by placing more 
orders into the market, this could be considered manipulative conduct. 
                                                 
7 SPIVA stands for S&P Indexes Versus Active management and measures the performance of actively 
managed funds against their benchmarks (See us.spindices.com/spiva for more information). 
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2.2  Market Quality, Efficiency, and Integrity 
Based on Fama (1970), in an efficient market, all information relevant to a stock must be 
reflected in its market price at any given time. Many papers in the literature associate 
market quality with market efficiency. For example, Brogaard (2010) used price 
discovery, liquidity, and volatility to describe market quality. Market quality increases 
when bid-ask spreads are tighter, market impact costs are lower, price discovery is faster, 
and there is less intraday price volatility8. Price volatility can be attributed to intraday 
returns and transaction cost, revealed in bid-ask spreads (Baker and Kiymaz 2013). 
Although price efficiency is an essential part of market quality, most papers in the 
literature explore the transaction-cost aspect of efficiency, rather than price discovery 
(Aitken et al. 2012). 
General aspects of market efficiency are low relative bid-ask spread, rapid price 
discovery, low market volatility, and high liquidity (SEC 2014a). Hasbrouck and Saar 
(2013) used volatility as an informal inverse measure for market efficiency. Chordia et 
al. (2008) found that higher liquidity is associated with higher efficiency.  
Aitken and Comerton-Forde (2003) defined liquidity on page 45 as “the ability to 
convert shares into cash (and the converse) at the lowest transaction costs.” They 
discussed measures that were used in the literature, particularly for liquidity, and 
categorised them into either trade-based or order-based measures. Trade-based measures 
(such as overall value of trading, total trading volume, number of executed trades [trading 
frequency], and turnover ratio) are very common because they are easy to calculate and 
are based on publicly available market data. For example, the World Federation of 
Exchanges (WFE) (2016) used turnover measures as proxies for liquidity. However, 
using only trade-based measures might not be suitable, as they are based on the previous 
trades and might not be a good indicator for future trades. 
Order-based measures of liquidity are calculated based on the orderbook data and 
can immediately reveal trading ability and the associated cost (Aitken and Comerton-
                                                 
8 Although lower volatility considered to be associated with higher efficiency, an important consideration 
regarding volatility is that it does not mean zero volatility is ideal. Generally, when the price of a security 
is relatively stable, that stock has low volatility. 
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Forde 2003). Bid-ask spread, which is the difference between the best bid prices and ask 
(offer) prices, accurately shows investors the immediate cost of trading. In order to 
compare liquidity of stocks with different price levels, SEC (2016) used relative spread, 
which is calculated as a percentage of the stock price. 
A comprehensive measure of liquidity should also consider the order depth in each 
price level in the order book to capture the market impact of large traders and the 
associated opportunity cost (Aitken and Comerton-Forde 2003). Similarly, WFE (2016) 
defined a deep market as one where there are many ready buy and sell orders in the order 
book, which limits the impact of a large order on prices.9  
Aitken et al. (2018) named bid-ask spreads and price volatility as traditional 
measures for trading cost and market efficiency. Kyle and Viswanathan (2008) used price 
discovery and liquidity as proxies for market efficiency. Market efficiency usually 
increased when transaction cost is minimised and price discovery is maximised. In other 
words, lower transaction cost and faster information flow reflect into prices and lead to 
a more efficient market. Therefore, measures for trading cost and price discovery might 
be good proxies for market efficiency (Aitken and Harris 2011). 
Furthermore, Aitken et al. (2012) stated that market quality is a broader concept 
than market fairness or integrity. The International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) (2003) named three main objectives for financial market 
regulators to improve market quality: investors’ protection; promoting fair, transparent, 
and efficient markets; and reducing systemic risk. These objectives are closely correlated 
with each other and actually overlap in some aspects. For example, many requirements 
that improve market fairness and efficiency also help protect investors and reduce 
systemic risk. Second, investors should be protected from any fraudulent or manipulative 
practices. For example, relevant information should be available to all investors at the 
same time including access to material information.  
Market fairness is mainly related to investor protection by preventing any 
potentially harmful practices. The market structure should not improperly favour selected 
participants, and all investors should have fair access to both information and prices. 
                                                 
9 In line with depth, other dimensions of liquidity are breadth, resilience, and immediacy. 
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Market efficiency improves if information disseminates in a timely and widespread 
manner, and fully reflects prices. Transparency in equity markets refers to how much 
information about a trade is revealed to all market participants in real time. Systemic risk 
is usually associated with the unexpected financial failure of market intermediaries, when 
regulators could prevent this. Regulators should reduce the failure impacts for other 
market participants and isolate the risk to the failing institution.  
One of the primary objectives of equity market regulation is to protect market 
fairness or integrity.10 However, few studies define fair markets or when markets have 
high levels of integrity (Austin 2016). Without a comprehensive definition, it is difficult 
to assess how regulation was effective in improving market integrity. Austin (2016) 
analysed how securities regulators describe fairness and integrity, and how the terms are 
used in governing. She found that fairness and integrity were used interchangeably and 
divided market fairness and integrity concepts into three fundamental elements. First, 
they should prevent market abuse, in which one trader uses their position to unmerited 
advantage over other market participants. Any form of information-based manipulation 
(such as insider trading) and trade-based manipulation (such as marking the close) are 
market abuse activities. Second, all traders should have non-discriminatory access to the 
marketplace. Third, all traders should have access simultaneously to transparent, accurate 
information related to prices and security issuers. Several studies measure changes in 
market abuse metrics as a measure for regulation effects on the market integrity, but 
Austin (2016) suggested that integrity measures should consider all fairness and integrity 
elements discussed here to capture all aspects of a fair and high-integrity market.  
2.3  Manipulation in Liquid and Illiquid Markets 
O'Hara (2004) defined a liquid market as a market where traders can buy and sell quickly 
with relatively low price impact. Generally, a market is liquid if traders can buy and sell 
instantly without having large price impact and if there are ready sellers and buyers at all 
times (O'Hara 2004).  
                                                 
10  Other fundamental objectives are investor protection, improving market efficiency, and protecting 
markets from systemic risks.  
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There has been much discussion of the relationship between liquidity and stock 
manipulation (Withanawasam et al. 2015). Based on Aggarwal and Wu (2006), 
manipulation is more common in stocks with a low level of liquidity because most of the 
recorded stock manipulation enforcement cases have occurred with illiquid stocks. On 
the other hand, in a more liquid stock, a manipulator may be able to hide his or her 
activities among the trades of other market participants. 
 It is plausible to argue that manipulation in stocks with a high level of liquidity is 
harder because of the high trading volume, low information asymmetry, and high order 
book depth. Very illiquid stocks, on the other hand, are not attractive as the manipulation 
is not profitable enough for manipulators (Comerton-Forde and Putniņš 2014, 2011a; 
Withanawasam et al. 2015). As a result, manipulation is more likely to happen in stocks 
with higher information asymmetry and a medium to relatively low level of liquidity 
(Comerton-Forde and Putniņš 2014). 
2.4  High-Frequency Trading (HFT) 
“Like powerful tools or drugs, high-frequency trading (HFT) is both extraordinarily 
valuable and incredibly dangerous.” (Harris 2013) 
The rise of HFTs attracted attention from market regulators, analysts and journalists, 
particularly when it turned out that by withdrawing liquidity and exacerbating market 
volatility HFTs participated in the 6 May 2010 Flash Crash (Easley et al. 2011; Kirilenko 
et al. 2017). 
On October 2014, the SEC fined Athena Capital Research, an HFT firm, USD 1 
million for manipulating the closing price of many Nasdaq-listed stocks. The company 
used its sophisticated algorithmic trading system for marking the close manipulation by 
executing aggressive rapid-fire buy orders in the last second (even last milliseconds) of 
trading (SEC 2014b). This is the first high-frequency trading manipulation case to come 
to light in the US. 
Despite its importance, the term HFT is not universally or legally defined (Miller 
and Shorter 2016). To overcome this problem, five characteristics that are often attributed 
to HFT firms, based on several definitions proposed in the literature (Gomber and 
Haferkorn 2015; Brogaard 2010; Henrikson 2011; Aldridge 2013) are:  
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1. HFTs use high-speed, sophisticated trading algorithms to create, route, and place 
orders in the market; 
2. HFTs use co-location and high-speed data feeds provided by exchanges to 
minimise trading latency; 
3. HFTs liquidate their established positions in a very short timeframe; 
4. HFTs cancel most of their submitted orders shortly after submission; and 
5. HFTs liquidate all their accumulated shares at the end of the trading day. 
It is not necessary for firms to have all of these characteristics to be classified as 
HFTs, as this inappropriately limits the definition. On the other hand, since trading-
account data to distinguish different types of market participants is not public, using 
general proxies for HFTs based on public, market-wide data might capture not only HFTs 
but also a great deal of algorithmic trading. For example, some institutional investors use 
algorithmic trading to slice large orders into many small ones, and then submit them 
gradually into the market over time, without excessive price impact. Firms using this 
kind of algorithm should not be classified as HFTs, as they liquidate or establish positions 
at much longer horizons than the intraday HFT timeframe. Other common, computer-
assisted, trading tools that are difficult to distinguish from HFT are smart-order routing 
systems with automated functionalities that take advantage of the fragmented U.S. equity 
market structure. 
Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) considered HFTs as a subset of algorithmic trading and 
discussed the distinction between them. They separated algorithmic trading into “agency 
algorithms” and “proprietary algorithms”. Agency algorithms are usually used by 
institutions to minimise the associated trading cost of changes in their investment 
portfolios by switching between providing and taking liquidity, or splitting large orders 
to reduce price impact. HFTs use proprietary algorithms. They have their own capital, 
turn over positions very quickly, trade at very high speeds (in milliseconds or even 
microseconds), and have no overnight inventory.  
HFT is a large subsection of algorithmic trading, but by no means all of them 
(Hagströmer and Nordén 2013). However, it might be difficult to differentiate other types 
of algorithmic trading from HFT without having trading-account data with labelled types 
of market participants. 
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Proprietary firms may use different trading strategies that benefit or harm market 
quality. To clarify the effects of HFT on market quality, this thesis focuses on these 
trading strategies and then asks whether or not any of them are associated with any risk 
for other market participants.  
There are four major short-term trading strategies for proprietary firms: Passive 
market-making, arbitrage, structural, and directional (SEC 2010b). Passive market-
making mainly refers to submitting non-marketable resting orders (e.g. limit orders) and 
providing liquidity at targeted prices. These firms profit from a spread between bids and 
offers, rather than directional price moves. These orders are in the order book and the 
vast majority will be cancelled or modified as a result of changes in market conditions 
(Chlistalla et al. 2011).  
Arbitrage tries to capture imbalances between related products (such as an 
exchange-traded product (ETP) and its relevant underlying stocks) or marketplaces. They 
profit from price convergence, rather than directional price moves. Although the success 
rates for arbitrage strategies are only 51%, they are profitable because they are transacted 
thousands of times in a trading day (Jones 2013). Lewis (2014) fully described HFT’s 
controversial arbitrage strategies. 
Structural strategies aim to take advantage of vulnerabilities in the marketplace or 
particular market participants. For example, a trader who has access to market data and 
trading tools with the lowest latency can make a profit by offering executions at stale 
prices to other market participants (SEC 2010b).  
De la Vega (1688) described price momentum:  
“Merchant: In this chaos of opinions, which one is the most prudent?  
Shareholder: To go in the direction of the waves and not fight against the powerful currents.” 
Directional strategies usually refer to trading based on the anticipation of market 
future movement. Momentum ignition and order anticipation are two aggressive types of 
this strategy that might pose serious risks for market participants. Order anticipation is 
based on looking for large buyers or sellers ahead of whom to trade by assuming to take 
profit from their trading price impact (Harris 2013). Carrion (2013) and Brogaard et al. 
(2014) analysed Nasdaq HFT datasets and found that 50% of HFT activities were 
aggressive orders that were instantly executed against passive resting orders. A 
momentum-ignition strategy involves starting a rapid price movement by placing 
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multiple orders and trades that spoof other traders, and convince them to buy (or sell) 
more aggressively (SEC 2010b). As these strategies are similar to illegal practices, such 
as front-running (SEC 2013e) and spoofing, 11  they are a central focus of market 
regulators. 
Harris (2013) discussed different aspects of directional strategies and possible 
regulatory solutions. He believes that HFT access to low-latency, news feed, and trading 
tools causes information to be reflected in prices more quickly than it does for any other 
market participants. Other traders lose to HFTs, as they cannot modify or cancel their 
limit orders in the order book as quickly as HFTs. Traditionally, traders lose to better-
informed competitors, but now they lose simply because they are not as quick as HFTs. 
A practical solution here is for companies to release price-sensitive announcements when 
markets are closed or inform exchanges, so that trading for that specific stock can be 
halted at approximately that time. Harris (2013) also found that successful order 
anticipation is mostly due to efficient pattern-recognition algorithms, rather than low-
latency trading tools. Therefore, that is not an HFT problem. Finding a regulatory 
solution to protect traders from order anticipators is difficult, as it leads to substantially 
less-transparent markets. However, the best practice to protect large traders and 
institutional investors may be the use of dark pools, as identifying future orders will be 
significantly difficult (Eng et al. 2013). 
This chapter provided an overview of the related literature and the research 
background including market manipulation, market quality, and HFT. Regarding market 
manipulation, different forms of manipulation discussed from both academics and 
regulators perspectives. The following chapter will describe the characteristics of closing 
price manipulation experimentally by analysing repeating patterns and similar 
manipulative behaviours related to the key elements of closing price manipulation in all 
reported prosecuted manipulation cases in the U.S. market from 1995 to 2018. 
  
                                                 
11 Spoofing is illegal, based on Section 747 of the Dodd Frank Act (P.L. 111-203) and the Securities 






 Manipulation Case Studies 
3.1   Introduction 
This chapter describes the characteristics of marking the close manipulation by analysing 
all reported prosecuted closing price manipulation cases in the U.S. market. Although 
some characteristics of closing price manipulation described in the previous chapter were 
based on empirical and theoretical studies in the literature, our current understanding of 
this kind of manipulation is limited as empirical studies that analyse real cases are still 
rare (Putniņš 2012). Empirical studies related to market manipulation are limited as 
prosecuted cases are rare. Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2014) suggested that around 1% 
of the closing price of the stocks traded in the U.S. and Canadian stock exchanges might 
be manipulated, but only a limited number of them lead to a prosecution and reporting 
by market regulators. 
Considering that reported prosecuted cases constitute a fraction of all 
manipulations, the judgment reports can provide beneficial information about key 
elements of successful (and also unsuccessful) manipulation scenarios. This information 
pertains to the following key questions: 
1. Who manipulates the prices? 
2. When do manipulations occur? 
3. What were the motivations behind the manipulation? 
4. What are the characteristics of manipulated stocks? 
It is also important to note that although each judgment report provides detailed 
information related to manipulation, it only covers the facts related to isolated instances 
of case subject matter. Therefore, a generalisation of the findings from a relatively small 
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number of prosecuted manipulation cases might not make sense. Table 3.1 shows the 
very few litigation releases by the FMA related to market manipulation in New Zealand. 
Table 3.1: FMA litigation cases related to market manipulation 









Manipulation tactics including 
2014 – 26* 






Two occasions “wash trades”/ placing 
multiple orders bids and offers without 
completing the trade “layering”/ 
forcing other buyers to bid at higher 
prices in order to trade and affecting 
the market closing price 
2015 – 
33*** 








Dec 2013 - 
Aug 2014 
Warminger’s manipulation involved 
trading small parcels on-market via 
direct market access (DMA), then 
executing a relatively large volume 
off-market in the opposite direction/ 
marking the close  





Eroad Sep 2015 
Honey disclosed confidential material 
information about Eroad’s 
performance in the U.S. and suggested 
that another individual sell Eroad 
shares before the information became 
available to the public 
* This is the first case of market manipulation litigated in New Zealand.  
** He was one of the company’s co-founders. 
*** This is the first trade-based manipulation case that went to trial in New Zealand. 
To have a better understanding of the general reasons behind closing price 
manipulation, a relatively large number of litigation releases should be analysed. Due to 
the limited number of prosecuted cases in New Zealand, a more informative approach is 
to analyse marking the close manipulation cases in the U.S. reported by the SEC. The 
SEC website provides the largest number of litigation releases of all major market 
regulators over the last 20 years.12 
                                                 
12 Major market regulators include: the SEC in the US, the FCA in the UK, the Securities and Exchange 
Surveillance Commission (SESC) in Japan, and the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). 
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The SEC website provides detailed information about all litigation releases dating 
from 28 September 1995, when the website was established. Figure 3.1 shows a 
screenshot of the litigation releases page. 
 





In total, there are 8,568 litigation reports available on the SEC website (as of 30 
June 2018). Figure 3.2 shows the number of yearly litigation reports released by the SEC 
from January 1998 to June 2018. This includes all the judgment reports that were 
prosecuted by the SEC related to different misconducts including market manipulation. 
The SEC oversees listed companies’ periodic filings and disclosure requirements under 
the Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act). The SEC has brought many enforcement 
actions in violation of the Exchange Act and other federal securities laws, such as 
disseminate false or misleading information to the public through the Electronic Data 
Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR)13 filing system. The SEC can prosecute, 
fine, or sanction market participants, including exchanges and self-regulatory 
organisations (SROs)14. Lastly, the SEC protects investors against fraud by providing a 
remedy, bringing civil enforcement, or bringing criminal actions for serious violations of 
federal securities laws. Based on the Exchange Act, investors can also sue any market 




Figure 3.2: Number of litigation reports released by the SEC from Jan 1998 to Jun 2018 
 
                                                 
13 EDGAR is the SEC online filing system. It currently provides free access to more than 21 million filings 
related to US listed companies. 
14 A SRO is an authorized organisation to develop and enforce regulations and polices like the Financial 
























3.2  Market Manipulation Rules and Regulations in the US 
In the US, the SEC’s oversight of the securities industry is based on its statutory powers 
provided by legislation such as the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, and the Investment Company Act of 1940.15 The Exchange Act mainly regulates 
any securities transactions in the U.S. secondary market (like stock exchanges). Section 
10(b) of the Exchange Act is the main piece of legislation against fraud and market 
manipulation and the SEC promulgated under Rule 10b-5 of the Act (SEC 2013b). 
As stated in Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act (the Rule) “It shall be unlawful for 
any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate 
commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To 
employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of 
a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements 
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate 
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security.” 
Rule 10b-5 is the most important provision of the securities laws and one of the 
best-known provisions of American law (Thel 2014). “[I]t is difficult to think of another 
instance in the entire corpus juris 16  in which the interaction of the legislative, 
administrative rulemaking, and judicial processes has produced so much from so little 
(Louis et al. 1961).” Figure 3.3 shows the violation section of a judgment report in 
relation to marking the close transactions. The Court finds that “Respondents willfully 
violated Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, which prohibit 
fraudulent conduct in connection with the purchase or sale of securities” (SEC v. Schultz 
2005). 
                                                 
15 Based on the SEC (2012), the laws that govern the securities industry in the US include: “Securities Act 
of 1933, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Trust Indenture Act of 1939, Investment Company Act of 1940, 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, Public Company Accounting 
Reform and Corporate Responsibility Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley Act), Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank), and Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012”. 




Figure 3.3: Violation section of a judgment report (SEC v. Schultz 2005) 
Related sectioned are highted. 
As the Rule is the SEC’s primary statutory weapon against fraud, most of the 
litigations brought by the SEC were in violation of it. The breadth of the Rule includes a 
variety of deceptive practices, including insider trading, market manipulation, and false 
or misleading statements in listed company security filings or announcements; therefore, 
10b-5 suits are very common. Although, the SEC website provides access to all judgment 
reports from 1995 under the litigation releases section, it does not produce any analysis 
regarding manipulative behaviours. 
To have a better understanding of which forms of manipulation are more common 
in the U.S. markets, as a first step, the content of all of the judgment reports provided by 
the SEC were analysed and all judgments related to market manipulation were identified. 
In the second step, the judgments were categorised into the common manipulation 
scenarios described in the previous chapter. Figure 3.4 shows the most common 
manipulation scenarios based on the number of litigation releases by the SEC. The area 
for each category corresponds approximately to the number of litigation reports released 




Figure 3.4: Prosecuted manipulation cases by the SEC breakdown 
This Figure shows the most common manipulation scenarios based on the number of litigation 
releases by the SEC. The area for each category displays the number of litigation reports released 
related to that manipulation scenario. 
As shown in Figure 3.4, illegal insider trading is by far the most common 
manipulative scenario accounting for half of the judgment reports. In terms of trade-
based manipulation scenarios, matched orders, wash sale, and marking the close are the 
most common types.17 
It is also important to mention that some manipulation cases have more than one 
litigation release based on the number of legal entities involved in the manipulation 
scenario. For example, there are five litigation releases regarding closing price 
manipulation with the Weida Communications Inc. (Weida) share price (SEC v.  
                                                 
17 Most of the litigations related to pump and dump manipulation are information-based. 
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Giordano 2006; SEC v. Esposito 2008; SEC v. Ferrer 2009; SEC v.  Zumwalt 2006; SEC 
v. Holbrook 2008). A capital management company, a hedge fund, and a share broker 
were involved in the manipulation. They pushed Weida share prices from $1.30 to over 
$5 per share to satisfy Nasdaq listing requirements18 and also to facilitate the sale of 
Weida stock in private transactions at inflated prices. 
3.3  The Manually Collected Dataset 
To develop a set of characteristics relating to closing price manipulation, all available 
marking the close manipulation cases reported by the SEC were analysed. To do so, a 
manually collected dataset was created from all prosecuted cases reported by the SEC 
and then assessed for repeating patterns of behaviour.  
As mentioned in the previous section, the SEC website provides access to 8,568 
litigation releases brought by the SEC from 1995 to 2018. This includes a variety of 
misconducts, like enforcement actions related to companies’ disclosure requirements, 
sanctions and fines against any market participants who violate the Exchange Act, and 
bringing civil enforcement or criminal actions against any market participants who 
defraud investors or disseminate false or misleading information to the public. 
Following Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2011a), marking the close manipulation 
cases were identified systematically from searches of the litigation releases on the SEC 
website. The SEC does not categorise the litigation releases. Therefore, to find all closing 
price manipulation cases, in the first step, only judgment reports in violation of Rule 10b-
5 were kept. This included 2,889 litigation cases directly related to market manipulation. 
In the second step, only judgment reports that were related to closing price manipulation 
were kept. Some of the judgment reports are incomplete and some important information 
such as the name of the target stock or manipulation period are omitted. For example, in 
one judgment report, the SEC referred to the manipulation as “by manipulating the share 
prices of three penny stocks” and in another it says “in several times during 2003”. 
Therefore, in the final step, the litigation releases with incomplete information such a 
missing stock name or manipulation period were excluded from the dataset.  
                                                 
18 At the time of the offence, Nasdaq required that the stock should be trade at $5 or more per share during 
a certain period of time to be eligible for listing. 
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The final dataset comprised 306 instances of closing price manipulation obtained 
from 130 litigation releases. As mentioned earlier, some of the litigation releases referred 
to the same instances of manipulation based on the number of individuals/companies 
involved in the manipulation. That is, in many cases multiple people conspire with the 
same objective and overlapping motivations. We find, therefore, that all of the 306 
manipulation instances can be obtained from only 40 independent cases. These 
manipulations were related to trading in 71 independent stocks from major U.S. stock 
exchanges including NYSE, Nasdaq, AMEX19 and also relatively small off-exchange 
trading in over-the-counter (OTC) markets and pink sheets. The full list of 306 
manipulation instances can be found in Appendix A. 
Having a manually collected dataset of 40 independent marking the close cases that 
include 306 instances of manipulation provides a unique opportunity to analyse repeating 
patterns and similar behaviours in the market. The following sections of this chapter 
answer some key questions related to the principles of manipulation as defined in 
litigation released by the SEC. 
Although the judgment reports vary in terms of the number of pages 20  and 
information related to each isolated instance of manipulation, almost all have the same 
structure: summary, respondent (appearance), facts (findings), violation, and order 
(penalties, conclusion). The first page of a judgment report usually includes the relevant 
Act or federal securities law that the SEC invoked in its enforcement action, the litigation 
release date, respondents’ names, and a summary of the case. The respondent or 
appearance section provides detailed information about the individual or company who 
manipulated the closing prices.  
“Facts and finding” is by far the most extensive section of a judgment report and 
mainly covers findings and evidence from the SEC’s investigations. The facts section 
includes not only the manipulation details (stock name, manipulation date and time) but 
also provides important information about how the defendants manipulated the share 
price, the reason behind the manipulation, and how they profited. All of the judgment 
                                                 
19 The AMEX is now known as the “NYSE American” and is the third largest stock exchange in the US 
based on the volume of trading (https://www.nasdaq.com/investing/glossary/a/american-stock-exchange). 
20 For example, SEC v. Urban (2010) is 57 pages while (SEC v. Havill 1998) is 13 pages. 
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reports referred to in this analysis pertain to violation of Rule 10b-5 under Section 10(b) 
of the Exchange Act. Finally, the order section includes the judge’s conclusion about the 
manipulation case and the possible imposed penalties, fines, sanctions, and criminal 
charges. 
A summary of all 40 independent judgment reports related to marking the close 
manipulation cases is provided in Appendix B. The summary covers some key questions 
related to the principles of marking the close manipulation for each isolated instance of 
manipulation related to each case. These questions are:  
1. Who manipulates the prices? 
2. When do manipulations occur? 
3. Why do people manipulate stock prices? 
4. What are the characteristics of manipulated stocks? 
In the next section, the answers for each question for all cases are compared to find 
any repeating patterns in manipulation scenarios. 
3.4  Manipulation Characteristics 
3.4.1  Who Manipulates the Prices? 
Manipulators can be categorised in four ways: fund managers, CEOs and board members, 
major non-board shareholders, and broker-dealers.  
Fund managers were involved in 40% of the cases (16 out of 40). For example, in 
SEC v. Schultz (2005), the fund manager manipulated the closing prices on the last 
trading day of every quarter for the stocks in which they had heavily invested their 
clients’ assets. They did this to improve the fund performance results of their clients’ 
portfolios.  
CEOs and board members were involved in 42% of the cases (17 out of 40). For 
example, the CEO and executive vice president of LNB Bancorp, a Nasdaq-listed 
company, manipulated the closing price of the LNB Bancorp shares on 285 separate days 




A company’s major shareholders were involved in 20% of the cases (8 out of 40). 
For example, George Georgiou, who owned a large portion of the unrestricted stocks of 
three AMEX-listed companies, made around USD30 million in illegal gains (SEC v. 
Georgiou 2009). He manipulated the closing prices during various trading days through 
numerous offshore brokerage accounts. Then he profited from selling shares at inflated 
prices, and he illegally obtained money from overseas brokers by obtaining margin loans. 
Broker-dealers were involved in 40% of the cases (16 out of 40). In most of the 
cases, they helped other market participants by facilitating trades in their favour and they 
profited from commissions and other trading fees. However, in some cases like 
Silverman’s trading in Grandparents.com, Inc., an OTC bulletin board (OTCBB)-listed 
company, the broker-dealer profited not only from commissions but also from his own 
trading in Grandparents stock during the manipulation period in January 2012 (SEC v. 
Silverman 2016). 
Figure 3.5 shows the relationship between major parties involved in closing price 
manipulation cases. In most cases, broker-dealers act as trade facilitators for a 
manipulation orchestrated by a fund manager or a company’s CEO. For example, in SEC 
v. Competitive Technologies (2008), the defendants included six brokers from four 
different brokerage firms, the company’s CEO, and the company itself. The investors 
bought Competitive shares at inflated prices of $20 per share which fell to $3 per share 




Figure 3.5: The 40 cases analysed, categorised by who is involved 
This Figure demonstrates the relationship between major parties involved in the closing price 
manipulation cases. In most cases, broker-dealers act as trade facilitators for a manipulation 
orchestrated by a fund manager or a company’s CEO or major shareholder. 
 
3.4.2  When Do Manipulations Occur? 
In terms of closing price manipulation time and duration, all cases can fit into three 
categories: first, trading days at the end of the month, end of the quarter, and end of the 
year; second, during successive trading days; and third, during various other trading days. 
17.5% of the manipulations happened in the last trading day of the month, quarter, 
or year (7 out of 40). An interesting observation is that all these were in relation to fund 
manager manipulation cases. For example, in SEC v. Wanger (2012), the owner and 
president of Wanger Investment Management, Inc., a registered investment adviser firm, 
Wanger manipulated the closing prices of four thinly traded securities held by the Fund 
on at least 14 occasions at month and quarter ends, to artificially improve the fund’s 
reported monthly and quarterly performance. 
Also, 17.5% of the cases happened during consecutive trading days (7 out of 40). 
In most of these cases, manipulators tried to maintain the company’s share price above 
the minimum required for listing by Nasdaq. For example, Michael Ling manipulated the 
closing price of Cyberdefender Corp. during 90 consecutive trading days to maintain its 
















Patten, president and owner of an investment company and a registered broker-dealer, 
manipulated the closing price of Initio, Inc., which was listed on the Nasdaq Small-Cap 
Market, to $1.00 or more to satisfy Nasdaq listing requirements during a pricing period 
of 10 consecutive trading days (SEC v. Patten 2006). 
Finally, 65% of the manipulation cases happened during various trading days over 
a relatively long period of time. For example, Michael Rivers, a board member of a 
privately controlled bank, made more than 136 trades of First Federal shares just before 
the market close. His trading affected the closing price of First Federal common stock on 
at least 99 days to satisfy or to prevent the margin calls21 he had received on his brokerage 
accounts. Figure 3.6 shows the portion of manipulation cases based on timing and 
duration. 
 
Figure 3.6: Closing price manipulation timing and duration based on the 40 cases 
analysed 
This Figure shows the portion of manipulation cases based on timing and duration. 65% of the 
manipulation cases happened during various trading days over a relatively long period of time. 
17.5% of the manipulations happened in the last trading day of the month, quarter, or year. 17.5% 
of the cases happened during consecutive trading days. 
                                                 
21 Margin calls usually happen when the value of an account falls below the broker’s minimum value 
requirement. Margin calls are usually calculated based on the closing price of the securities in a margin 
account. 













3.4.3  Why Do People Manipulate Stock Prices? 
By analyzing all prosecuted marking the close cases reported by the SEC, manipulative 
trades can be put in the following categories: improving fund performance, avoiding 
margin calls, profiting from positions in derivatives, during takeover and merger pricing 
periods, seasoned issue (or "seasoned equity offering"), satisfying requirements to keep 
a stock’s listing on an exchange, and obtaining financial benefit by selling shares at 
artificially high prices or via undisclosed commissions. 
The reason behind manipulation in 22.5% of the cases was to improve fund 
performance (9 out of 40), see Figure 3.7. Fund managers could profit from higher fund 
performance in different ways such as collecting more management and advisory fees 
they received from clients, and even maintaining their reputation as an experienced 
financial adviser. For example, Koch Asset Management LLC manipulated the closing 
prices of three relatively illiquid community bank shares held in their client portfolios at 
the end of the last trading day of the month from September through December 2009 to 
improve fund performance (SEC v. Koch 2014). By doing so, they maintained their 
reputation as a skilled investment adviser and profited by charging their clients higher 
advisory fees. 
In 20% of the cases, the reasons behind manipulation were to avoid margin calls (8 
out of 40). When a trader buys stocks on margin from a broker, the borrower agrees to 
maintain a minimum maintenance margin value in a margin account as collateral on the 
loan. For example, if a trader buys $100,000 worth of stock on margin with a 50% loan 
from a broker, the trader pays only $50,000 and the broker pays the remaining cost. If 
the market value of that security falls below a certain percentage of the loan, then the 
broker will call for a deposit of additional margin money. The trader should deposit the 
money asked for by the broker into the margin account in a timely manner; otherwise, 
the broker has the right to liquidate the trader’s securities according to the maintenance 
margin rules.  
An illegal way to avoid margin calls is to keep the share price of the stocks in the 
margin account higher than a certain level by manipulating their closing price. For 
example, John Venners manipulated the closing price of KFX, in which he held a large 
number of shares, more than 50 times between April 1997 and June 1998 (SEC v. 
Venners 2000). On 34 occasions, his KFX trades were the last of the day on the AMEX. 
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By manipulating the KFX closing price, he avoided many margin maintenance calls and 
misled his broker by manipulating the value of his margin loan collateral. 
15% (6 out of 40) of the manipulation cases were related to derivatives. For 
example, Edward Brokaw manipulated the closing price of Monogram Biosciences, Inc., 
a Nasdaq-listed company, to coincide with the pricing period of his contingent value 
rights,22 a derivative security whose price was linked to Monogram Biosciences share 
price (SEC v. Brokaw 2013).  
Only 5% of the cases happen during a seasoned issue23 and merger/takeover pricing 
periods (2 out of 40). In some merger or acquisition agreements, a listed company takes 
over another company using a combination of cash and a portion of its own shares. 
Therefore, a higher share price means they are required to pay less cash. For example, 
based on SEC v. Baron (2003), pursuant to a merger, Southern Union Company (SUG) 
acquired another company using cash plus some SUG stock. Based on the merger 
agreement, the SUG share value would be considered as its average closing price between 
19 October and 1 November 1999 (the 10-day pricing period). During the pricing period, 
manipulators made so many purchases that they increased SUG’s average daily trading 
volume from fewer than 19,000 shares per day to more than 70,000. The manipulator’s 
purchases were around 80% of the overall trading activity in SUG shares during the 
pricing period. 
Satisfying the exchanges’ requirements to keep a stock listed on an exchange was 
the reason behind manipulation in 15% of cases (6 out of 40). For example, in SEC v. 
Vigue (2000), the former CEO and CFO of Firstmark Financial Corp. manipulated the 
closing price of the company to satisfy Nasdaq listing requirements. When the 
manipulation collapsed in 1997, the company’s share price declined from around $4 to 
less than $1. 
22.5% of manipulation cases (9 out of 40) were related to obtaining financial 
benefit by selling shares at artificially high prices or linked products. In an interesting 
                                                 
22 Contingent value rights are a specific form of option with predefined events that enable the seller to 
acquire more shares under specific circumstances. 
23 A seasoned issue is when an established listed company issues additional securities, mostly in order to 
raise more money. 
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example, the co-founder of Stan Lee Media, Inc., manipulated the closing price of the 
company’s shares by placing buy orders at or near the market close between 2 October 
2000 and 24 November 2000. Then he sold accumulated shares after the market close to 
avoid public reporting of the sales transactions. When he stopped bidding for more 
shares, the Stan Lee Media share price dropped by 72% in just two days (SEC v. Paul 
2004). Figure 3.7 breaks down the reasons behind closing price manipulations. 
 
Figure 3.7: Motivations for closing price manipulation in 40 cases 
By analysing all prosecuted marking the close cases reported by the SEC, the reason behind 
manipulation can be put in the following six categories: improving fund performance, avoiding 
margin calls, profiting from positions in derivatives, during takeover/merger pricing periods, 
seasoned issue, keeping a stock’s listing on an exchange, and obtaining financial benefit by 
selling shares at artificially high prices or via undisclosed commissions. 
 
3.4.4  What Are the Characteristics of Manipulated Stocks? 
All of the 306 instances of closing price manipulation used in this study related to trading 
in 71 independent stocks. These stocks traded either on major U.S. stock exchanges 
including the NYSE, Nasdaq, and AMEX, or on OTC markets and Pink Sheets. Most 
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these are known as penny stocks24 and microcap stocks.25 As there is no specific listing 
requirement for OTC markets, most small companies traded there and over half of the 
manipulation cases were related to them (36 out of 71). Since there is no requirement for 
filing financial statements or engaging with investors in OTC markets, it is easier for 
manipulators to mislead and deceive investors.26  
25% of manipulations happened in Nasdaq-listed stocks (18 out of 71). As 
discussed in the previous section, the majority of these manipulation cases were to satisfy 
Nasdaq minimum listing requirements. Nasdaq Capital Market27 rules require all listed 
companies to maintain a closing bid price of $1 or more for some consecutive trading 
days (usually 10 days) during a grace period (usually six months). Nasdaq Global Market 
rules are more stringent compared to Nasdaq Capital Market requirements and mandate 
a minimum price of $5 per share over a given period of time for the stocks to be eligible 
for listing. Figure 3.8 shows the Weida share price before and after the manipulation 
period from 2004 to April 2005. Manipulators pushed the Weida share price from $1.30 
to over $5 per share in order to satisfy Nasdaq listing requirements (SEC v.  Giordano 
2006). 
                                                 
24 Based on the SEC definition, “penny stock” refers to companies with shares traded at less than $5 per 
share (SEC 2013d). 
25 Based on the SEC definition, Microcap stock usually refers to companies with market capitalization of 
less than $250 or $300 million (SEC 2013c). 
26 It is also important to mention that in recent years some well-known foreign companies listed on the 
Pink Sheets and OTC Markets, probably to avoid paperwork required by the SEC. Some of these stocks 
are Nestle (Mkt cap: $267b), Siemens (Mkt cap: $118b), Novartis (Mkt cap: $213b), Volkswagen (Mkt 
cap: $80b), and China Construction Bank (Mkt cap: $182b). Mkt cap calculated in July 2017 and reported 
in USD. 




Figure 3.8: Weida share price before and after the manipulation period 
This Figure shows the Weida share price before and after the manipulation period from 2004 to 
April 2005. Manipulators pushed the Weida share price from $1.30 to over $5 per share in order 
to satisfy Nasdaq listing requirements. 
24% of the cases were related to a variety of NYSE- and AMEX-listed stocks (17 
out of 71). Although Nasdaq and OTC listed-stocks were relatively illiquid and small 
companies, NYSE and AMEX listed-stocks include a variety of stocks with different 
characteristics in terms of the level of liquidity and market capitalisation.  
For example, SUG, a natural gas distribution company which traded on the NYSE, 
had a market capitalisation of approximately $1.3 billion in October 1999 when fund 
manager Baron Capital, Inc., manipulated its closing price (SEC v. Baron 2003). The 
SEC ordered the fund manager to pay $2.7 million to settle the alleged closing price 
manipulation. According to a Wall Street Journal article, it was the highest settlement 
paid at the time related to closing price manipulation (Scannell 2003). 
In another case, an employee of ABN Amro (SEC v. ABN Amro Incorporated 
2001), a registered broker-dealer of the Netherlands’ largest bank, and an employee of 
Oechsle (SEC v. Oechsle International Advisors 2001), a registered investment adviser, 
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tried to manipulate the closing price of five stocks concomitant with the fiscal quarter 
ending on 30 June and 30 September 1998. The stocks included Pohang Iron and Steel 
American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) (a South Korean steel-making company), traded 
on the NYSE; Renault (a French automobile manufacturer), traded primarily on the Paris 
Stock Exchange; Volkswagen A.G. (a German automobile manufacturer), traded 
primarily on the Frankfurt Exchange; British Biotech plc., (was a British biotechnology 
company) traded on the London Stock Exchange; and Banca di Roma SpA (an Italian 
bank) traded on the Milan Stock Exchange.  
In the above case, manipulators tried to drive up the Volkswagen share price by 
buying 67,000 shares at the end of the quarter just before the Frankfurt Exchange close. 
As the company share price at the time was about €90, the manipulators bought more 
than €6 million of Volkswagen shares on that day. Despite the manipulators’ large 
purchase, Volkswagen’s closing price declined compared to the previous day’s closing 
price as broad market decline (Hakim 2001). 
In summary, as shown in Figure 3.9, just over three out of four manipulated stocks 
were relatively illiquid and traded in either OTC markets or Nasdaq. A quarter of 
manipulated stocks were more liquid stocks, with larger market capitalisation, traded on 
the NYSE and the AMEX.28 
                                                 
28 Although exchange listings is associated with market cap and liquidity, there are small-cap firms on the 




Figure 3.9: Proportion of manipulated stocks by exchange related to the 71 analysed 
stocks  
As shown in this Figure, just over three out of four manipulated stocks traded in either OTC 
markets or Nasdaq. A quarter of manipulated stocks traded on NYSE and AMEX. 
 
3.5   Discussion 
Analysing more than 300 closing price manipulation instances enabled us to identify 
some repeating patterns of manipulation in the market. 
Some fund managers manipulate the closing price of the stocks they are heavily 
invested in at the end of the month to improve their performance during the reporting 
period. Ben-David et al. (2013) found that this is common in stocks with high institutional 
ownership that exhibit abnormal returns on month-end trading days. They found 
evidence that hedge funds manipulate the price of stocks at the end of the month during 
the final minutes of the trading day to inflate their trading performance. As mentioned 
by Jim Cramer, an ex-hedge fund manager, in an interview with TheStreet.com in 
December 2006 “If I were long, and I wanted to make things a little bit rosy, I would go 
in and [buy] a bunch of stocks and make sure that they were higher…It’s a fun game, and 
it’s a lucrative game…And it is a very quick way to make money. A hedge fund needs to 











CEOs and a company’s executives might manipulate the closing price to profit 
from positions in derivatives like options. Some studies examined the abnormal price 
movements around executive stock option grants and found evidence that CEOs and 
other executives manipulate the company’s stock price prior to their option grant date in 
order to profit (Cicero 2009; Balsam et al. 2003). Chauvin and Shenoy (2001) described 
inside directors’ stock option grants as an opportunity for CEOs to manipulate the market 
without being involved in insider trading. CEOs and company executives were involved 
in some manipulation cases related to seasoned issue and takeover pricing periods. Devos 
et al. (2015) found abnormal stock price fluctuations when the split announcements 
coincided with a CEO’s stock option grant. 
A company’s major shareholders manipulate closing prices mainly to benefit 
indirectly from price fluctuations (such as avoiding margin calls). Christopherson and 
Gregoriou (2004) discussed a closing price manipulation scenario to avoid margin calls 
from a short-seller perspective. They argued that short-sellers might want to manipulate 
the closing price of the stock they shorted if they were wrong in their market direction 
prediction, in order to avoid financial loss. They say this is especially true in bull 
markets29 because they borrowed shares and prices moved against them and they need a 
reserve liquidity cushion.30 
Satisfying Nasdaq listing requirements was the reason behind 15% of manipulation 
cases to either facilitate a company’s listing on Nasdaq or to keep the stock listed on 
Nasdaq. These companies tried to be listed on Nasdaq mostly to get access to more 
liquidity and improve the companies’ public profiles (Harris et al. 2008). 
By far the majority of manipulated stocks were traded on OTC markets (see Figure 
3.9). This finding is in line with recent research (Aggarwal and Wu 2006; Nelson et al. 
2013; Massoud et al. 2016), which found that OTC-listed stocks are frequent targets for 
market manipulation. Based on Cumming et al. (2015), OTC-listed companies cover the 
largest portion of manipulation litigated cases in the US, Canada, and the UK. 
                                                 
29 A bull market is when securities prices are generally rising in the market. The market is tossed up by the 
horns of the bull and clawed down by the bear conversely. 
30 A liquidity cushion usually referred to a reserve of highly liquid assets or cash held by a company or 
individual for unexpected cash demands. 
55 
 
Manipulation can happen either over a period of successive trading days or just on 
a specific date. An interesting observation in different manipulation scenarios is that the 
period is much shorter in larger and more liquid stocks. Generally, highly liquid stocks 
have high levels of trading activity, low information asymmetry, and high-order book 
depth (Cooper et al. 1985; Withanawasam et al. 2013). These characteristics make them 
more difficult to manipulate because other market participants provide liquidity and trade 
against the manipulator, decreasing adverse selection 31  (Aitken et al. 2015a). This 
observation is in line with the literature that says that moving the market price in very 
liquid stocks is difficult for a manipulator (Comerton-Forde and Putniņš 2014, 2011a; 
Withanawasam et al. 2015). 
It is also important to note that marking the close manipulation cases are difficult 
for market regulators to prove in the courts due to their complex nature (Berle 1938). For 
example, in ramping or pump and dump manipulation scenarios, the reason behind 
manipulation is to profit from selling shares held at an artificially higher price. However, 
in closing price manipulation profits may result indirectly from a listed stock share price 
fluctuation. Therefore, finding the reason behind manipulator activity is difficult. As 
described in SEC v. Koch (2014), KAM fund management manipulated the closing prices 
of the securities held by their clients by purchasing shares on end-of-month trading days. 
KAM’s motivation for manipulation was to maintain their reputation as an expert 
financial adviser firm and to profit financially by charging their clients with higher 
advisory fees. Their suspicious trades were flagged by the NYSE surveillance team just 
four days after the manipulation happened. However, it took more than 4 years for the 
SEC to investigate and collect all evidence related to the reason behind the alleged 
manipulative trades, including emails, text messages, and telephone conversations, 
before commencing the prosecution. 
The SEC generally has two main approaches regarding the establishment of the 
purpose behind the manipulative trades: the context of the trading and market data 
analytics. In the first, evidence from letters, emails or telephone communications might 
be used as proof of intention. Below is an example of manipulators’ emails related to 
                                                 
31 Adverse selection occurs when in a transaction one party has information that the counterparty dose not 
have. Adverse selection is a special case of asymmetric information. 
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trading in High Country Bancorp Inc. (HCBC) shares, which were provided to the court 
by the SEC as evidence of the traders’ intentions: “Please put on your calendar to buy 
[High Country] … before the close of the market. … I would like to get a closing price 
in the $20-$25 range, but certainly above $20.” (SEC v. Koch 2014) 
Table 3.2 shows all trades in HCBC shares on 30 September 2009 (it was thinly 
traded). Manipulators’ trades in the final minutes of market trading time pushed the 
HCBC price from $16, the intraday lowest price, to $23.50. In another email between 
manipulators, they mentioned that they will try to push the HCBC closing price on 30 
September 2009 as near as possible to $25 “without appearing manipulative”. 
Table 3.2: All trades in HCBC shares on 30 September 2009 
This Table shows all trades in HCBC shares on 30 September 2009. Manipulators’ trades in the 
final minutes of market trading time pushed the HCBC price from $16, the intraday lowest price, 
to $23.50. 
 
RIC Date Time Price Volume Qualifiers 
HCBC 30-Sep-09 11:29:43  $18 200 Open 
HCBC 30-Sep-09 11:41:39  $16 200 Intraday Low 
HCBC 30-Sep-09 12:03:19  $16 180  
HCBC 30-Sep-09 15:57:27  $20 480  
HCBC 30-Sep-09 15:58:36 $22 400  
HCBC 30-Sep-09 15:59:03  $23.99 120 Intraday High 
HCBC 30-Sep-09 15:59:43  $23.50 400 Close 
 
In the second approach for establishing the purpose of manipulative trades, the SEC 
describes factors used as alerts for market manipulation based on trades and quotes. For 
example, in SEC v. Markusen (2014), the SEC provides a list of factors/characteristics 
that explain closing price manipulation in CyberOptics Corp. (CYBE), a Nasdaq-listed 
company, as follows: 
- They tried to push CYBE’s closing price by placing numerous buy orders 
just seconds before the market close 
- On the days they manipulated the closing price, CYBE closed at a higher 
price compared to the previous and next trading days 
- Their trading set CYBE’s intraday high price 
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- Their trading accounted for more than 75% of the total traded volume in the 
last 15 minutes of the trading day. 
Figure 3.10 shows CYBE’s daily price summary on a daily basis in mid-2010. The 
box highlights the last trading day in May, when the stock price was manipulated 
upwards. The closing price of $10.04 per share on this day is higher than any nearby 
closing prices. 
 
Figure 3.10: CYBE’s daily price summary pre and post manipulation on 28 May 2010 
This Figure shows CYBE’s daily price summary pre- and post-manipulation day on 28 May 
2010, the last trading day of the month. As highlighted, the closing price (Last column) on 28 
May 2010 is higher than the previous and next days. 
 
Figure 3.11 shows all CYBE’s transactions on 28 May 2010. All trades were 
executed in the last half-hour before market close and the majority were executed in the 











Figure 3.11: CYBE’s transactions on 28 May 2010 (manipulation day) 
This Figure shows all CYBE’s transactions on 28 May 2010. All trades were executed in the last 
half-hour before market close at 16:00 and the majority were executed in the last 15 minutes of 
the trading day. 
Using factors similar to those that the SEC used as alerts for market manipulation, 
Aitken et al. (2018) and Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2011a) developed two indices as 
measures for the frequency and severity of marking the close manipulation. The Aitken 
et al. (2018) manipulation index compares the price changes in the last 15 minutes before 
market close for each given day with the distribution of average price changes in the past 
30 trading days. The Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2011a) manipulation index is more 
complex, with suspicious manipulation instances determined based on sudden increases 
in returns, trading frequency, bid-ask spreads before market close, and reversion to true 
prices in the morning of the following trading day. These characteristics for manipulated 
stocks are also in line with several other studies (Carhart et al. 2002; Hillion and 
Suominen 2004; Branch and Evans 2011). 
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3.6  Summary 
This chapter describes the characteristics of closing price manipulation by analysing all 
reported prosecuted manipulation cases in the U.S. market from 1995 to 2018. This is a 
major contribution because to the best of my knowledge, this study is the first that has 
manually collected and analysed all instances of closing price manipulation from the SEC 
back to 1995. This dataset comprised 306 instances of closing price manipulation 
obtained from 130 litigation releases that were related to trading in 71 independent 
stocks. 
This dataset provides a unique opportunity to experimentally analyse repeating 
patterns and similar manipulative behaviours related to the key elements of closing price 
manipulation. 
Fund managers might manipulate the closing price of the stocks at the end of the 
month to improve their performance during the reporting period. Also, CEOs and 
company executives might manipulate the closing price to profit from seasoned issue and 
takeover pricing periods or positions in derivatives like options.  
Satisfying an exchange’s listing requirements and avoiding margin calls were the 
reason behind manipulations in many cases. Most manipulated stocks were illiquid small 
companies. Manipulation could happen either over a period of successive trading days or 
just on a specific date depending upon the intention behind the manipulation. Generally, 
however, the manipulation period is shorter in larger and more liquid stocks than it is in 
smaller, illiquid stocks. 
The SEC’s arguments in judgment reports clearly demonstrate what constitutes 
manipulation. It also reveals the way the SEC investigates suspicious manipulative trades 
and collects evidence. The factors the SEC used as an indication for manipulative 








 HFT and Market Quality: a 
Natural Experiment 
4.1  Introduction 
This chapter analyses the impact of changes in market regulation on HFT participation 
in the U.S. equity markets. This research also investigates whether alterations in the level 
of HFT participation in the markets affect different aspects of market quality, including 
the efficiency and integrity of the equity market. To do so, a natural experiment is 
performed to investigate the impact of the SEC’s 2011 naked access ban on HFT activity, 
market efficiency, and market integrity by comparing two time periods before and after 
Rule 15c3-5 became effective. 
Automated Trading Systems (ATS) in capital markets have changed the 
relationship between broker-dealers and their customers as agents. It has also increased 
the popularity of “sponsored” and “direct” market access arrangements (SEC 2010b). 
These arrangements enable clients to trade electronically in stock markets using their 
broker-dealer’s Market Participant Identifiers (MPID). The SEC estimates that half of 
the total trading volume in the U.S. equity markets in 2010 was traded through sponsored 
access (also referred to as “unfiltered” or “naked” access) without sufficient 
intermediation by broker-dealers (SEC 2010b). Naked access can lead to various 
financial and regulatory compliance risks because of a lack of appropriate and effective 
risk management control of regulatory requirements on broker-dealers.  
Broker-dealers’ customers for these kinds of arrangements range widely, from 
institutions such as hedge funds, mutual funds, banks, or insurance companies, to 
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individuals or other broker-dealers. These arrangements have two different forms: “direct 
market access” and “sponsored access”. With direct market access, a customer’s order 
will be checked by the broker-dealer’s trading systems before submitting the order is 
submitted into the markets. With sponsored access, a customer’s order flows directly into 
the market and bypasses the broker-dealer’s trading system (Poser et al. 2019). Generally, 
no pre-trade supervision or controls apply to “naked” or sponsored orders as they are 
submitted directly to an exchange or ATS. 
These market access arrangements have benefits for certain market participants. 
Electronic access to markets creates new opportunities for broker-dealers and exchanges 
to gain a wider variety of order flow and greater volumes. For customers, the new 
arrangements increase trading speed and reduce latencies. Now high-speed orders can 
execute in less than 1 millisecond. These low-latency orders help customers maintain the 
confidentiality of their sophisticated trading strategies (Goldstein et al. 2014). 
Automated electronic trading has dramatically reduced intermediary costs (SEC 
2010b; Hendershott et al. 2011). HFT technology can reduce the costs and frictions of 
trading and has the potential to make prices more efficient (Hendershott et al. 2011). By 
increasing market liquidity, HFTs reduce price volatility, as they help assets remain 
consistently priced (Chaboud et al. 2014). Menkveld (2016) reviewed the recent HFT 
literature in order to investigate the economic value of HFTs. Based on his study findings, 
HFT economic benefits outweigh its costs regarding its impact on market quality by 
reducing transaction costs for other market participants. 
 Although theoretical studies concerning HFT are emerging in the literature, 
empirical research on the impacts of HFT activity on market quality in equity markets 
have been very limited until recently (Carrion 2013). Specific research examining the 
efficiency aspect of market quality and studies of the impact of HFT on market fairness 
are still scarce (Aitken et al. 2018). 
4.2  Rule 15c3-5 
During 2009 and 2010, the SEC reviewed market structure practices based on new 
developments in trading technology and strategies and proposed new rules, including 
Rule 15c3-5 (the Rule) in November 2010, to address specific vulnerabilities based on 
current market structure. The rise of HFTs attracted attention from market regulators, 
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analysts and journalists, particularly when it turned out that by withdrawing liquidity and 
exacerbating market volatility HFTs participated in the 6 May 2010 Flash Crash (Easley 
et al. 2011; Kirilenko et al. 2017). 
On page 448 of the Securities Exchange Act Of 1934, Rule 15c3-5 requirements 
are defined as follow: “Rule 15c3-5 will require brokers or dealers with access to trading 
securities directly on an exchange or ATS, to establish, document, and maintain a system 
of risk management controls and supervisory procedures that are reasonably designed to 
(1) systematically limit the financial exposure of the broker or dealer that could arise as 
a result of market access, and (2) ensure compliance with all regulatory requirements that 
are applicable in connection with market access” (SEC 2010b). 
The Rule risk management requirements should be reasonably designed for the 
new automated high-speed trading environment in the U.S. markets and have two main 
aspects. First, it requires all brokers and dealers to check the orders they receive from 
their clients to ensure they comply with relevant regulations before executing the orders; 
they are known as “pre-trade requirements”. Second, all brokers and dealers are required 
to review their clients' trades regarding any potential manipulation; they are known as 
“post-trade requirements”. 
The Rule’s extended compliance date was November 30, 2011. The SEC has 
brought numerous litigation releases concerning civil lawsuits in federal court against 
broker-dealers (violating Rule 15c3-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). These 
were directly related to failure to monitor market access customers’ trading based on the 
time of execution, including potential instances of marking the close (for example, (SEC 
2014a; NYSE ARCA INC 2015)). 
4.3  Hypotheses 
Brogaard et al. (2014) found that HFTs improve price discovery by removing pricing 
errors. Hasbrouck and Saar (2013), Brogaard (2012), and Hagströmer and Nordén (2013) 
found that more HFT activity in the market leads to less volatility and they consider 
volatility as an inverse proxy for market efficiency (SEC 2014a). In terms of liquidity, 
Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) found that liquidity is associated with HFT participation, and 
Chordia et al. (2008) state that market efficiency is greater when liquidity increases.  
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Aitken et al. (2018) showed that greater algorithmic trading activity causes lower 
relative effective spreads, which improve trading efficiency by reducing transaction costs 
of trade execution. Their finding is consistent with Hendershott and Moulton (2011), 
Jarnecic and Snape (2010) and Brogaard (2010), who all found that higher HFT activity 
reduces bid-ask spreads. In particular, Jovanovic and Menkveld (2016) found that 
introducing HFT firms into Dutch stocks lead to a 15% drop in effective spreads and a 
23% decline in the costs of adverse selection. Malinova et al. (2013) found that fewer 
HFT activities in Canadian financial markets increased bid-ask spreads. Using datasets 
provided by Nasdaq to study HFT, Hendershott et al. (2011), and Brogaard et al. (2014)  
found that HFTs improve both liquidity and price discovery.  
Aggressive HFT strategies can improve price discovery in short timeframes (SEC 
2014a). Brogaard et al. (2014)  noted similar findings in the Nasdaq market, as aggressive 
HFT strategies trade in the same direction as permanent changes in prices and trade 
against transitory errors in pricing. However, HFT aggressive strategies might impose 
adverse selection costs for other market participants. 
Benos and Sagade (2012) found, however, that aggressive HFT strategies are 
associated with greater noise in prices, compared to non-HFTs in UK markets. Zhang 
(2012) showed that although aggressive HFTs significantly improve price discovery 
during a short period of time (less than 10 seconds), non-HFTs had a higher impact on 
improving price discovery during a longer period of time (more than two minutes). Zhang 
and Riordan (2011), and Brogaard et al. (2014) found evidence that aggressive HFT 
strategies can impose trading costs on other market participants by increasing adverse 
selection costs. Hirschey (2016) and Clark-Joseph (2013) found that some aggressive 
HFT strategies might use momentum-ignition and order-anticipation strategies, which 
increase transaction costs for institutional investors and increase volatility in the market. 
Aggressive trading strategies might significantly increase fragility and volatility in 
the markets. Examples include the May 6, 2010 flash crash, the U.S. market crash on 
Aug. 24, 2015, in which more than 1,000 points of the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
(DJI) vanished in the first five minutes of trading, and extreme volatility in the U.S. 
Treasury markets on Oct. 15, 2014 (Miller and Shorter 2016). As Timothy Massad, the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) Chair, noted, more than 35 similar 
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extreme volatility events, referred to as flash events, happened in the U.S. futures market 
in 2015 (Massad 2015).32 
In order to summarise the above discussions, we first must distinguish between 
short-term (transitory) and long-term (permanent) aspects of price impact. Using the 
Hasbrouck (1991) vector autoregressive framework, Benos and Sagade (2012) discussed 
the relationship between market efficiency and volatility in relation to HFT. They found 
that more HFT activity improves efficiency if the market is volatile, as the HFTs 
incorporate new information about fundamentals. In contrast, if HFT activities move 
prices away from fundamentals, this volatility is interpreted as noise and harms 
efficiency. Benos and Sagade (2012) found that more aggressive HFT strategies improve 
price discovery, but they conclude that the general benefit implications of HFT 
participation in the markets are still unclear. 
In summary, the bulk of the evidence on market efficiency dispels concerns that 
HFTs generally harm market quality as an uneven competitor in equity markets. My first 
hypothesis is that more HFT activities lead to more competitive markets, increase 
liquidity, and improve market efficiency. 
Hypothesis 1: HFT activities and market efficiency are positively related. 
Manipulators usually attempt to dislocate market prices by misleading partially 
informed traders that new price-sensitive information is about to be disclosed which 
prompts them to trade, based on a made-up price trend. Manipulators then liquidate their 
position and take profits before artificially ramped up prices reverse (Aitken et al. 2018).  
HFT activities, especially arbitrage strategies of trading against manipulators, 
increase the cost of manipulation by providing liquidity, minimising their trade impact 
in the market, and significantly decreasing adverse selection. This is consistent with 
Aitken et al. (2015b) that HFTs make market manipulation more difficult, as 
manipulators must liquidate their position at falsely inflated (or deflated) prices faster 
than other market participants (including HFTs). Therefore, I hypothesise that HFT 
                                                 
32 For example, Michael Coscia, owner of a proprietary energy trading firm, was convicted for 12 spoofing 
and commodity fraud charges on 3 Nov 2015 (Barros 2015; CFTC 2013). 
65 
 
activities have a negative impact on the number of suspicious manipulative behaviours 
in the market. 
Hypothesis 2: HFT activities and market integrity are positively correlated 
Aitken et al. (2015a) described DMA as one of the requirements for HFT. 
According to the SEC (2010b), the Rule “could ultimately limit the algorithmic trading 
of some smaller proprietary trading firms and potentially lower overall trading volume. 
To the extent that lowered trading volume leads to lower overall market liquidity, market 
participants may also incur additional costs due to lost trading opportunities and the 
possibility that smaller broker-dealers may not be able to aggregate trade flow and obtain 
favourable tiered pricing.” These conjectures imply the hypothesis that banning DMA 
decreases HFT activities by increasing trading latency and decreasing market liquidity.  
Hypothesis 3: Banning DMA decreases HFT activities 
Finally, as addressed by the SEC (2010b), “Rule 15c3-5 will likely impose market 
costs related to increased latency times, reduced liquidity, and increased trading costs”. 
Lower liquidity and higher trading cost as a consequence of this rule can harm market 
efficiency. For this reason, it is expected that banning DMA will harm market efficiency. 
Hypothesis 4: Banning DMA harms market efficiency 
This hypothesis presents an interesting contradiction. On the one hand, one of the 
fundamental objectives of market regulation is improving market efficiency, so it is a 
rational expectation that SEC rules help make equity markets more efficient and fair. On 
the other hand, as this rule increased latency times, it may actually harm market 
efficiency. A natural experiment will be used to investigate the impact of the Rule on 
HFT activity, market efficiency, and market integrity by comparing market behaviour 
before and after the Rule became effective.  
4.4  Data  
4.4.1  Stocks Sample 
The underlying data was obtained from the Thomson Reuters Tick History (TRTH) 
database, which is an intraday tick-by-tick database maintained by the Securities Industry 
Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA). The rule applies to all broker-dealers with 
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market access, so it affects all stocks trading on U.S. stock exchanges and ATS. One of 
the most important considerations is that the sample dataset gives a representative view 
of the whole U.S. market, such as stocks listed in different U.S. exchanges and a 
diversified sample of stocks with different market capitalisation levels. Therefore, stocks 
were sampled not only from NYSE and Nasdaq, but also from AMEX, NYSE Arca, and 
OTC stocks. Sample data cover trades that executed on exchanges during continuous 
trading hours, except auction time periods from Jan. 2009 to Jun. 2014. Trades and quotes 
before 9:30 am and after 4 pm are also omitted (Carrion 2013). 
This dataset consists of trades and quotes for a randomly selected, stratified sample 
of 150 stocks. Sample stratification is based on market capitalisation, with 50 large-, 
medium- and small-capitalisation stocks if they had characteristics in terms of market 
capitalisation similar to the stocks in the Nasdaq HFT dataset as described by Carrion 
(2013). The fifty large capitalisation stocks have the largest capitalisation levels, such as 
Apple and GE. Medium-capitalised stocks are ranked near the 1,000th largest stocks in 
the Russell 3000. Fifty small-capitalisation stocks are ranked near the 2,000th largest 
stock in the Russell 3000.  
It is plausible that more-liquid stocks (i.e. large-capitalisation stocks) traded more 
widely compared to less liquid stocks (i.e. small-capitalisation stocks) and a counter-
party for trading in a large-capitalised stock can be more easily found (Haslag and 
Ringgenberg 2017). As liquidity is a multi-dimensional concept, we had to choose 
between different measures of liquidity to classify stocks as more- and less-liquid stocks. 
In this study, market capitalisation is used as a proxy for market liquidity because of its 
simplicity and wide usage in the literature.  
For the market capitalisation stratification process, data from November 2011 was 
used. This study then calculated the average daily trading volume for all stocks in the 
sample over November 2011 and omitted the stocks that could not meet the trading 
volume requirements described by Brogaard et al. (2014) for each market-capitalisation 
category. Finally, 50 stocks in each category were chosen randomly as final candidates 
for their respective groups. Market capitalisation was calculated as the number of 
outstanding shares multiplied by the share price for each stock. Trading volume was 
calculated using dollar value traded per stock day.  
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A stratified sample of stocks was created for this study. HFT activity levels were 
determined using indirect measures based on the characteristics of stocks in the Nasdaq 
HFT datasets. This approach is also used by many researches and regulators around the 
world. For example, the ESMA used the same approach for their stocks sample and to 
classify HFT activities in research about HFT activity in EU equity markets (Bouveret et 
al. 2014). Table 4.1 shows more details about market capitalisation and average dollar-
trading volume for each market category in this study over November 2011. 
Table 4.1: Sample stock characteristics 
This Table shows more details about market capitalisation and average dollar-trading volume for 
each market category over November 2011 in the dataset. 
Number of stocks Market Cap ($b)* Trading Volume ($m)**  
Large-cap stocks 50 $73.97 $189.67 
Mid-cap stocks 50 $1.19 $4.85 
Small-cap stocks 50 $0.64 $0.87 
All stocks 150 $25.27 $65.13 
* Equal-weighted averages of market capitalisation 
** Average dollar-trading volume per stock day 
4.4.2  Sample Time Periods  
The before time period was selected as Jan. 1, 2009 to July 13, 2011, and the after time 
period Dec. 1, 2011 to June 13, 2014 (this choice of dates is explained in the following 
paragraphs). In order to remove any probable selection bias that could arise from 
selection of days that are systematically different from other days, such as month-end, 
quarter-end, and especially year-end days, both periods are of the same length for both 
before and after the compliance date periods33.  
The proposal for Rule 15c3-5 was published on January 26, 2010 for public 
comment in the Federal Register. On November 3, 2010, the SEC adopted Rule 15c3-5. 
The initial compliance date was July 14, 2011. During April and May 2011, the Financial 
Information Forum (FIF), the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association 
(SIFMA), and the Wholesale Market Brokers’ Association (WMBA) submitted letters to 
                                                 
33 In unreported results, the same analysis was performed on different sample period ranges of two calendar 
years before the extended compliance date on Nov 30, 2011 (i.e. between Dec 1, 2009 and Nov 29, 2011) 
and a after period of two calendar years after that (i.e. between Dec 1, 2011 and Nov 29, 2013). The results 
were qualitatively unchanged. 
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the SEC and requested that the SEC extend the compliance date for those requirements 
because developing and implementing appropriate controls required by the Rule in this 
area was a complex exercise (SEC 2011). Therefore, the SEC extend the compliance date 
until 30 November 2011 to give broker-dealers more time to comply with the Rule 
requirements. 
The quality of broker-dealers’ implemented risk control systems differed greatly 
depending on their individual surveillance systems. Some broker-dealers have 
monitoring systems based on current SRO rules, while others have no surveillance 
systems and rely simply on promises from their clients – especially sophisticated 
institutions – that they already have appropriate risk management systems, and so they 
do not have any surveillance systems (SEC 2010b). One could argue that, based on the 
quality of broker-dealer risk controls before the compliance date, developing and 
implementing appropriate surveillance controls required by the Rule may vary over time. 
Some broker-dealers with better infrastructure for risk-control systems might apply their 
surveillance system from the initial compliance date of July 14, 2011 and filtered out the 
orders that pose any risk in the market as addressed in the Rule. On the other hand, some 
broker-dealers, such as those who asked the SEC to extend the compliance date, might 
have applied their surveillance system from the extended compliance date on Nov. 30, 
2011. Therefore, between July 14, 2011 and Nov. 30, 2011, some market participants 
still had direct access to the markets. 
I did find some evidence, such as (NYSE ARCA v. Wedbush 2015), that some 
broker-dealers “had no surveillance in place until May 2013 to monitor market access 
customers’ trading based on the time of execution, including for potential instances of 
marking the close.” But overall, it is plausible that from Dec. 1, 2011, most of the 1375 
broker-dealers to which this rule applied had proper risk management controls and 
supervisory procedures. So, I chose my before period to end on July 13, 2011 just before 
the initial compliance date of July 14, 2011 and I chose my after period to begin on Dec 






4.5  Research Design 
4.5.1  Univariate Analysis 
As a proxy for market efficiency, I used daily turnover, price volatility, and relative bid-
ask spread. For HFT participation two indirect measures were combined as proxies for 
HFT activities: Cancel-to-Trade Ratio (CTR) and Order-To-Trade Ratio (OTR). As a 
proxy for market integrity, two indices developed by Aitken et al. (2018) and Comerton-
Forde and Putniņš (2011a) were used as measures for the frequency and severity of 
marking the close manipulation. 
Previous research has used different approaches to measure HFT participation, 
based on one or several HFTs characteristics. This leads to different results in evaluating 
the level of HFT participation in equity markets (Bouveret et al. 2014). The European 
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) categorise approaches to measure HFT 
participation as direct or indirect.  
Direct approaches are usually based on the firm’s main business or the services 
they use to reduce trading latency. These services include fast data feeds, co-location, 
and distance to trading venues. Many direct studies are based on Nasdaq datasets. The 
factors Nasdaq uses are order lifetimes, order-to-trade ratio, and how often the firms clear 
their net holding positions during a trading day (SEC 2014a). Direct approaches only 
pick activities from flagged HFT firms and do not include HFT activity by 
multidisciplinary businesses, such as investment banks or HFT activities traded through 
DMA provided by a broker. 
Indirect approaches are heavily based on publicly available trade patterns, quotes 
data, and known strategies used by HFTs. Jovanovic and Menkveld (2016), and Kirilenko 
and Lo (2013) defined an HFT activity measure, based on two HFT characteristics: A 
high number of trades (frequency), and a neutral position overnight. This measure might 
capture some HFT market-making strategies, but not all of them. Hasbrouck and Saar 
(2009) used another approach, based on order lifetimes before they were cancelled or 
modified. In line with HFT characteristics, ESMA (2014) reported that half of orders 
have less than a 1-second lifetime for HFT-only firms and less than 10 seconds for other 
HFT firms, such as investment banks. In a slightly different approach, Kirilenko et al. 
(2017) and Clark-Joseph (2013) classified firms as HFT if they have a very narrow net 
70 
 
holding during the day, with zero net holding overnight. Thresholds for order lifetimes 
must be set carefully to prevent underestimating or overestimating HFT participation and 
make this approach more practical. For example, Baron et al. (2012) reported that 54.4% 
of double-counted volume is associated with HFTs, but  Kirilenko et al. (2017) estimated 
34.2% for the same time period. 
Academics and market regulators both use the level of order (or message) traffic 
as a proxy for HFT and algorithmic trading participation. For example, Malinova et al. 
(2013), Hendershott et al. (2011), and Hendershott and Riordan (2013) used OTR, based 
on the number of messages per $100 of traded securities. The Federal Financial 
Supervisory Authority (BaFin) in Germany used message traffic to identify HFTs.34 As 
other regulatory examples, the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada 
(IIROC) (2012) and the Australian Securities & Investments Commission (ASIC) 
(2013b) used OTRs, alone and mixed with other indicators,35 as a proxy for HFTs. 
However, using OTR as the only measure for HFT just captures passive HFT strategies, 
such as market making, and misses other strategies such as arbitrage (Malinova et al. 
2013).  
Hagströmer et al. (2014) used HFT datasets provided by Nasdaq-OMX to identify 
HFT firms, based on their market-making or opportunistic strategies. These approaches 
are more useful for determining the contribution level for different HFT business models, 
rather than for identifying the overall level of HFT participation in the marketplace.  
Combining different approaches, such as in Kang and Shin (2012) and ASIC 
(2013a), is a good solution. So, in this study, two indirect measures were combined as 
proxies for HFT activates: OTR and CTR. The SEC uses both measures as a part of its 
market activity report methodology in the Market Information Data Analytics System 
(MIDAS).36  
                                                 
34 The Act on the Prevention of Risks and Abuse in High-frequency Trading (High-frequency Trading Act, 
Hochfrequenzhandelsgesetz) March 23, 2013. 
35 Other metrics include the number of messages posted in less than 40 milliseconds after an event, holding 
time, end-of-day positions, total trade volume, and at-best-order ratio. 
36 MIDAS is a new system implemented by the SEC and combines advanced technologies and empirical 
data to provide a better understanding of US equity markets. 
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CTR for each stock was calculated as the number of cancellations divided by the 
number of trades per day and then averaged through all stocks for each day. To find the 
number of cancelled orders, following (Aitken et al. 2018) and Hasbrouck and Saar 
(2013), ready orders in the order book were aggregated within the same time (in 
milliseconds) and the same direction just before a trade execution. These were matched 
with the number of shares instantaneously traded against orders in the order book before 
the trade. The OTR calculation is straightforward, based on message traffic. It is 
calculated as the sum of traded shares, divided by the sum of the order volumes in the 
order book for each stock, and then averaged through all stocks for each day. 
As a proxy for market integrity, two indices developed by Aitken et al. (2018) and 
Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2011a) were used here as measures for the frequency and 
severity of marking the close manipulation. Suspected manipulation cases are based on 
sudden increases in returns, frequency, and bid-ask spreads before market close and 
reversion to true prices in the morning of the next trading day. These characteristics for 
manipulated stocks are also in line with other researchers (Carhart et al. 2002; Hillion 
and Suominen 2004; Branch and Evans 2011). 
A market integrity measure should be able to address specific changes in the market 
as a result of changes in the market regulatory regime. Therefore I must find how the new 
rule affects market participants, and then pick measures that capture any possible changes 
in the market as a consequence of new rules. By banning DMA, the SEC asked 
brokers/dealers with market access to check all the orders they received from their clients 
by implementing pre-trade risk-management controls and by using thorough supervisory 
procedures to ensure they were in compliance with regulatory requirements to help 
prevent erroneous orders. This was the SEC’s first significant rulemaking to address new 
market structure issues, such as the flash crash in May 2010. To measure the impact of 
the Rule on the market, the number of suspicious marking the close manipulations was 
used as a proxy for abnormal fluctuations in security prices and changes in market 
fairness caused by the Rule. 
Aitken et al. (2018) manipulation index (a-Manip) compares the price changes in 
the last 15 minutes before market close for each given day with the distribution of average 
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𝑡=−31       (4.2), 
in which, ∆𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is the return in the last 15 minutes before close, and ∆𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
is the average 15-minutes-before-close return in the past 30 trading days. A price might 
have been manipulated if ∆𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡  is more than three standard deviations from 
∆𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , as Equation 4.3 shows. 
a-Manip =  {
1,        |∆𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 − ∆𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ |    > 3𝜎𝑖
0,                                                𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 
     (4.3) 
Sometimes changes in price are due to actual supply and demand forces in the 
market rather than manipulation. Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2011a) showed that 
manipulated closing prices usually reverse the next trading day. Therefore, changes in 
closing prices are considered manipulated if they reverse in price by 50% or more on the 
morning of the next trading day. 
Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2011a) used changes in price returns before close 
and return reversed on the morning of the next day, the number of traders before market 
close (as frequency), and relative bid-ask spreads before close, for their model 
parameters. To control the selection bias for stocks or days that systematically differed 
from other stocks or days, they used a two-stage difference-in-differences approach, as 
Blundell and Costa Dias (2000) discussed. In the first stage, they compared calculated 
variables for each stock/day with the median of calculated variables in a specific period 
of time before that day, for the same stock. In the second stage, they compared calculated 
variables for each stock/day to the median of calculated variables for all other stocks 
listed on the same exchange on that specific day. 
To generalise the index to stocks with very volatile prices and to stocks with stable 
prices, the calculated difference-in-differences are standardised by a sign statistics test (a 
non-parametric sign test). Calculated sign statistics for each parameter are then run 
through a logistic regression, as Equation 4.4 shows.  










)⁄  ,   (4.4) 
in which i-Manip is the probability of manipulation of the closing price. 
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For these two market-manipulation indexes, return, return reversal, trading 
frequency (trades per hour) and relative bid-ask spreads, are calculated based on 
Equations 4.5 to 4.8 (Comerton-Forde and Putniņš 2011a).  
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 (%) = ln (
𝑃𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒 
𝑏𝑖𝑑−𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝑀𝑖𝑑15 
) × 100 ,     (4.5) 
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙 (%) = ln (
𝑃𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒 
𝑏𝑖𝑑−𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 




) × 60 ,   (4.7) 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 (%) =  (
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒
𝑏𝑖𝑑−𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝑀𝑖𝑑15
) × 100 ,   (4.8) 
Here 𝑃𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒  is the closing price, 𝑏𝑖𝑑 − 𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝑀𝑖𝑑15  is the bid-ask midpoint 15 
minutes before close, 𝑏𝑖𝑑 − 𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 is the bid-ask midpoint at 11 am the 
next trading day, 𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠 is the number of trades within 15 minutes before close, and 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒  is the best ask price minus best bid price at the close. The number of 
suspicious manipulated closing prices can then be calculated for each stock for each year. 
In other words, i-manip is the average number of suspicious manipulations in a year, per 
stock. 
As a proxy for market efficiency, I used daily turnover, price volatility, and relative 
bid-ask spread. Daily turnover was defined as daily trading volume (number of traded 
shares), divided by the number of outstanding shares averaged on all stocks for each day. 
Volatility is the mean standard deviation of daily returns on a trading day. Following 
McInish and Wood (1992), time-weighted relative bid-ask spreads were calculated as the 
difference between the best bid and best ask prices in the order book and scaled by the 
midpoint price, then weighted by the time they existed. 
A set of control variables were required in this analysis to represent stock-specific 
characteristics. The trade-based measures included the daily average of trading volume, 
trade frequency, daily return, and prices. Volume is the mean, daily traded shares for all 
sampled stocks in millions of dollars. Trades is the mean, daily trading volume divided 
by 10,000 shares. As an order-based measure, order depth used in this study was 
calculated as overall order volume in shares divided by the number of outstanding shares. 
Before is for the period before the initial rule compliance date of July 14, 2011. After is 
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for the period after the extended rule compliance date of Nov. 30, 2011. Figure 4.1 
presents summary statistics for each of these variables and metrics split into two time 
periods, before and after the Rule compliance date. 
 
Figure 4.1: Summary statistics 
Trade-based measures included the daily average of trading volume, trade frequency, daily 
return, and prices. Volume is the mean, daily traded shares for all sampled stocks in millions of 
dollars. Trades is the mean, daily trading volume divided by 10,000 shares. As an order-based 
measure, order depth used in this study was calculated as overall orders volume divided by the 
number of outstanding shares. Before is for the period before the initial rule compliance date of 
July 14, 2011. After is for the period after the extended rule compliance date of Nov. 30, 2011. 
Summary statistics are split into two time periods, before and after the Rule compliance date. 
Following Brogaard (2010), simple averages of each parameter compared before 
and after the Rule compliance date with no controls were tested for significant difference. 
The Welch-Satterthwaite formula was used to compute degrees of freedom and a t-test 
using the Dixon-Massey formula (Dixon and Massey 1969) for significance. The 
statistical significance for difference in mean values for before and after the Rule 
compliance date rejected the equality of means hypothesis for all variables (except for 











For average daily trading volume, average daily trading frequency (number of 
trades), and average daily turnover, the p-value and the confidence interval of 99% 
demonstrated that the mean decreased after the Rule change. Therefore, the test 
confirmed that both daily trading volume and trade frequency decreased after banning 
direct access, while average daily prices increased, mostly due to the market recovery 
after the 2008 financial crisis. On the other hand, both relative bid-ask spread and 
volatility (standard deviation of return) significantly decreased after the Rule. Therefore, 
the Rule seemed to improve market efficiency by reducing trading costs. Although daily 
returns remained almost constant over time, price volatility decreased after the Rule. 
OTR as an inverse measure for algorithmic trading activity in the market, and CTR 
as a direct measure for HFT participation in the market, were negatively correlated for 
HFT participation measures. Therefore, a significant decrease in OTR and a significant 
increase in CTR converged in increasing the HFT activities after the Rule. Finally, it is 
difficult to make any conclusion about the effect of banning direct access on market 
manipulation for i-Manip at this stage. Based on the t-test, there was a statistically 
significant difference between before and after the Rule for i-Manip. Although the 
median remained almost the same, the average number of manipulated prices decreased. 
Therefore, although the probability of manipulation seems to be the same, the intensity 
of manipulation decreased after the Rule. That is, the number of days with a high number 
of suspicious manipulated prices decreased after the Rule. 
4.5.2  Causal Impact Analysis 
To infer the impact of the Rule on HFT participation and market quality as the response 
metric of interest, I used a diffusion-regression, state-space model proposed by Brodersen 
et al. (2015). This event study method predicted counterfactual market responses if there 
was no intervention, by constructing a Bayesian structural time-series model. The FTSE 
100 top five constituent stocks were used as instrumental variables (IVs) in the control 
time series. Following Abadie et al. (2010), the method combined all control variables as 
a synthetic control, which is a robust approach with counterfactual studies. 
A common setup in a causal impact analysis is when a randomised experiment is 
available. For example, as Rubin (1974) discussed, a causal impact of a treatment can be 
inferred as the difference between the observed and unobserved responses that would 
have been found by an alternative treatment. In financial studies, when the response 
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variable is a time series, causal impact of interest can be inferred as the difference of the 
observed time series and the time series that would have been observed if the intervention 
had never occurred (Brodersen et al. 2015).  
Financial-event studies mainly try to identify the presence of event-induced returns 
in a specific time period, usually called an event period (Corrado 2011). The main 
research structure in event studies that measure abnormal returns using deviations from 
market model predictions is almost the same as the method first introduced by Fama et 
al. (1969), but statistical inference from abnormal returns is an innovative research area. 
Schwert (1981) was the first event study to evaluate the impact of regulatory changes in 
capital markets, which is what I am doing here. 
As with all non-experimental, causal inference approaches, reliability of 
conclusions are mostly based on the strength of assumptions. This study needs a control 
time series (predictors) not affected by the intervention (the Rule). The control time series 
should be highly correlated with the response time series, but not affected by the Rule. 
As the Rule applied to all stocks traded in the U.S. markets, a sample of stocks that traded 
outside the U.S. market was used as predictors. There are many studies showing linkages 
among major international stock markets (Ramchand and Susmel 1998); (Hamao et al. 
1990). For example, Eun and Shim (1989) found a substantial interdependency among 
major national stock markets, and Boudoukh and Richardson (1993) discussed the high 
correlation between movement of the U.S. and UK markets.  
Being mindful of control time series requirements, and following Hassan and Naka 
(1996), this study examined the interdependence among U.S. and UK markets by 
comparing the S&P 500 composite index and the FTSE 100 share index from January 
2009 to November 2011. I found co-integrating relationships between the indices, 
particularly in the long-run. Therefore, the FTSE 100 was chosen as one of the control 
time series. The model also required metrics for HFT and market quality, based on trades 
and quotes data. One approach was to use an ETF which tracks the FTSE 100. However, 
this might bias the result because HFT activities in an ETF might not truly represent HFT 
activity in FTSE 100 stocks and the UK market. To handle this bias include the FTSE 
100 top five constituent stocks were also included as a control time series in the predictor 
time series. These five stocks cover more than 26% of the market capitalisation of all 
FTSE 100 stocks. Table 4.2 shows more details about these selected stocks. 
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Table 4.2: FTSE 100 Top Five Constituent Stocks* 





HSBC Hldgs Banks 142,663 7.70 
British American Tobacco Tobacco 96,890 5.23 
Royal Dutch Shell A Oil & Gas Producers 91,090 4.92 
BP Oil & Gas Producers 85,240 4.60 
GlaxoSmithKline Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 78,964 4.26 
Totals  494,847 26.71 
* Data obtained from FTSE Russell Factsheet published on June 30, 2017 
** Stocks category based on The Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) 
In the causal impact analysis, the impact of the Rule on HFT activity and quality 
of U.S. markets was inferred. To do so, each market-quality and HFT-participation metric 
was calculated for the control time series, iShares Core FTSE 100 ETF, and the five 
largest market-capitalisation stocks in the FTSE 100. Then all predictors were combined 
for each variable as a synthetic control, constructed based on the behaviour of both 
response time series (US-market metrics) and predictive time series (UK-market 
metrics), prior to the Rule becoming effective in the US. Finally, using the metric 
variables in the UK market after the Rule compliance date, and the metric variables in 
the U.S. market prior to the Rule becoming effective, the counterfactual posterior 
distribution was computed. The difference between predicted metrics values in the U.S. 
market and observed values after the Rule compliance date produced a semiparametric 
Bayesian posterior distribution for the causal effect (Brodersen et al. 2015). Table 4.3 
shows the detailed results for each of the HFT-activity and market-quality metrics. 
Table 4.3: Causal impact analysis on HFT-activity and market-quality metrics 
This Table shows the detailed results for each of the HFT-activity and market-quality metrics. 
Actual mean is the arithmetic average of the variable after the Rule was introduced. Absolute 











CTR 19.4 14 (2.3) 5.4 (2.3) 37% (16%) 0.01 
Relative Spread 0.07 0.17 (0.04) -0.097 (0.04) -58% (24%) 0.02 
i-Manip 5 7.1 (2.4) -2.1 (2.4) -30% (34%) 0.04 
The findings are very straightforward for CTR as a measure of HFT participation. 
During the after period, the CTR’s average value was 19.4. By contrast, in the absence 
of the Rule, an average CTR of 14 expected. The Rule’s causal effect on the CTR of 5.4 
estimated as the difference between the predicted and the observed response. With a p-
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value of 0.01, the causal effect of the Rule on HFT participation is statistically significant, 
and a 37% relative effect shows a strong positive relationship between them. 
The absolute effect of the Rule was -0.097 for relative bid-ask spread, and the 
relative effect was -58%, which shows that the Rule had a strong negative effect on 
relative spread. The causal effect with the p-value of 0.02 can be considered statistically 
significant.  
The p-value was 0.04 for the i-Manip. The observed average value for the 
manipulation index after banning direct assess was 5, but an average response in the 
absence of the Rule of 7.1 was expected. The absolute effect of the Rule on the 
manipulation index was -2.1, which had a statistically significant negative effect.  
In sum, this study finds that the Rule provided a significant increase in HFT 
participation, and a significant decrease in spreads and the probability of manipulated 
prices. 
4.5.3  Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) Analysis 
In this section, Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) was used to determine the 
relationship between the Rule and changes in HFT participation and market quality. SEM 
is a generalised simultaneous equation model and often used to determine whether or not 
a certain model is valid, in a confirmatory manner (Anderson and Gerbing 1988). This 
study extended SEM to find the relationships across variables and how they affected each 
other. One of SEM’s useful characteristics is its ability to include latent or abstract 
variables. Here I investigated latent variables (such as market efficiency), based on 
multiple observable measures (such as relative spread, volatility, trading volume, and 
turnover). To do this, latent variables are defined for HFT participation, market integrity, 
and market quality, respectively. Being mindful about the endogeneity issue in the latent 
variables, similar to the previous section, the FTSE 100 top five constituent stocks were 
used as instrumental variables. Then, each market-quality and HFT-participation metric 
was calculated for iShares Core FTSE 100 ETF and the five largest market-capitalisation 
stocks in the FTSE 100. Like three-stage least square (3SLS), SEM also handles 
measurement error bias and addresses any endogeneity problem in latent variables with 
many indicators (Antonakis et al. 2014). 
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For HFT participation, both cancel-to-trade ratio and trade-to-order volume were 
used as the observed measures. For market efficiency, relative bid-ask spread was 
included as a measure of trading cost and standard deviation of return was included as a 
measure of market volatility. I also included daily returns, turnover, trading volume, and 
number of trades. For market integrity, the manipulation indices constructed by 
Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2011a) (i-manip) and Aitken et al. (2015a) (a-manip) were 
used. 
The SEM model implementation is as follows: first the observed relationship 
between variables is modelled based on the covariance matrix of the model inputs. Then 
the number of observations and formal model specification are supplied to the model. 
Finally, SEM tried to reproduce the covariance matrix by estimating parameters in the 
best possible way. Therefore, a better-fitting model means there is a better reproduction 
of the covariance matrix and a lower chi-squared statistic.  
Figure 4.2 shows the correlations for the observed variables. Rule is a dummy 
variable, which is 0 before the Rule compliance date and 1 afterwards. Spread, sd_return, 
return, turnover, vol, and frequency are observed variables for market-efficiency proxies. 
i-Manip and a-Manip are Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2011a) and Aitken et al. (2015a) 
manipulation indices, respectively. CTR and OTR are HFT activity measures. The 
covariance of the observed variables shows strong correlation between some of them. 
Turnover, volume, and frequency are positively correlated, as all are trade-based metrics 
for market liquidity. Spread and sd_return are positively correlated, which means lower 
cost of trading associated with lower volatility. i-Manip and a-Manip are positively 
correlated, as both basically share many of their primary components. CTR and OTR are 
negatively correlated because CTR is a direct measure for HFT activities, but OTR is an 
inverse measure for algorithmic trading. There is no meaningful correlation between 
return and other variables. Finally, the Rule is negatively correlated with efficiency 




Figure 4.2: The correlations for the observed variables 
This Figure shows the correlations for the observed variables between 1 (blue), strong positive 
correlation, and -1 (red), strong negative correlation. Rule is a dummy variable, which is 0 before 
the Rule compliance date and 1 afterwards. Spread, sd_return, return, turnover, vol, and 
frequency are observed variables for market-efficiency proxies. i-Manip and a-Manip are 
Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2011a), and Aitken et al. (2015a) manipulation indices, 
respectively. CTR and OTR are HFT activity measures. 
 
SEM usually requires a relatively large sample size. We should be careful about 
sample size when using chi-square for evaluating overall model fit because small samples 
reduce chi-square’s statistic power to differentiate model quality (Kenny and McCoach 
2003). On the other hand, as chi-square is a statistical significance test, using very large 
samples might reject the model (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1993). This model hypothesised 
that three latent variables (efficiency, integrity, and HFT participation) capture the 
covariance between the 10 behavioural variables described earlier. Every factor loading 
for the model was freely estimated.  
Evaluation of hypothesised models, based on observed relationships in SEM, 
usually uses goodness-of-fit chi-square statistics (Bryant and Satorra 2012). This SEM 
model was fitted using maximum likelihood (ML) estimation with robust standard errors. 













accepted overall model fit assessment test in the SEM literature (Bryant and Satorra 
2012). Our model fits the data well, with 𝑥2 = 55.345, degrees of freedom (df) = 25, p = 
0.042, root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = 0.048, comparative fit index 
(CFI) = 0.991, standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) = 0.031, and Satorra-
Bentler scaled chi-square = 1.014.37 
To examine the impact of the Rule on HFT participation and market quality, the 
latent variables were estimated based on the related observable measures. Then the 
covariance between latent variables was calculated (usually termed the factor 
correlation). Finally, the factor loading was estimated for the impact of the Rule on HFT 
participation, integrity, and efficiency latent variables. Figure 4.3 shows the estimated 
values for covariance and coefficients of the fitted SEM model. 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Graphical representation of estimated SEM model (path diagram) 
Significant parameters are shown in solid lines (p-value <0.05). Observed variables represented 
in the path diagram by rectangular boxes. Latent variables are represented by the elliptical shapes. 
One-headed arrows represent regression relationships. Curves with arrow-heads on both sides 
represent correlational relations. The paths loadings represent correlation and regression 
coefficients. 
                                                 
37 For judging good fit, RMSEA of about 0.05 or less (acceptable: 0.05-0.08), the CFI of about 0.97 or 
higher (acceptable: 0.95-0.97) and SRMR of about 0.05 or less (acceptable: 0.05-0.10) would indicate a 





Interestingly, the Rule’s effect on HFT participation was positive and significant. 
Although the Rule requirements for monitoring and supervisory procedures increased 
trading latency, the Rule also positively affected both the efficiency and integrity latent 
variables. As the SEC anticipated, risk-management controls required by the Rule 
resulted in overall improved efficiency and fairness in the U.S. markets.  
SEM setup also gave us the opportunity to study the direct correlation between 
latent variables. HFT participation is highly correlated with market efficiency. This study 
finding is in line with Brogaard et al. (2014), and Hagströmer and Nordén (2013) who 
found that HFTs improve price discovery and reduce volatility in the market. On the 
other hand, more market efficiency increases HFT participation as HFTs are more 
aggressive when the spreads are narrow (Carrion 2013).  
HFT participation is positively correlated with market integrity. Higher HFT 
participation increases market integrity and vice versa. This thesis findings are in line 
with Aitken et al. (2015b) who found that HFTs make market manipulation more 
difficult, as manipulators must liquidate their position at falsely inflated (or deflated) 
prices faster than other market participants (including HFTs). Finally, market integrity is 
positively correlated with market efficiency. Higher integrity leads to more efficient 
markets and vice versa. These results are similar to Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2011a) 
finding that price manipulation, pricing accuracy, and market liquidity as two 
fundamental aspects of market quality. 
4.6  Discussion 
This study suggest that HFT activities increased over time, and that Rule 15c3-5 
increased HFT participation in U.S. markets. Over and above that trend, this increase in 
HFT participation was associated with lower trading cost and market volatility as two 
important aspects of market efficiency. Interestingly, although lower trading cost and 
market volatility reflected more efficient markets, trade-based measures for liquidity 
became worse. The reason behind the difference between trade-based and order-based 
measures of market liquidity might lie in HFTs’ sophisticated trading strategies. As a 
part of their trading strategies, HFTs submit many non-marketable resting orders, the vast 




This finding is in line with Jovanovic and Menkveld (2016) that HFT activities lead 
to narrower bid-ask spreads, as they intermediate trades at lower cost. On the other hand, 
Jones (2013) found that, although HFT arbitrage strategies could earn only a small profit 
per trade, they are profitable because they trade hundreds or thousands of times per 
trading day. Therefore, more HFT arbitrage strategies should cause an increase in trading 
frequency. However, this study could not find similar evidence. One explanation may be 
because HFT firms mostly use other trading strategies (other than arbitrage), and 
arbitrage does not have a significant impact on overall trading frequency in the U.S. 
market.  
As a proxy for market integrity, the estimated number of suspiciously manipulated 
prices were compared for each stock, before and after the Rule compliance date. The 
results showed that the average number of manipulations decreased after the Rule 
compliance date, while the median remains almost the same. This indicates that the Rule 
improved market integrity by decreasing the intensity of price manipulation.  This means 
the number of days with a high number of manipulated prices decreased after the Rule. 
More HFT participation in the market makes manipulation more difficult by providing 
liquidity and trading against the manipulator and decreasing the adverse selection. These 
findings are in line with Aitken et al. (2015a), who found that HFT activities significantly 
reduced both frequency and severity of market manipulation. 
Surprisingly, banning DMA did not decrease HFT activities in the market. This 
study findings are contrary to the potential harmful conjectures addressed by the SEC 
(2010b). The Rule had no negative effect on HFT participation, perhaps because it 
increased latency for all market participants. HFTs still had the advantage in routing and 
placing the orders much faster than their competitors. Furthermore, most large HFT firms 
are also broker-dealers and can route their orders and trades through required surveillance 
systems very quickly.38 
 
 
                                                 
38 Holzer and Peterson (2010) stated that the rule might have no negative impact on large HFT firms, as 
they are also broker-dealers and have their own DMAs. 
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4.7  Conclusion 
This study sought to investigate the impact of SEC Rule 15c3-5 (which bans naked access 
in the U.S. markets) on HFT participation, market efficiency, and market integrity. To 
do so, an event study natural experiment was designed. This study’s findings suggest that 
the Rule’s effect on HFT participation was positive and significant. This research also 
found evidence that the improvement of both efficiency and integrity in the U.S. markets 
after the Rule compliance date was associated with increased HFT participation in the 
market. As the SEC anticipated, risk-management controls required by the Rule resulted 
in overall improved efficiency and fairness in the U.S. financial markets. 
In order to examine the impact of the Rule on HFT activity, cancel-to-trade ratio 
and trade-to-order volume were used as proxies for HFT activities. As a proxy for market 
integrity, the estimated number of manipulated prices were compared for each stock 
before and after the Rule compliance date. As a proxy for market efficiency, a 
combination of trade-based and order-based measures were used for price discovery, 
market volatility, and market liquidity (such as daily turnover, trading volume, daily 
trading frequency, daily return, relative bid-ask spread, and price volatility). 
This research sheds new light on the current understanding of HFT as one of the 
largest market participants in the U.S. equity market. This study’s findings suggest that 
between 2011 and 2014, higher HFT participation in the U.S. markets was associated 








 NZX Trading Characteristics 
5.1  Introduction 
In March 2017, Mark Warminger (a Fund manager at Milford Asset Management) was 
convicted in the High Court of New Zealand for manipulating the price of FPH and ATM 
shares traded on the NZX. The Warminger case was the first trade-based manipulation 
case that came to trial in New Zealand. This chapter and chapter 6 of this thesis focus on 
the characteristics of closing price manipulation in New Zealand in light of the 
Warminger case. This case reveals important information about possible manipulative 
scenarios in the New Zealand context. However, considering the technical details of the 
Warminger case, it is necessary to discuss some possibly unique characteristics of the 
NZX. Therefore, this chapter will focus on NZX trading characteristics compared to 
major exchanges around the world. For example, based on the NZX company research 
website, around two-thirds of all NZX trades are negotiated dark pool (i.e. off-market) 
trades with almost no pre-trade transparency. This chapter investigates changes in off-
market trading on the NZX over a 10-year period from 2007 till 2017. 
Some studies have suggested that a high level of off-market trading could harm 
both the efficiency and integrity of the market (Comerton-Forde and Putniņš 2015). To 
address this issue and promote more liquidity, in April 2018 the NZX released a 
consultation paper related to its NZX Participant Rules and a possible rule changing to 
increase on-market trading and limit off-market trades by setting a minimum trade size 
of $50,000 for all off-market crossings (NZX 2018b). This chapter also investigates the 
impact of this potential amendment in the NZX Participant Rules on the NZX on-market 
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liquidity by analysing all executed on-market and off-market trades for the NZX 50 
largest stocks in terms of market capitalisation. 
There has been a long debate (Potter 1995; Rosborough et al. 2015), with mixed 
views, about the NZX’s level of liquidity and the consequences of this due to the 
exchange’s unique characteristics. By traditional measures, the NZX’s liquidity has 
improved in recent years, but New Zealand’s market capitalisation per GDP is still 
relatively low compared to other OECD countries (NZX 2018b). 
Another important issue, which was a major concern for both market participants 
and regulators in New Zealand, is the level of NZX pre-trade transparency. In the NZX, 
direct participation by retail investors is very low and the majority of trades have been 
executed by international or domestic institutional investors. Also, more than 50% of the 
large NZX-listed companies are owned by the New Zealand Government or other 
controlling shareholders. This is a major concern as the majority of institutional traders 
prefer to trade manually through private transactions outside of the formal stock 
exchange (that is, off-market). These negotiated off-market trades are conducted outside 
of the NZX electronic limit-order book with no pre-trade transparency. 
It is generally accepted that small share markets are also fairly illiquid (Chordia et 
al. 2000). However, as mentioned by NZX (2018b), another fact that contributes to the 
NZX’s low liquidity is that the majority of trades in terms of dollar volume are negotiated 
off-market trades. The NZX company research website statistics show that around 60% 
of NZX trading is done off-market, which is high compared with most other markets. As 
the off-market trades are generally conducted at or within the bid-ask spread, on-market 
trades determine the price level and spread (that is, price discovery). Therefore, if the on-
market trade becomes too thin, price discovery cannot be trusted and on-market prices 
may be open to manipulation.  
5.2  Capital Markets 
Capital markets allow the buying and selling of securities like bonds and stocks. Capital 
markets can be either public or private in terms of issuance, both of which operate in 
New Zealand. Public markets are facilitated by a stock exchange and are available to all 
participants, who can buy or sell shares of listed companies. Private market activities, 
however, are usually facilitated by individual institutions or brokers and have lower 
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reporting requirements than public markets. As they are not subject to regular earnings 
disclose or financial statement audit reports, information about private companies are 
less visible to the public than listed companies. 
Another dimension of capital markets is primary and secondary markets. In capital 
markets, initial issuance happens on primary markets, like initial public offerings (IPO), 
which are allocated and sold by a bank or broker. After initial issuance, investors can 
trade on a secondary market like a stock exchange. Investors in capital markets can be 
institutional (wholesale) investors or retail investors. In New Zealand, institutional 
investors transactions are usually higher than $750,000. On the other hand, for retail 
investors, like mums and dads, transactions are often relatively small.  
Capital markets play a vital role in sourcing funds. Some researchers have 
suggested that more liquid and deeper financial markets go hand-in-hand with economic 
growth (Laeven 2014; Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 2008; Wurgler 2000). Also, market 
capitalisation relative to GDP is often used as a proxy for stock market development. The 
literature suggests that financial system development and long-term economic growth are 
positively related (Levine and Zervos 1996). An underdeveloped capital market can 
affect economic growth fundamental functions, including resource allocation and risk 
management (RBNZ 2014; Capital Markets Development Taskforce 2009).39 
5.2.1  Concentrated v Fragmented Capital Markets 
In terms of their structure, financial markets can be either concentrated or fragmented. In 
a concentrated market, almost all trading activities are conducted in one trading centre. 
The Milwaukee Grain Exchange trading pit ,which first was introduced in the 1870s, was 
an example of concentrated market. On the other hand, in a fragmented market, traders 
can enter their orders through multiple trading venues. For example, stocks listed in the 
U.S. markets currently trade in 12 national stock exchanges, 44 ATSs and various over-
the-counter (OTC) systems (OECD 2016). In a fragmented market, trading venues 
compete with each other to receive higher order flow. Each of these market structures 
has its own pros and cons. Concentrated markets are generally able to provide more 
                                                 
39 Economic growth can also affect financial market development, which means that long-run economic 
growth can cause deep and liquid capital markets and vice-versa. 
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liquidity and greater transparency than fragmented markets, but they can also lead to 
monopolies and higher trading costs for investors and traders. In a fragmented market, in 
contrast, more alternatives for order flow could lead to lower trading costs for investors 
and traders, but decentralisation could also lead to less liquidity and less price 
transparency. These fragmented venues include stock markets, ATS, electronic 
communications networks (ECN), and dark pools. Based on O'Hara and Ye (2011), 
approximately 30% of all equity volume in U.S. markets is traded through off-exchange 
venues. Although there is no official dark market in New Zealand, most institutional 
investors use the IOI to find their trading potential counterparty and these are usually 
filled off-market. Figure 5.1 shows a screenshot of the Thomson Reuters Autex IOI and 
trade advertisements. 
 
Figure 5.1: A screenshot of the Thomson Reuters Autex IOI and trade advertisements 
(image provided by Thomson Reuters) 
Hatheway et al. (2017) investigated the impact of dark venues on quality of equity 
markets. Their findings suggest that dark trading could improve market quality only by 
executing large trades. However, regarding small trades execution, dark pools harm 
market quality as traders are less informed in the dark markets compared with the lit 
markets. This finding is in line with Madhavan (2012), who found that more market 
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fragmentation could lead to transitory volatility40 as it can thin out the limit order book 
and prices could be affected by order imbalances.  
5.2.2  New Zealand Market Capitalisation 
New Zealand has a relatively low market capitalisation, as measured against GDP (at 
43%), compared to OECD countries, as shown in Figure 5.2. Market capitalisation 
represents the total value of all the companies’ outstanding equity in 2016 and is simply 
calculated as the current share price multiplied by the number of outstanding shares for 
each listed company. Listed domestic companies includes only domestic incorporated 
companies listed on the national stock exchange at year-end. Investment companies or 
mutual funds are not included in the listed domestic companies. 
 
Figure 5.2: OECD market cap of listed domestic companies in 2016 (% of GDP) 
New Zealand has a relatively low market capitalisation, as measured against GDP (at 43%), 
compared to other OECD countries. (Data from World Bank) 
Figure 5.3 shows the historical market capitalisation of listed domestic companies 
(as a percentage of GDP) for New Zealand, Australia and the United States from 1985 
onward. In the early 1990s, New Zealand and Australia had almost the same level of 
stock market capitalisation, at around 40% of GDP. At the same time, the U.S. stock 
market capitalisation was 70% of GDP. However, Australian and U.S. relative 
                                                 




capitalisation surged from the second half of the 1990s onwards, while New Zealand 
market capitalisation per GDP shrank. 
 
Figure 5.3: New Zealand, Australia, and the United States market cap per GDP 
This Figure shows the historical market capitalisation of listed domestic companies (percentage 
of GDP) for New Zealand, Australia and the United States from 1985 onward. (Data from The 
World Bank World Development Indicators databank) 
As stated in the New Zealand Minister of Commerce speech, when passing the 
FMCA 2013 to the Parliament (Foss 2012), financial markets in New Zealand are very 
similar to Australia in terms of market structure and regulatory framework. Also, NZX 
and the Australian securities exchange (ASX) listing requirements, disclosure, and price-
sensitive announcements regulations are similar (NZX 2017a; ASX 2013). Therefore, as 
a result of these similarities in New Zealand and Australia legislation frameworks, a 
comparison between NZX and ASX is attempted in this study. Overall, NZX lagged 
behind ASX in terms of total market capitalisation size, level of liquidity and the ability 
to attract new listings (FMA 2018). 
The ASX with AUD1.9 trillion, is currently ranked 15th worldwide in terms of 
market capitalisation; the NYSE, with USD20 trillion, has the highest market 
capitalisation in the world. Nasdaq with USD7.4 trillion is the second largest market 




As of March 2018, there were 2284 companies listed on the ASX, 2026 of which 
were domestic and 130 of which were foreign companies. The ASX’s overall market cap 
in March 2018 was AUD1.92 trillion. On the other hand, the NZX main board’s (NZSX) 
overall market capitalisation as of March 2018 was NZD128.63 billion, with 160 
companies listed. 
In Australia, the S&P/All Ordinaries Index (XAO) accounted for 93% of all 
Australian equity market as of March 2018. The XAO consisted of the 500 largest ASX 
stocks by market capitalisation, with total market cap of AUD1.82 trillion. The XAO was 
established in 1979 and is usually referred to as a benchmark and primary index for the 
Australian equity market. In New Zealand, the S&P/NZX 50 covers around 90% of the 
NZX market capitalisation. The S&P/NZX 50 contains the 50 largest stocks listed on the 
NZSX, with total market cap of NZD112.2 billion. The S&P/NZX 50 index launched on 
3 March 2003 from a base value 1880.85 (NZX 40 Index closing level on 28 Feb 2003) 
and is usually considered as the NZX’s main benchmark index.  
The relatively small size of the New Zealand stock market compared to other 
countries’ stock markets could be due to the differences in New Zealand production and 
ownership structure. New Zealand’s relatively small equity market could reflect the size 
of New Zealand firms. Figure 5.4 shows the number of enterprises by employee size 
group. Based on the New Zealand Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment 
(MBIE) business stats factsheet, small enterprises of up to 20 employees account for 97% 
(499,944) of all enterprises in New Zealand and produce around 30% of New Zealand’s 
GDP. Also, 70% of enterprises in New Zealand are independent operations, self-




Figure 5.4: Number of enterprises by employee size in New Zealand 
This Figure shows the number of enterprises by employee size group. Small enterprises of up to 
20 employees account for 97% (499,944) of all enterprises in New Zealand and produce around 
30% of New Zealand’s GDP. (Data from Statistics New Zealand Business Demography, Feb 
2016) 
As mentioned earlier, direct participation by retail investors in the NZX is very 
low. A large portion of NZX big companies are either owned by offshore investors or 
New Zealand government agencies. The low retail investment rate in New Zealand could 
be explained as a result of the low saving rate among New Zealanders. Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand (RBNZ) household wealth data in 2013 shows that New Zealander 
investors prefer to invest their money in residential property ($719 billion) and bank term 
deposits ($129 billion) rather than in domestic equities ($25 billion).  
Another reason for the relatively small size of the NZX can be explained by the 
rural sector. It is New Zealand’s main economic engine and it is not fully represented in 
the NZX, and Fonterra, as the sector’s largest company, is a co-operative company and 
is not listed fully in the share market. As highlighted in the RBNZ November 2014 
Financial Stability Report, financial system development and general economic growth 
in New Zealand was inherited by a relatively illiquid and underdeveloped equity market 














50 Or More Employees
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Taskforce (CMD) mentioned that the capital markets in New Zealand were failing to act 
as an economic growth engine as there were too few companies large enough to compete 
at the global level (Capital Markets Development Taskforce 2009).  
5.2.3  S&P/NZX 50 Component Stocks 
The S&P/NZX 50 index is the headline benchmark index for the New Zealand equity 
market because of its wide use by investment professionals, media and the public. The 
S&P/NZX 50 components are the largest and most liquid stocks listed on the NZX. The 
index is calculated using a free float market capitalisation methodology (S&P Dow Jones 
Indices 2015). The S&P/NZX 50 general index membership inclusion requirements are 
that stocks should be quoted on the NZSX and they can be either New Zealand-listed 
companies or dual-listed overseas companies. Equity funds like ETFs are not eligible for 
inclusion in the index. 
S&P/NZX 50 components also should meet additional requirements for their level 
of liquidity, known as absolute and relative liquidity. There are some other requirements 
related to minimum closing price. For example, S&P/NZX 50 members should maintain 
their six-month average closing-price higher than 25 cents (S&P Dow Jones Indices 
2015). The index calculation is relatively complicated, especially for dual-listed or 
overseas listed companies, because of the need to consider New Zealand free float 
capitalisation for each entity. New Zealand market capitalisation is calculated based on 
the number of shares issued in New Zealand for each security, which represents the 
portion of the company listed on the NZX. 
Although the index calculation methodology is described in detail by the NZX, 
recalculation is almost impossible for researchers, given that NZX does not provide either 
New Zealand market capitalisation or New Zealand shares issued for dual-listed and 
overseas companies. Instead, the NZX report the overall market capitalisation and 
outstanding shares including both New Zealand and overseas capitalisation of each 
company on its websites. For example, Westpac Banking Corporation (WBC) is an 
Australian company, a portion of which is listed on the NZX and is one of the S&P/NZX 
50 components. In September 2017, the NZX website showed NZD115.78 billion as 
WBC’s market cap, which was higher than the S&P/NZX 50 aggregated market cap at 
the same time (NZD109.58 billion). This example clearly shows that the NZX reports 
overall market capitalisation of dual-listed or overseas companies listed on the NZX 
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rather than New Zealand market cap, which represents the portion of the company listed 
on the NZX. For more clarification, I sent an inquiry to the NZX Client and Data Services 
and they confirmed that there is nowhere on the NZX websites that display the New 
Zealand market cap for listed companies (October, 2017). Both the calculations and the 
data owned by Standard & Poor’s Dow Jones Indices are only available to their licensed 
subscribers.  
5.3  NZX Trading Structure 
While most major stock exchanges around the world rely on market makers, the 
ASX and NZX were among the pioneers in market automation and moved to the Stock 
Exchange Automated Trading System (SEATS) in the early 1990s. Blennerhassett and 
Bowman (1998) found that automation in the NZX reduced trading costs and increased 
the availability of quotes. Today, the Centralised Limit Order Book (CLOB) is the most 
common market structure in Asian and European stock exchanges (Hasbrouck 2007). 
The only major stock exchange with an active trading floor is the NYSE, which has 
around 20% of its trading volume executed on the floor. 
As mentioned in the previous chapters, opening and closing prices are very 
important and exchanges have a special mechanism for market opening and closing. 
During ordinary trading hours, most exchanges operate an order-based continuous call 
auction that executes submitted orders to the market as soon as they matched based on 
price and time priorities. As an alternative to a continuous auction, in a periodic auction, 
orders submitted to the exchange over a period of time (auction period) are aggregated 
and execute simultaneously at a common price, which maximises trading volume at the 
auction price. The use of periodic call auctions to set the market opening price was 
common from the introduction of electronic trading, while call auctions to set the closing 
price were first introduced for relatively illiquid stocks traded on the Paris Bourse in 
1996. Again, the ASX was one of the first exchanges in the world to set the closing price 
using the closing call auction, doing so in February 1997 for all listed companies. When 
the London Stock Exchange introduced a closing call auction in 2000, most exchanges 
started to switch to a closing auction mechanism to set the closing price. Closing call 
auctions were introduced on the NZX on 6 July, 2007. The closing call auction is now 




All transactions on the NZX are cleared and settled by the New Zealand Clearing 
and Depository Corporation (NZCDC). The NZX is the only licensed market operator in 
New Zealand and operates both securities and derivatives markets. In December 2002, 
NZX became a limited liability company and, since June 2003, NZX has been listed on 
its main board (NZSX).  
The NZX also acts as the market regulator in New Zealand. The NZX sets the 
listing, participant and derivatives market rules in New Zealand. The NZX also governs 
the admission and market conduct of issuers of equity and debt securities, and market 
participants. The NZX also monitors all transactions to comply with market rules and 
legislation for any potential breaches, such as market manipulation and insider trading. 
The NZX investigates any potential breaches and takes appropriate action, including 
referral to the FMA. On 1 May 2011, the FMA replaced the Securities Commission, 
assuming oversight of registered markets and the derivatives market. 
5.4  NZX Trade Types 
As described in the NZX Participant Rules 2016, trades can be categorised into two main 
categories: on-market and off-market trades.  
5.4.1  On-Market Trades 
As a centralised limit order book market, NZX provided the Fully Automated Screen 
Trading and Electronic Registration (FASTER) system for trading, clearing and settling 
orders. Any transaction inside FASTER is an on-market trade. This means that when 
orders match based on price and time priority in the limit order book, the execution is an 
on-market trade. On-market trades are executed only during the ordinary trading session 
from 10:00am to 4:45pm New Zealand time. 
The majority of trading orders are either market or limit orders. A market order is 
an order to buy or sell a specific number of a security as shares at the best available price. 
As market orders have no predefined condition, they execute immediately, assuming the 
liquidity exists. Although best-bid, best-ask and last-traded price are good indications for 
a market order price execution, there is no guarantee of trade price, especially in less 
liquid stocks. Limit orders, on the other hand, are orders to buy or sell a specific number 
of shares at a predefined price or better. The limit order will execute only at 
predetermined price or better, but there is no guarantee of execution. The NZX 
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encourages its participants to trade on-market to take advantage of more transparency 
and to help increase NZX’s liquidy and market depth (NZX 2017b).  
Generally, on-market trades determine price level and spread (that is, price 
discovery). On the NZX, the only subcategory of on-market trades that is not involved in 
the price-setting process is odd-lot trades. The NZX flags a trade as an odd-lot when the 
trade volume is relatively small compared to the other executed trades for the same 
security. Figure 5.5 shows a screenshot of the NZX company research website with an 
odd-lot trade highlighted in yellow for Fletcher Building Limited (FBU) ordinary shares 
on 13 March 2017. There are also some minimum holding requirements for investors that 
are not current shareholders on a NZX listed company (ASB 2018). If an investor owns 
the minimum holding, then he or she can buy or sell any number of shares they like, but 
they should hold the minimum shareholding requirements unless they are selling their 
entire holding. The ASX does not have any minimum shareholding requirement. 
 
Figure 5.5: An odd-lot trade highlighted in yellow 
This Figure shows a screenshot of the NZX company research website with an odd-lot trade 




5.4.2  Off-Market Trades 
Handling the price impact of a large trade is an important part of any exchange’s trading 
system. As discussed by Venkataraman (2001), a trader who wants to trade a large block 
of shares relative to the current market liquidity and depth of the order book might decide 
to trade off-market in order to reduce his or her trade exposure risk. Based on the NZX 
participants’ rules book, an off-market trade is any transaction outside FASTER. This 
includes any transaction between trading participants in a listed NZX security outside the 
NZX trading system. Off-market trades can occur either during or outside of normal 
trading hours (NZX 2018c). Off-market trades are usually facilitated by brokers who 
contact and negotiate trades between potential off-market traders. An off-market trade 
will be considered and flagged as an international crossing when at least one party to the 
transaction is an overseas resident (NZX 2018c). 
Generally, off-market trades are less transparent than on-market trades (in which orders 
are executed in the electronic limit order book). As mentioned already, as there is no 
official dark pool in New Zealand, institutional investors usually use the IOI as a tool to 
indicate their potential trading interest. IOIs are non-binding and usually used to identify 
potential counterparties for a large trade. Although IOIs might contain some details about 
the security name, trade direction (buy or sell), price and volume, they are not trading 
orders or contractual offers. Using IOIs is also associated with some risk to the market. 
For example, IOIs can be misused by an NZX participant to gather and exploit 
information about other market participants’ genuine trading intentions. 
When both parties have agreed on the price and volume of an off-market trade, they 
should report the trade to the market immediately. On the NZX, the seller is responsible 
for reporting the off-market trade in FASTER as a two-sided negotiated deal. Exchanges 
have different rules regarding off-market trades. For example, the ASX has a minimum 
value for off-market trades and off-market trades can take place at any price. On the other 
hand, the NZX has no minimum order size for off-market trades, but trades should 
generally be at or within the bid-ask spread. Table 5.1 shows the 20 largest off-market 




Table 5.1: The NZX top 20 largest off-market trades by value between 2007 and 2018 
 







(millions of NZD) 
1 CEN 5/08/2015 09:27:07 $4.65 373 $1,733 
2 SKT 5/03/2013 09:42:26 $4.8 163 $783 
3 TME 18/12/2012 09:03:28 $3.805 202 $768 
4 FSF 27/05/2013 09:24:48 $7.92 60 $475 
5 ZEL 1/10/2015 09:06:48 $6 58 $348 
6 ZEL 1/10/2015 09:07:58 $6 53 $317 
7 ZEL 2/06/2016 10:03:16 $8.01 36 $292 
8 MET 25/11/2013 09:38:37 $3.53 79 $280 
9 MET 25/11/2013 09:39:04 $3.53 79 $280 
10 AIA 15/02/2013 09:43:28 $2.76 100 $277 
11 MET 7/04/2017 09:08:37 $5.61 42 $238 
12 SKT 2/11/2012 09:17:05 $5.05 43 $218 
13 FBU 28/11/2013 09:21:39 $9 21 $191 
14 AIR 20/11/2013 10:22:04 $1.65 111 $183 
15 AIR 20/11/2013 10:16:30 $1.65 111 $183 
16 FBU 7/09/2012 16:41:07 $6.478 25 $165 
17 TPW 23/04/2015 12:55:27 $7.74 20 $155 
18 SPK 5/04/2017 15:12:04 $3.65 40 $146 
19 SKC 28/06/2017 09:06:51 $4.05 35 $143 
20 AIR 27/06/2007 09:53:09 $2.7 44 $119 
 
5.5  Data 
For this analysis, I used the Thomson Reuters Tick History (TRTH) database to obtain 
stock trades and quotes. TRTH is provided to academics in New Zealand and Australia 
by SIRCA. I focused on S&P/NZX 50 components stocks for my analysis in this chapter. 
As mentioned above, S&P/NZX 50 stocks are the 50 largest NZX stocks in terms of 
market capitalisation and are among the most liquid stocks listed on the NZX. S&P/NZX 
50 components cover approximately 90% of NZX market capitalisation and its top 10 
listed companies have approximately half of the total NZX market cap. 
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Data were collected from July 2007 (when closing auctions were introduced on the 
NZX) until September 2017. The market closing mechanism plays an important role in 
my analyses as I focused on closing price and trading volume around close time. I am 
especially interested in comparing volume attracted by the closing auction and off-market 
trading volume just after market close. Therefore, as closing auctions were introduced to 
the NZX in July 2007, data were obtained from that time until September 2017. 
5.5.1  Description of Data 
The dataset covers all S&P/NZX 50 components from 6 July 2007 to 29 September 2017. 
Because of additions and deletions from the index, this includes 84 stocks. The 
S&P/NZX 50 components are subject to a quarterly index review. Each year, on the first 
Friday in March, June, September, and December, index components are subject to an 
eligibility review, as follows. All eligible stocks listed on the NZX are ranked based on 
their six-month average New Zealand free-float market capitalisation (S&P Dow Jones 
Indices 2015). Although the calculation is somewhat complicated, basically the top 50 
stocks in the ranking will form the index, which could lead to the addition or deletion of 
some members. 
ANZ and WBC are two Australian companies in our dataset that are dual-listed on 
the ASX and the NZX and are part of the S&P/NZX 50. Also, many of the stocks in our 
dataset are New Zealand-based companies that are also listed on the ASX. Generally, 
NZX-listed companies are listed on the ASX in order to diversify access to the greater 
capital and liquidity provided in the Australian market. The ASX is also trying to 
encourage NZX-listed companies to be dual-listed on the ASX by setting an easier listing 
requirement for them. Currently, NZX-listed companies can also dual-list on ASX as a 
foreign exempt listing, but they are not required to meet the financial thresholds applied 
to other ASX foreign exempt listings. New Zealand-based companies listed on the ASX 
must comply with the NZX rules in general and only some ASX listing rules.41 
Market capitalisation levels for stocks in this analysis as of September 2017 are 
provided in Table 5.2. 
                                                 




Table 5.2: Market capitalisation summary 
This Table shows the market capitalisation level for stocks in this analysis as of September 2017. 
Market capitalisation (millions of NZ dollars) 
Total market cap $108,593.32 
Average market cap $2,171.87 
Largest stock $8,304.81 
Smallest stock $275.82 
Median market cap $1,407.03 
 
Table 5.3 shows the overall number of trades (trading frequency), traded volume, 
and dollar value of trades for all stocks in the dataset from July 2007 to September 2017.  
Table 5.3: S&P/NZX 50 overall trading summary from July 2007 to September 2017 
Volume 
(millions of shares) 
Volume  
(millions of dollars) 
Number 
of trades 
59,185 247,933 7,457,130 
 
5.5.2  Data Verification 
Each trade in TRTH is associated with a trade qualifier code that denotes the trade type 
(such as IN, OL or SP). Although the different trade types are described in the NZX 
market participants regulation book, the book does not mention how to interpret various 
trade condition codes. On its trading platform glossary, ANZ Securities provides a short 
description for NZX trades condition codes (ANZ 2018). The same information is 
available on Fonterra farm source trading service help, which is also provided by ANZ 
New Zealand Securities. 
Because this chapter focuses on the trade distribution in terms of whether it is executed 
on-market or off-market, it is important to categorise all different trades types correctly 
as on-market or off-market. To ensure that the qualifiers code is correctly linked to the 
corresponding type of trade, two separate empirical tests were conducted. First, all the 
various trade condition qualifiers were listed and then matched where possible to the 
corresponding descriptions for exactly the same trade provided by the NZX company 
research website. For example, Figure 5.6 shows an off-market trade (one of the last 10 
trades at that time) highlighted in yellow for Fisher & Paykel Healthcare Corp Ltd (FPH) 
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traded on 13 March 2017 at around 1 pm. It was labelled as off-market by NZX and was 
obviously not included in the price-setting process42. Figure 5.7 shows exactly the same 
trade in the TRTH with a qualifier starting with SP. This observation confirmed the ANZ 
trading platform’s glossary description that an SP trade qualifier represents an off-market 
trade. The same observation was done more than 20 times for each type of trade condition 
qualifier to ensure that all trades were correctly classified as either on-market or off-
market. 
 
Figure 5.6: An off-market trade highlighted in yellow 
This Figure shows a screenshot of the NZX company research website with an off-market trade 
highlighted in yellow for FPH traded on 13 March 2017 at around 1 pm. 
 
                                                 
42 Based on the NZX company research, trades that are not price-setting are not considered as the highest, 




Figure 5.7: The same off-market trade highlighted from TRTH data 
The NZX Company Research website provides a summary of the 50 top traded stocks on 
the NZX over the last year. The summary shows both on-market and off-market total 
traded value for each stock. For validation, the total on-market and off-market traded 
value for each of the top 50 traded stocks between 29 September 2016 and 28 September 
2017, based on the trade data available in my dataset, was compared with the data 
provided by the NZX Company Research website. The results were almost identical. The 
normalised results data and performed a t-test to confirm whether both data are the same. 
The t value of 1 for both on-market and off-market trades value confirmed that the way 
I had broken down all trades to on-market and off-market general categories was the 
same as NZX’s method. The full list of trading value for all 50 stocks is provided in 
Appendix C. 
5.6  Research Design 
5.6.1  Descriptive Statistics 
In this study, dollar volume of trading (value), volume of trading (number of shares), 
trading frequency (number of transactions), and trading turnover ratio were used as trade-
based liquidity measures. Also, bid-ask spread was used as an order-based liquidity 
measure. Finally, order-to-trade ratio (OTR) was used as a measure of algorithmic trading 
activities. 
There are a wide range of traditional liquidity measures. Aitken and Comerton-
Forde (2003) divided liquidity measures into two main groups: trade-based and order-
based measures. Trade-based liquidity measures are popular among academics because 
they are easy to calculate and are used widely by market practitioners (Aitken and 
Comerton-Forde 2003). The most common trade-based measures in the literature include 
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dollar volume of trading (value), volume of trading (number of shares), trading frequency 
(number of transactions), and trading turnover ratio. Trade-based liquidity measures 
generally capture market characteristics in the past as they are based on market historical 
transactions. Order-based measures, on the other hand, capture current market liquidity 
by looking into the orders available in the order book. Order-based liquidity measures 
provide a good indication of the ability of trading and associated cost of trading. The 
most common order-based measure for market liquidity is the bid-ask spread. Calculating 
the bid-ask spread as a percentage of a stock’s price enables us to compare stocks with 
different price levels. Therefore, following McInish and Wood (1992), a time-weighted 
relative bid-ask spread was used as the order-based liquidity measure. 
The NZX August 2017 Regulation report estimated that approximately 10% of 
trading by value of traded shares was associated with algorithmic trading. To analyse 
changes in algorithmic trading activities on the NZX, the OTR ratio calculated as the 
total volume of orders (the number of shares) divided by the overall number of executed 
orders was used. OTR is widely used as a measure for algorithmic trading activities 
worldwide especially in European countries to comply with MiFID II regulatory 
requirements. I also compared changes in average trade size in terms of dollar volume of 
traded shares and trading frequency, which can be correlated with the level of algorithmic 
trading. Generally, higher algorithmic trading activity could lead to smaller trade size 
and higher trading frequency. 
5.6.2  Univariate Analysis 
Based on traditional liquidity measures, NZX market liquidity has increased significantly 
in recent years. As shown in Figure 5.8, overall monthly trading dollar volume on NZX 
has increased in recent years. This increase in the overall trading value was associated 
with tighter relative bid-ask spread; as shown in Figure 5.9. Following McInish and 
Wood (1992), the time-weighted relative bid-ask spread was calculated as the difference 
between the best-bid and best-ask limit orders in the order book and scaled by the 
midpoint price, then weighted by the time it existed during continuous trading hours, 
except auction time periods when the market crosses, then averaged on all stocks for each 
trading day. 
Considering stock turnover as a proxy for market liquidity, in recent years NZX 
liquidity increased by trading volume from 2 billion shares in 2010 to 3.4 billion shares 
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in 2014 for S&P/NZX 50 components stocks. There are several reasons that have resulted 
in growth and increasing turnover on the NZX: the Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013, 
tax changes in 2010, and KiwiSaver scheme providers holding domestic stocks in their 
portfolios (RBNZ 2015).  
 
Figure 5.8: NZX overall monthly trading dollar volume 
NZX overall monthly trading dollar volume on NZX has increased in recent years. 
 
Figure 5.9: NZX averaged monthly relative bid-ask spread 
The increase in the NZX overall trading value was associated with tighter relative bid-ask 
spreads. 
OTR was used as a measure for algorithmic trading activity in the market. Equation 
5.1 shows the OTR calculated as the total monthly volume of orders (the number of 
shares) divided by the overall number of executed orders. Figure 5.10 shows changes in 




𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 (𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠) 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 (𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠) 
             Equation (5.1) 
In August 2004, NZX announced that DMA would be granted to six accredited 
NZX firms43 to encourage more trading activity by a broader range of traders, which 
would subsequently increase NZX liquidity. Although Cumming et al. (2012) described 
DMA as one of the requirements for algorithmic trading, algorithmic traders were less 
active on the NZX until 2011. From 2011, both trading volume and trading frequency 
increased significantly compared to previous years. The FMA 2012 report on the NZX 
general obligations review highlighted these increase in NZX trading activities and 
linked that to the rise in algorithmic trading activities from overseas institutional clients 
that used DMA provided to them by their NZX trading participants. The report also 
mentioned that the NZX provides a number of algorithmic traders access to the NZX 
trading system via DMA. The NZX Regulatory Agenda 2017 reported that algorithmic 
trading is responsible for approximately 10% of NZX trading by value and that most of 
these trades were submitted by Australian-based traders utilising DMA.  
As expected, this increase in algorithmic trading activity on the NZX was 
associated with higher trading frequency (number of executed trades) and lower average 
trade size in terms of value. Figure 5.10 and Figure 5.11 show the trading frequency and 
average trade size for all stocks in my dataset, respectively. 
 
Figure 5.10: NZX overall monthly order-to-trade ratio 
Algorithmic trading activities increased mainly from 2011 since NZX provides a number of 
algorithmic traders access to the NZX trading system via DMA. 
                                                 
43  These accredited NZX firms were First NZ Capital, Macquarie, Goldman Sachs, ABN AMRO, 




Figure 5.11: NZX overall monthly trading frequency (number of executed trades) 
From 2011, both trading volume and trading frequency increased significantly compared to 
previous years. The FMA 2012 report on the NZX general obligations review highlighted the 
increase in NZX trading activities and linked that to the rise in algorithmic trading activities from 




Figure 5.12: NZX average trade size dollar volume 
The increase in algorithmic trading activity on the NZX was associated with lower average trade 
size in terms of value. 
5.6.3  NZX Trading Sessions 
The NZX operates based on an electronic limit order book structure. Traders can place 
their orders through licensed brokerage firms. The exchange matching algorithm then 
matches these orders in priority based on price and time of entry. Each trading day 
consists of different trading phases. For the NZSX, which is the NZX’s main board, the 
pre-opening session is from 9 am to 10 am (New Zealand Standard Time). During the 
pre-opening session, orders can be submitted, withdrawn or amended but no orders shall 
be matched. Before the market opens, at around 10 am, the trading system 
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instantaneously matches the orders and sets the opening price in a way that maximises 
the trading volume at the opening price. 
Ordinary trading hours are from 10 am to 4:45 pm. Orders can be submitted to the 
trading system at any time and can match immediately with a counterparty order and 
result in a trade or rest in the limit order book, but a market order can fail to execute if 
there is insufficient depth. At 4:45 pm the pre-close session begins and lasts around 15 
minutes. During the pre-close session, dealers, DMA dealers, and DMA authorised 
persons can submit, withdraw or amend orders but no trades can be executed. At around 
5 pm, the trading system matches the orders and set the closing price in a way that 
maximises the trading volume at the closing price. The duration of pre-open and pre-
close sessions are subject to a couple of random seconds (added or subtracted) to make 
opening and closing price manipulation more difficult. After the market closes, there is 
an adjustment session for a period of 30 minutes, During the adjustment session, dealers 
can adjust the number of their existing orders or withdraw them, but they can not enter a 
new order and orders shall not be matched by the trading system. At 5:30 pm, the NZSX 
is placed into an enquiry session until the next trading day’s pre-open session. During an 
enquiry session, no order can be submitted, amended, withdrawn or matched in the 
trading system. 
Figure 5.13 shows the overall trading value, broken down into hours during a 
trading day from morning to afternoon. Because of time differences, when financial 
markets are open in Europe, the US, and part of Asia, the NZX is closed. Based on the 
NZX’s trading rules, all off-market trades that were affected in the inquiry session (from 
5:30 pm until 9 am on the next trading day) should be reported through the trading system 
during the next trading day’s pre-open session. Therefore, the highest number of traded 
shares appeared between 9 am and 10 am during the pre-open session and almost all of 
them were off-market international trades. Although the market opens at 10 am, the 
market opening time is subject to a random +/- 15 seconds, which means the NZX can 
open at any time between 9:59:45 and 10:00:15. Between 10 am and 12 pm, trading 
volume is relatively low but from 12 pm, when the ASX opens, trading volume has a 
significant increase, which shows the high impact of Australian-based traders and 
investors on the NZX. Closing auction time is subject to a random + 60 seconds, which 
means the market can be closed at any time between 5:00:00 and 5:01:00. So, the closing 
auction volume and price appears in 17:00-18:00 time intervals in Figure 5.13. All off-
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market trades affected during the adjust session after market close shall be reported 
immediately during the adjust session. Almost all off-market trades during the adjust 
session are domestic off-market trades. 
In summary, the on-market trades on the first and last columns of Figure 5.13 
(before 10 am and after 5 pm) represent the volume captured by the opening and closing 
auctions. The off-market trades on the first interval (before 10 am) represent all off-
market trades effected during the enquiry session. The off-market trades on the last 
interval (after 5 pm) represent all off-market trades effected during the adjustment 
session. 
 
Figure 5.13: Overall trading value breakdown into hours during a trading day 
This Figure shows the aggregatte value of trade from 2007 to 2017 broken down into hours during 
a trading day from morning to afternoon. The sum of all volume displayed here is $247,933 
million, as shown in Table 5.3. 
There is a well-known U-shaped pattern in spreads during the trading day, whereby 
beginning-of-day and end-of-day spreads tend to be larger than middle-of-the-day 
spreads (Harris 1986). Figure 5.14 shows changes in the bid-ask spread during the trading 
day for each year from 2007 to 2017. The relative bid-ask spread was calculated as the 
difference between the best-bid and best-ask prices, divided by the bid-ask midpoint then 






































As shown in Figure 5.14, the average bid-ask spread reduced from 90 basis points 
(bps) in 2007 to 30 bps in 2017. Also, as expected, spreads are larger around market open 
and close time. 
 
Figure 5.14: Relative bid-ask spread during ordinary trading hours 
This Figure shows changes in the bid-ask spread during a trading day for each year. The average 
bid-ask spread reduced from 90 basis points (bps) in 2007 to 30 bps in 2017. Also, as expected, 
spreads are larger around market open and close time. 
 
5.6.4  NZX Trades Size 
As discussed earlier, off-market trades are an important part of the CLOB market as they 
can reduce the price impact of large trades relative to current market liquidity and 
therefore depth of the order book (Venkataraman 2001; Berkman and Comerton‐Forde 
2011). Therefore, it is expected that relatively small trades will be executed on-market 
and that large trades that might have big price impact are executed off-market. Some 
exchanges also have some trading rules in place trying to maintain market liquidity by 
limiting off-market trading for market participants. For example, ASX has specific rules 
110 
 
including minimum trade size for off-market trades.44 There are similar rules in the U.S. 
for block trades. There is, however, no minimum size or similar rule that limits off-
market execution on NZX: institutional traders can negotiate a trade with a counterparty 
for a number of shares at the last traded price or any price within the bid-ask spread. To 
analyse this furthers in this section, on-market and off-market trades are examined in 
terms of trade size. Figure 5.15 shows a trade size (dollar value) histogram for on-market, 










                                                 
44 Based on the Rule 6.1.2 of the ASIC Market Integrity Rules 2017, the minimum trade size for off-market 
trades are “$1 million ASD for Tier 1 equity market products; $500,000 or more for Tier 2 equity market 








Figure 5.15: Trade size (dollar value) histogram for different trades types 
This Figure shows NZX trade size histogram by dollar value for different trades types in both 
logarithmic scale (top chart) and linear scale (bottom chart). The trade size boxplots show some 
similar characteristics for all trades types. 
 
Table 5.4 shows summary statistics of different trades types for all stocks trades in the 
dataset. 
Table 5.4: Trade size summary statistics (in NZD) 
This Table shows summary statistics of different trades types for all stocks trades in the dataset 
(NZX 50 from 2007 to 2017).  
 1st Quartile Median Mean 3rd Quartile 
On-market $1,625 $4,738 $11,692 $11,860 
Odd-lot $18 $70 $108 $173 
Off-market (domestic) $10,650 $31,400 $161,046 $111,900 




The trade size boxplots in Figure 5.15 show some similar characteristics for all 
trades types. For example, for all trade types, the majority of trades are located on the 
low-value side (right-skewed) and the median is closer to the first quartile which means 
that majority of trades are relatively small. Also, all boxplots have a long tail, which 
means although the majority of trades are on the low-value side, there are a quite few 
large trades in each category. Having these large trades affects the mean trade value and 
moves the mean value for all trade types close to the third quartile. 
In terms of trade values, odd-lot and international trades values are as expected. 
Although odd-lots trades are executed from orders submitted to the limit-order book, they 
are not included in the price-setting process by the NZX because their value is relatively 
small compared to the other executed trades for the same security. The trading value for 
the majority of odd-lots trades is less than $100, which is in line with the NZX definition 
of odd-lot trades. On the other hand, the international trade value median is close to 
$200,000, which is much higher than to the on-market trade value median of around 
$5,000. This is again in line with what is expected, as the off-market trade value is meant 
to be much bigger than that of on-market trades, to avoid price impact. 
Interpretation of on-market and domestic off-market trade values is more 
complicated as the range of trading values overlapped. Based on the off-market trading 
definition, large trades, relative to the current market liquidity, are executed off-market 
to reduce their price impact. However, on-market trade size shows that a large portion of 
off-market trades could be executed on-market as they were not large enough to have a 
major price impact. As a rule of thumb, orders that are over 2.5% of the average daily 
volume (ADV) might have a price impact (Chiyachantana et al. 2004). 
A possible reason for the high portion of off-market trades on the NZX could be 
the NZX trading rules. The NZX Participant Rules were issued in 2003 and, while NZX 
changed materially since then, the rules have not been meaningfully reviewed. While a 
large portion of the off-market trades are relatively small, there is no minimum size for 
off-market execution on the NZX to limit negotiated off-market trading and move those 
small off-market trades to the market. Also, the current NZX pricing structure, which has 
a fixed-cost fee structure, is more in favour of institutional investors seeking off-market 
trades than retail investors who trade in multiple small trades on-market. Generally, off-
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market trading is associated with a lower cost of trading for brokers and institutions 
compared to trading on-market (Gaynor 2016). 
In April 2018, the NZX published a participant rule consultation request seeking 
feedback related to some rule changing to promote more liquidity and market integrity 
in NZX (NZX 2018a). The proposal centres around two main changes: introducing a new 
pricing structure based on a value base point change, and initiating a minimum value of 
$50,000 for off-market trades. These changes in the NZX pricing and rule structure are 
in line with the ASX’s current trading rules and, as mentioned in the consultation report, 
are consistent with global best practice to increase market liquidity. 
An interesting question here is what portion of off-market trades are smaller than 
$50,000 and how much liquidity they could add to the NZX market as a result of this rule 
changing? As shown in Table 5.4, in terms of the number of trades, more than half of 
domestic off-market trades and almost all of on-market trades have a value of less than 
$50,000. Figure 5.16 shows the off-market trades broken down into trades with a value 
lower than $50,000 (labelled as off-market small) and trades with a value higher than 
$50,000 (labelled as off-market large). In the past 10 years, more than 88% of the count 
of all NZX trades were conducted on-market. Over the same period of time, around 7% 
of the count of NZX trades were off-market with less than $50,000 value. Off-market 
trades with more than $50,000 value cover only 5% of the count of all NZX trades in the 
past 10-years. Therefore, based on the NZX level of liquidity in the past 10-years, the 
new rule can result in an increase in the count of on-market trades, regarding the number 
of executed trades from 88% to 95%. However, how much liquidity could be added to 




Figure 5.16: NZX overall yearly number of trades breakdown 
This Figure shows the off-market trades broken down into trades with a value lower than $50,000 
(labelled as off-market small) and trades with a value higher than $50,000 (labelled as off-market 
large). In the past 10 years, more than 88% of the count of all NZX trades were conducted on-
market. Over the same period of time, around 7% of NZX trades were off-market with less than 
$50,000 value. Off-market trades with more than $50,000 value covers only 5% of all NZX trades 
in the past 10-years.  
 
Figure 5.17 shows the off-market trade value broken down into trades with a value 
less than $50,000 (labelled as off-market small) and trades larger than $50,000 (labelled 
as off-market large). 28% of the overall NZX trading value was executed on-market, 68% 
was large off-market trades and only 4% of off-market trades were less than $50,000. So, 
based on the overall value of NZX trades in the past 10 years, the new rule can increase 





























Figure 5.17: Overal yearly value of trades breakdown 
This Figure shows the off-market trade value broken down into trades with a value less than 
$50,000 (labelled as off-market small) and trades larger than $50,000 (labelled as off-market 
large). 28% of the overall NZX trading value was executed on-market, 68% was large off-market 
trades and only 4% of off-market trades were less than $50,000. 
In recent years, NZ institutional funds under management (FUM) have grown 
strongly, mainly because of KiwiSaver investment schemes. Higher institutional trading 
has resulted in even more trades shifting toward negotiated off-market trades. These 
institutions mostly accept the bid-ask midpoint or the VWAP as a fair price to facilitate 
these off-market trades. As shown earlier in this chapter, in the past 10 years, only 28% 
of overall NZX trades in terms of value have been executed on-market. By setting a 
minimum crossing threshold for off-market trades, NZX has aimed to increase liquidity 
and the levels of on-market activity to achieve greater price discovery. 
5.6.5  On-Market Trades v Off-Market Trades 
In an electronic limit‐order market, it is common for a portion of trades to occur off-
market. For example, approximately 30% of the ASX’s overall dollar turnover in 2011 
was conducted off-market (Berkman and Comerton‐Forde 2011). However, based on my 
analysis of NZX company research data, around two-thirds of the total dollar turnover of 
the NZX is currently conducted off-market. Figure 5.18 shows the overall portion of 
stocks traded on-market and off-market for the selected stocks from July 2007 to 
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off-market trades in detail. The numbers show that, considering all trades for S&P/NZX 
50 components from July 2007 to September 2017, only 28% of trades were executed 
on-market and were part of the price-setting process. 
 
Figure 5.18: The overall portion of stocks traded on-market and off-market 
This Figure shows the overall portion of stocks traded on-market and off-market for the stocks 
in my dataset from July 2007 to September 2017. 
 
Table 5.5: The overall trade value breakdown in on-market and off-market trades 
This table shows considering all trades for S&P/NZX 50 components from July 2007 to 
September 2017, only 28% of trades were executed on-market and were part of the price-setting 
process. 
 On-Market Off-Market Overall 
 Price set 
Price not set 
(odd-lot) 
Domestic International  
Dollar volume 
(millions of dollars) 
69,251.7 136.3 125,141.7 53,403.2 247,933 
Overall trade value  
(percentage) 
27.95% 0.05% 50.5% 21.5% 100% 
 
Figure 5.19 shows changes in the portion of on-market trades from 2007 to 2017. 
Although our findings are in line with the NZX market research data, showing that 















between 2010 and 2013, more than 80% of trades were conducted off-market, which is 
very high by any measure.  
 
Figure 5.19: The portion of trades executed on-market by dollar volume 
This Figure shows changes in the portion of on-market trades from 2007 to 2017. In some months 
between 2010 and 2013, less than 20% of trades were conducted on-market. 
 
5.7  Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter has shown some important, and possibly unique, characteristics of the NZX 
and considered possible reasons behind NZX’s low level of liquidity. By analysing all 
S&P/NZX 50 stocks trades from 2007 to 2017, It was shown that 72% of all trades by 
dollar value, were conducted off-market. Most of the off-market international trades were 
negotiated during the NZX enquiry session, which is due to New Zealand’s time zone, 
when the market is closed overnight. Based on NZX’s trading rules, all negotiated trades 
during the enquiry session should be reported to the NZX trading system during the next 
trading day’s pre-open session. Therefore, almost all of the off-market trades reported 
during the pre-open session are international off-market trades. A large portion of 
domestic off-market trades are negotiated and reported during the adjust session when 
the closing price is determined and just after the market closes. The overall volume of 
negotiated off-market trades reported after market close is approximately four times 
higher than the volume absorbed by the closing auction. 
As discussed here, it is common for off-market trades to be executed at the closing 
auction price once it is determined (that is, large, off-market volume is often not part of 
the closing auction mechanism), and the closing call auction does not necessarily attract 
much volume. Therefore, the volume of off-market trades executed just after market 
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close is much higher – sometimes 100 times larger – than the volume absorbed by the 
closing auction. A possible concern here is that an off-market trader who wants to trade 
a large volume at the closing auction price might manipulate the thin45 pre-close auction 
using relatively low volume, so that their large-volume off-market order is executed at 
the manipulated closing price just after the close. 
Figure 5.20 is a snapshot of the NZX company research website showing trades 
around 5 pm on 17 August 2017 in Spark ordinary shares. In the last-10-trades table, 
several orders were executed simultaneously at the closing price as a result of the closing 
auction mechanism from 4:45–5:00 pm, and then some larger off-market orders were 
executed just after that. If these large off-market trades had come from the dominant 






Figure 5.20: Large off-market trades which executed just after market close 
This Figure is a snapshot of the NZX company research website showing trades around 5 pm on 
17 August 2017 in Spark ordinary shares. In the last-10-trades table, several orders were executed 
                                                 
45 This study findings suggest that only 17% of NZX’s overall dollar volume of trading is executed during 
the closing auction between 2007 and 2017. 
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simultaneously at the closing price as a result of the closing auction mechanism from 4:45–5:00 
pm, and then some of larger off-market orders were executed just after that. If these large off-
market trades had come from the dominant participants in a thin closing auction on that day, that 
would be a slightly different flavour of manipulation. 
 
Based on NZX trading conduct, if an off-market trade party tries to influence 
market price by trading on-market to benefit from higher or lower price in an off-market 
trade, this could be considered manipulative as it harms price discovery. As off-market 
trades usually are conducted at or within the bid-ask spread, on-market trades determine 
the price level and spread (that is, price discovery). So, if the on-market trade becomes 









 Marking the Close 
Manipulation on the NZX 
6.1  Introduction 
This chapter focuses on plausible trade-based manipulative scenarios in relation to 
negotiated off-market trades in the New Zealand context and a rule-based index proposed 
to measure the possibility and breadth of closing-price-manipulation on the NZX. To 
research this topic, I referred to the Warminger v FMA manipulation, which was New 
Zealand’s first manipulation case to go to trial (FMA v. Warminger 2017b). The 
judgment report, which was published in March 2017, clearly demonstrates what 
constitutes trade-based manipulation in the New Zealand context; this enabled me to 
create a rule-based index based on the principles of trade-based manipulation described 
by the FMA’s market experts and the defence expert witness (Professor Aitken). Using 
the proposed manipulation index in this chapter, I analysed trades in the S&P/NZX 50 
components stocks over a two-year period to measure the possibility and breadth of this 
kind of manipulation on the NZX. To the best of my knowledge, this analysis is the first 
empirical analysis of manipulation on the NZX. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, a large portion of trades in New Zealand are 
conducted off-market. Also, a large portion of domestic off-market trades are relatively 
small trades that could be executed on-market without having a large price impact. 
Therefore, negotiating a large portion of relatively small trades off-market could damage 
NZX market quality by reducing market liquidity, harming price discovery, and 
increasing trading costs as a result of wider spreads. For large trades, on the other hand, 
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dark pools could provide better facilities for large trade execution compared to 
downstairs markets (Seppi 1990; Madhavan and Cheng 1997; Bessembinder and 
Venkataraman 2004). 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, market quality has two important aspects: efficiency 
and integrity. Although several studies have considered on the impact of dark venues on 
efficiency aspects of market quality, studies on the impact of dark trading on market 
integrity and market fairness are still rare (Aitken et al. 2018).  
6.2  First Trade-Based Manipulation Case in New Zealand 
In July 2015, The FMA issued civil proceedings against Mark Warminger regarding his 
trading activities between December 2013 and August 2014 when he was employed by 
Milford Asset Management Limited (Milford). FMA v Warminger is New Zealand’s first 
manipulation case to come to trial and the second market manipulation case to be 
pursued.46 The FMA decided to take civil action and seek pecuniary penalties rather than 
pursue criminal action. Proceeding with civil action gave the FMA the advantage of a 
lower proof standard requirement compared to a criminal action, which should be beyond 
reasonable doubt. Also, taking a civil action is open to settlement, such as banning orders 
or fines, but a criminal trial can be delivered only either as a win or a loss. 
Warminger’s allegedly manipulative trades were first identified by the NZX 
Market Surveillance Team, which performed a frontline role in monitoring market 
trading activity using its SMARTS real-time market surveillance system. On 23 June 
2014, the team found that the Macquarie client code 5CE tried to interrupt a falling price 
trend in the Xero Limited share price.47 Executed trades included buying and then selling 
the same entity within a couple of minutes using different brokerage accounts. That 
incident led to a further investigation in relation to Warminger’s other trades and revealed 
his manipulative scenario. In many instances, he initially increased the market price or 
                                                 
46 The first case of market manipulation brought in New Zealand was against Brian Henry. In August 2014, 
Brian Henry admitted to engaging in six matched transactions including two “wash trades” and four 
“layering” occasions in shares of the company he co-founded, Diligent Board Member Services. He was 
ordered to pay a pecuniary penalty of $130,000. 
47 It is worth mentioning that each trade is associated with a transaction identifier that is not available to 
the public. Trader identifiers can provide very useful information about the trader, the trader’s institution, 
the broker, and whether he/she used DMA or not. 
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current quote for the specific stock by trading on-market using DMA, then sold a large 
volume of the same stock off-market at the elevated price via a different brokerage 
account. On 12 August 2014, NZX referred the Warminger case to the FMA for more 
investigation in relation to breach of the market manipulation provisions of the Securities 
Markets Act 1988 (the Act).48 
At the time, Warminger was a portfolio manager at Milford. As at August 2014, 
Warminger had around $669 million of assets under his management. The FMA 
interviewed Warminger on three occasions and also interviewed other market 
participants involved in those trades.  
As a result of investigations, the FMA concluded that Warminger’s trades had 
created a false and misleading appearance in demand and price in the market and 
breached section 11B of the Act and that Milford had failed to adequately monitor 
Warminger’s trades. FMA and Milford reached an agreement to resolve the issues related 
to Milford, under which Milford agreed to pay $1.1 million in lieu of a pecuniary penalty 
and $400,000 as a contribution to the FMA’s investigation costs, and also to improve its 
trading and monitoring systems based on PwC recommendations. 
As the settlement does not include Warminger’s trades, FMA brought a proceeding to 
the High Court of New Zealand in Auckland on 10 cause of actions (COAs) of 
Warminger’s trades, which are listed in the FMA v. Warminger (2017b) on paragraph 
[104]  in detail as follows: 
 “Fisher and Paykel Healthcare Corporation Limited shares on 27 May 2014 
(COA1)”  
 “The a2 Milk Company Limited shares on 29 January 2014 (COA2)” 
 “The a2 Milk Company Limited shares on 9 July 2014 (COA3)” 
 “The a2 Milk Company Limited shares on 6 August 2014 (COA4)”  
 “Restaurant Brands New Zealand Limited securities on 30 April and 1 May 2014 
(COA5)” 
                                                 
48 As Warminger’s suspicious trades occurred between December 2013 and August 2014, the case was 
taken under section 11B of the Securities Markets Act 1988 because it was prior to the application of the 
Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013. 
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 “Sky Network Television Limited securities on 19 February 2014 (COA6)” 
 “Xero Limited shares on 15 May 2014 (COA7)” 
 “Xero Limited shares on 30 June 2014 (COA8)” 
 “Wynyard Group Limited securities on 31 July 2014 (COA9)” 
 “Skellerup Holdings Limited securities on 30 April 2014 (COA10).” 
The FMA allegations can be categorised into three main areas: 
 Placing small trades on-market, followed by a larger off-market trade in the 
opposite direction. 
 Manipulating the closing price.  
 Trading on-market in a way that sets the price, rather than trading for a genuine 
commercial purpose. 
As Justice Venning highlighted in the judgment report, it is very important to determine 
whether the purpose behind a trade was manipulative or legitimate and genuine. The 
purpose behind trading can be established in different ways, including being based on 
market data and by considering the context of the trading. Aberrations in trading patterns, 
like Warminger’s trading in Xero shares on 23 June 2014, when it was picked up by the 
NZX SMARTS system for the first time, may be sufficient to permit a finding of intent 
even without having further contextual evidence. This was the approach that Professor 
Aitken (Warminger’s expert witness) took as he focused on market data analysis. Mr 
McMahon and Mr Solarz (the market experts called by the FMA), along with market 
data, also provided more evidence from letters, emails and telephone communications 
between Warminger and his trade counterparties as proof of intention. 
Aitken and the FMA’s market experts’ arguments are very important because they 
described the principles of trade-based manipulation from two different perspectives. 
Aitken is a professor at Macquarie University and designed the SMARTS market 
surveillance system, which is used in more than 50 stock exchanges around the world, 
including the NZX and Nasdaq. He took a market data analytics approach and described 
the seven factors he used as alerts of market manipulation. This also shows the way in 
which the NZX market surveillance team monitors trades, as they use the SMARTS 
market surveillance system that Aitken designed. He described the key factors that the 
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SMARTS system uses as signs or pattern alerts of a manipulative trade. These factors 
are: 
 Creating a new bid or ask price 
 Changing the bid or ask price more than three price levels 
 Executing small trades 
 Executing small trades around market close time 
 No independent auction 
 Price revision on the next trading day 
 Trading without an economic reason 
The presence of all of these factors is not necessary as an indication of suspicious 
manipulative trades: three or four factors are usually sufficient to start serious 
investigation by exchanges and regulators. The FMA’s experts also added more evidence 
from surrounding context information such as emails and telephone conversations 
between Warminger and his trade counterparties. The FMA used this evidence as proof 
of Warminger’s intention to create the false or misleading appearance of active trading 
or in the price of those securities. 
As a result, the FMA satisfied the court that Warminger’s trades in FPH on 27 May 
2014 (COA1) and ATM on 9 July (COA3) were manipulative. However, the FMA failed 
to satisfy the court regarding the other eight causes of action and the court dismissed the 
FMA’s alleged manipulation claim. As the FMA decided to take civil action and seek the 
imposition of a pecuniary penalty, on 29 June 2017, Justice Venning imposed a $400,000 
penalty on Warminger regarding his two contraventions (FMA v. Warminger 2017a). 
6.3  A Rule-Based Manipulation Index  
The Warminger v FMA judgment is very important because it clarified the fundamentals 
of trade-based manipulation for the first time in New Zealand. The judgment report 
provides useful details and insight related to the machinery of exchange surveillance 
systems and regulators’ investigation processes in the New Zealand context. Some of this 
information became available to the public for the first time with the release of the report. 
This information has been used as a foundation for an index to measure the possibility 
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and breadth of this kind of suspicious manipulative behaviours on the NZX. To do so, 
principle rules were created based on the FMA discussions related to Warminger’s trades 
in FPH on 27 May 2014 and ATM on 9 July, as highlighted in the judgment report by 
Justice Venning as the manipulation indication factors. A rule-based index was 
developed and applied to the S&P/NZX 50 components stocks over a two-year period to 
measure the possibility and breadth of closing-price manipulation on the NZX. 
Therefore, this manipulation index is based on the characteristics of one prosecution case 
and to target a particular form of closing price manipulation that resembles that case. 
The key area of concern is the practice of taking smaller positions on one side and 
then executing a large order on the other side (where the small positions have effects such 
as price support or moving the spread to enable the larger trade/crossing). Although this 
kind of manipulation can happen at any time during the trading day, I focused on the 
trading during the closing auction because of the importance and widespread distribution 
the closing price and also due to the NZX’s unique characteristics described in the 
previous chapter. It is common for off-market trades to be executed at the closing auction 
price once the price has been determined and the volume of off-market trades executed 
just after market close is much higher than the volume absorbed by the closing auction. 
Therefore, it is plausible that an off-market trader who wants to trade a large volume at 
the closing auction price could manipulate the thin pre-close auction using relatively low 
volume so that his/her large-volume off-market order is executed at the manipulated 
closing price just after the close. 
6.3.1  Warminger’s Trading In FPH on 27 May 2014 
Warminger’s trading in FPH on 27 May 2014 was manipulative because his buy orders 
increased the price for FPH shares and created a false or misleading impression of 
demand in FPH shares. Warminger’s manipulation involved trading small parcels on-
market via DMA, followed by larger off-market trade in the opposite direction.  
On 27 May, during the pre-opening session, Goldman Sachs and Forsyth Barr 
indicated that they were likely to be a buyer on the day and Warminger had indicated he 
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could be a potential seller.49 Figure 6.1 shows the FPH opening price on that day, which 
was $4.32. 
 
Figure 6.1: FPH opening price as a result of the opening auction on 27 May 2014 
At 10:38 a trader from Forsyth Barr advised her interest in buying 450,000 FPH shares 
by sending an email to Warminger. Almost immediately Warminger replied that he 
would sell for $4.35 per share, while the last traded price was $4.31. At 10:41, three 
minutes after the Forsyth Barr email, Warminger bought 30,000 FPH shares at $4.32. 
Following the execution of his trade, a Forsyth Barr trader emailed him again at 10:41 
and asked whether he would sell 200,000 shares at $4.32, to which Warminger did not 
reply. At 10:42 Warminger received a similar email from Goldman Sachs asking if he 
would sell at $4.32 and he did not reply to that email either. Figure 6.2 shows that 
Warminger bought 30,000 FPH shares at $4.32. 
 
                                                 
49 As there is no official dark pool in New Zealand, institutional investors usually use the IOI as a tool to 
indicate their potential trading interest. IOIs are non-binding and usually used to identify potential 




Figure 6.2: Warminger trades for 30,000 FPH shares at $4.32 
Between 10:43 and 10:45, Warminger bought 125,000 FPH shares in five DMA buy 
orders. His DMA trades pushed the last traded price up to $4.34. His trading activity 
resulted in a 4.6% increase in FPH’s share price, while the overall movement of the 
S&P/NZX 50 was only 0.014%. In terms of volume, Warminger’s buy order size was 
much larger compared to FPH’s overall on-market trading volume on that day. Figure 
6.3 shows trades in FPH between 10:43 and 10:45. 
 
Figure 6.3: Trades in FPH between 10:43 and 10:45 
This Figure shows trades in FPH between 10:43 and 10:45. Warminger bought 125,000 FPH 
shares in five DMA buy orders. His DMA trades pushed the last traded price up to $4.34. His 
trading activity resulted in a 4.6% increase in FPH’s share price, while the overall movement of 







This rapid increase in FPH’s price was instrumental in convincing the Goldman Sachs 
trader to pay $4.35 per share and secure the 300,000 share volume. Goldman Sachs then 
reported the off-market trade of 300,000 FPH shares at $4.35 at 10:54. Figure 6.4 shows 
the off-market trade. 
 
Figure 6.4: The off-market trade for 300,000 FPH shares at $4.35 
Goldman Sachs reported the off-market trade of 300,000 FPH shares with Warminger at $4.35 
at 10:54. 
As a result of this trade, Forsyth Barr became interested in buying 200,000 FPH shares 
from Warminger at $4.35 and then reported an off-market trade for 200,000 FPH at $4.35 
at 11:03. Figure 6.5 shows the second off-market trade. 
 
Figure 6.5: The off-market trade for 200,000 FPH at $4.35 
As a result of Goldman Sachs trade, Forsyth Barr became interested in buying 200,000 FPH 
shares at $4.35 and then reported an off-market trade for 200,000 FPH at $4.35 at 11:03. 
The FMA satisfied the court that Warminger was aware that Forsyth Barr and 
Goldman Sachs wanted to buy a substantial number of FPH shares off-market. He placed 
multiple buy orders on-market to manipulate and push the FPH price to an artificial level 





6.3.2  Warminger’s Trading in ATM Shares on 9 July 2014 
Warminger’s trades on 9 July were manipulative because they increased the price for 
ATM shares, which created a false or misleading demand for that security. He also 
maintained the market price at the elevated price level by entering relatively small buy 
orders compared to his fund’s holding of 54 million ATM shares at the time of trading. 
As the FMA highlighted in the judgment report, Warminger’s incentive for maintaining 
ATM share price at a higher level was because he was underperforming his benchmark 
and the fall in ATM’s share price in late February 2014 had contributed to that. 
This argument is consistent with Carhart et al. (2002), who found evidence that 
prices are abnormally high for investment funds’ equities because some fund managers 
use last-minute purchases to inflate the prices of the stocks they own. Closing transaction 
prices of investment fund holdings are often used to calculate manager performance and 
net asset value per share (NAV), which determine a fund’s ranking compared with other 
competitors and also determine fund manager remuneration and may other things. 
Based on the evidence from Warminger’s trades in ATM on 9 July 2014, the 
following behaviours can be considered as indicators of manipulation: 
 Manipulator trades accounted for a large portion of the traded shares for that 
specific security on the manipulation day. 
On 9 July 2014, Warminger bought a total of 709,900 ATM shares by entering 
26 buy orders using his DMA. His trading accounted for 67% of the total 
traded volume on that day, which was 1,050,372 shares. 
 The majority of these orders were submitted during or near the auction period. 
On 9 July 2014, Warminger’s trades accounted for 93% of the total volume 
traded near and during the auction period. 
 The manipulator trades in small parcels to maintain the price at a specific 
price level. 
 The ATM closing price on 8 July 2014 was $0.69. Warminger’s trades pushed 
the price up to $0.71 on 9 July 2014 during ordinary trading hours. Although 
more than 31,000 shares were offered at $0.69, Warminger entered 10 DMA 
buy orders for small volume (for example, 200 or 500 shares) at elevated 
prices to maintain the price. 
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 The manipulated price reverses on the next trading day. 
On 10 July 2014, the closing price for ATM shares was $0.68. 
6.3.3   Trade-Based Manipulation Characteristics 
Based on the above arguments from the judgment report, the main characteristics that 
can be used as indications for suspicious manipulative behaviour are as follows. First, 
the manipulator enters multiple buy orders on-market to push the price to an artificial 
level. In Warminger’s case, his trading activity resulted in a 4.6% increase in the FPH 
share price, while the overall movement of the S&P/NZX 50 was only 0.014%. Second, 
the manipulator trades accounted for a large portion of the traded shares for that specific 
security on manipulation day. Warminger’s buy order size was significantly large 
compared to FPH’s overall on-market trading volume on 27 May 2014. Also, his trading 
accounted for 67% of the total traded volume for ATM shares on 9 July 2014. Third, the 
majority of these orders were submitted during or near the closing auction period. 
Warminger’s trades accounted for 93% of the total volume traded near and during the 
auction period for ATM shares on 9 July 2014. Fourth, these on-market trades were 
followed by larger off-market trades in the opposite direction in order to profit from 
selling large volumes at the elevated price. In Warminger’s case, his on-market trades 
that resulted in a rapid increase in FPH’s price were instrumental in convincing Goldman 
Sachs and Forsyth Barr to pay $4.35 per share in their off-market trades. The fifth 
indicator was the manipulated price reversal on the next trading day. Although 
Warminger’s trades pushed the price up from $0.69 to $0.71 on 9 July 2014 during 
ordinary trading hours, the closing price for ATM shares on the next trading day was 
$0.68. 
Although the nature of the Warminger manipulation case is different from the 
closing price manipulation cases analysed by Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2011a) due 
to the differences in the U.S. and New Zealand stock markets, some of the manipulation 
characteristics are similar. By analysing 184 instances of manipulation obtained from 
eight independent manipulation cases in the U.S. and Canada, Comerton-Forde and 
Putniņš (2011a) found four main characteristics as indications for suspicious 
manipulative behaviour. First, manipulation caused abnormal price fluctuations of 1.4–
1.9%, which is around six times higher than the comparison of VWAP on pre and post 
manipulation days. Second, manipulated prices tend to reverse the next trading day. 
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Therefore, changes in end-of-day prices are considered the result of manipulation if they 
reverse in price by 50% or more on the morning of the next trading day within two hours 
after the market opens. Third, manipulation causes an abnormal increase in trading 
frequencies (number of trades), usually more than triple. Fourth, in the presence of 
manipulation, bid-ask spreads increase by between 0.11% and 0.63%. 
The insights from the Warminger case enabled academics and market practitioners 
to study this kind of manipulative behaviour for the first time by clarifying the central 
elements and characteristics of this kind of trade-based market manipulation in the New 
Zealand context. Based on these characteristics, I generated principal rules as the 
manipulation indication factors. I then created a rule-based index and applied the index 
to analyse S&P/NZX50 component stocks over a two-year period to measure the 
possibility and breadth of this kind of manipulation in New Zealand. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, a large portion of domestic off-market trades 
are executed during the adjust session, when the closing price is determined. Therefore, 
the closing call auction does not necessarily attract much volume and the volume of off-
market trades executed just after market close is much higher – sometimes 100 times 
larger – than the volume absorbed by the closing auction. A possible concern here is that 
an off-market trader who wants to trade a large volume at the closing auction price might 
manipulate the thin pre-close auction using relatively low volume so that their large-
volume off-market order is executed at the manipulated closing price just after the close.  
I decided to focus on trading around market close for two reasons. First, the 
majority of domestic off-market trade crossings are reported just after market close. 
Second, it is common for off-market trades to be priced at the closing auction price once 
that price is determined. Therefore, the closing price has the highest impact on setting an 
off-market trade price.  
6.3.4  Trader’s Identifier and Confidential Information 
The Warminger manipulation scenario involved the trading of small parcels on-market 
via DMA, followed by larger off-market trade in the opposite direction. Therefore, it is 
very important to find the link between on-market and off-market trades. The FMA v 
Warminger judgment report described some important features in the stock market data, 
referred to as trader identifiers, which are not available to the public. Each trade has an 
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identifier (for example, 5CE) that provides useful information about the trader, the 
trader’s institution, the broker who facilitated the trade, and whether the trader used DMA 
or not. This identifier plays a vital role in finding the relation between small trades on-
market and subsequent larger off-market trades in the opposite direction.  
Not having access to trade identifiers could lead to an increase in the number of 
false positives when I try to identify cases of market manipulation. For example, if a fund 
manager who owned a large portion of the shares of a relatively illiquid company 
legitimately sold the holding, the index model could flag this as manipulation because it 
might have a huge price impact. Also, price fluctuation in a company’s share could be 
due to a news or market announcement. For example, FBU’s share price dropped by more 
than 10% after the company announced on 20 March 2017 that its earnings might be 
$150 million less than expected.50 
To overcome this data limitation and to control the selection bias for stocks or days 
that systematically differed from other stocks or days, I applied a two-stage control. In 
the first stage, I checked whether there was any market announcement related to that 
specific stock and whether the announcement had any impact on the price. If the 
abnormal fluctuation was the result of a market announcement, it should not be 
considered as suspicious manipulative behaviour. In the second stage, I compared the 
price fluctuation for each stock with the S&P/NZX 50 movement over the same period 
of time. This was the same approach that the FMA had taken as a reference for the price 
impact of Warminger trades on FPH shares on 27 May 2014. As described on para 124 
in the Warminger’s judgment report, “Warminger’s DMA trades moved the quoted price 
up to $4.34, an increase of approximately 4.6%. Over the same period of time, the overall 
movement of the S&P/NZX50 was only 0.014%”. 
6.4  Data 
Trading data was obtained from Thomson Reuters Tick History (TRTH) which is 
provided to academics in New Zealand and Australia by SIRCA. I applied my 
manipulation index to analyse the S&P/NZX 50 component stocks over a two-year 
                                                 




period, from 20 August 2015 to 18 August 2017. This time period includes more than 
three million individual trades. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the S&P/NZX 50 
index is designed to measure the performance of the top 50 NZX-listed stocks in terms 
of market capitalisation. The S&P/NZX 50 index components stocks are the 50 largest 
and likely the most liquid stocks listed on the NZX. As of May 2018, the total market 
capitalisation of the S&P/NZX 50 components was $113.512 billion, which accounted 
for more than 86% of NZX’s overall capitalisation ($131.68 billion). Therefore, 
identifying suspicious manipulation and analysing S&P/NZX 50 components trades can 
provide a good understanding of the probability and breadth of this kind of manipulation 
in the NZX. 
As discussed earlier, it is probable that manipulation happens around market close 
time. Based on the results from the previous chapter, the closing call auction does not 
attract much volume compared to the off-market volume, which is sometimes 100 times 
larger. Also, it is common for off-market trades to be negotiated at the closing auction 
price once that price is determined. Therefore, similar to the manipulation scenarios 
described in the judgment report, an off-market trader who wants to trade a large volume 
at the closing auction price might manipulate the thin pre-close auction using relatively 
low volume so that his or her large-volume off-market order gets executed at the closing 
price just after the close. So, as mentioned previously, for the analysis in this chapter, I 
focused on trading activity around market close time. This includes trades during the half 
hour before the closing auction began (that is, between 4:15 pm and 4:45 pm), market 
closing trades as a result of the closing auction, and off-market trades during the adjust 
session (that is, between 5 pm and 5:30 pm). 
To obtain market announcements related to each specific stock, I used the NZX 
company research market announcements. These show all of the historical market 
announcements for all NZX-listed stocks, along with their price impact. Figure 6.6 shows 
a screenshot of FBU market announcements from the NZX company research website.51 
 
                                                 







Figure 6.6: FBU market announcements on the NZX company research website 
This Figure shows a screenshot of FBU market announcements from the NZX company research 
website. To obtain market announcements related to each specific stock, I used the NZX company 
research market announcements. These show all of the historical market announcements for all 
NZX-listed stocks, along with their price impact.  
6.5  Manipulation Index Model 
The index calculation for each stock/day is based on four steps. In the first step, the 
closing auction return, overall off-market trades volume reported during adjust session, 
and closing auction volume were determined. Using the same method I used in the 
previous chapter, all trades were categorised as either on- or off-market trades. The 
volume-weighted average price (VWAP) for on-market trades between 4:15 pm and 4:45 
pm was then calculated, the last half hour of the market ordinary trading hours. The 
closing auction return based on the VWAP and the market closing price was calculated. 
Closing auction volume was calculated as the total volume for all trades executed 
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simultaneously as a result of the closing auction. Figure 6.7 shows the index Step 1 
calculation. 
 








𝑇𝑜       16: 45
→ 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒(𝑉𝑊𝐴𝑃) 
𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 → {
𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒





𝑇𝑜       17: 30




}  → 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒(𝐴𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛) 
Figure 6.7: Proposed manipulation index Step 1 
In the index Step 1, the closing auction return, overall off-market trades volume reported during 
adjust session, and closing auction volume were determined. 
 
In the second step, the S&P/NZX 50 index return over the same period of time was 
determined. To do this, the S&P/NZX 50 index average price between 4:15 pm and 4:45 
pm and calculated index return based on the index average price and the market closing 




𝑇𝑜       16: 45
→ 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒 → 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
}  
→ 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛) 
Figure 6.8: Index components Step 2 calculates the S&P/NZX 50 index return 
Index components Step 2 calculates the S&P/NZX 50 index return over the same period of time. 
To do this, the S&P/NZX 50 average price between 4:15 pm and 4:45 pm and calculated index 
return based on the index average price and the market closing price were calculated. 
In the third step, I checked whether there was a significant difference between the 
closing auction return and the S&P/NZX 50 index return. Following Aitken et al. (2018), 
trading during the closing auction could be flagged as suspicious if, the auction return is 
more than three standard deviation away from the index return over the previous 30 
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trading days (3𝜎𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛). Similarly, the closing price is suspect when the following 
off-market trades are more than three standard deviation away from the closing auction 
volume over the previous 30 trading days (3𝜎𝑎𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 ).
52 Figure 6.9 shows the 










|𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑁𝑍𝑋50 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 |     >    3𝜎𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 
𝑎𝑛𝑑
|𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝑜𝑓𝑓_𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 − 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛| >  3𝜎𝑎𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒  
0                                           𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 ,                                                             
 
Figure 6.9: Index components Step 3 
The third step checked whether there was a significant difference between the closing auction 
return and S&P/NZX 50 index return. Trading during the closing auction could be flagged as 
suspicious if, first, the auction return was three times more or less than the S&P/NZX 50 index 
return and, second, if the following off-market trades have at least three times larger volume 
compared to the closing auction volume. 
As mentioned earlier, price fluctuation in a company’s share could be due to a 
release of news or a market announcement related to that specific company. Finally, in 
the fourth step, the NZX market announcement tool was checked for any market 
announcement related to that specific stock and whether the announcement had any 
impact on the price. An abnormal auction return can be considered to be the result of a 
suspicious manipulative trading activity in the absence of any related market 
announcement. 
The example below demonstrates how the proposed manipulation index flags 
suspicious manipulative trades. Table 6.1 shows trades from around 5 pm on 21 
November 2016 in shares of The Warehouse Group (WHS). The index flagged trading 
in the closing auction on that day as suspicious manipulation because it ticked all three 
boxes for manipulative behaviour. First, the closing auction return is significantly higher 
than the S&P/NZX 50 index during the same period. Second, the volume of off-market 
trades reported just after market close at the closing price is much higher than the volume 
                                                 
52 Being mindful about the impact of model parameters on model results, a simple sensitivity analysis was 
performed by varying the threshold parameter values one-at-a-time. To do so, I changed the 3σ threshold 
(which flagged 279 of closing priced as suspicious) to 2σ as well as 4σ. By setting the threshold to 2σ, the 
number of suspicious closing prices increased to 342 and by setting the threshold to 4σ, the number of 
suspicious closing prices decreased to 232. However, it does not affect this study findings as there are 
many observations much higher than the threshold. Table 6.2 shows some of the suspicious trades flagged 
by the manipulation index and a full list is provided in Appendix D. 
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absorbed by the closing auction on that day. Third, there was no price-sensitive market 
announcement around that time that could be considered as a reason for the abnormal 
price movement on that day. 
On 21 November 2016, the market opening price for WHS shares was $2.95. At 
4:35 pm WHS’s price was at the lowest intraday level at $2.89, which shows a drop of 
more than 2% in the intraday price level (highlighted in the blue box in Table 6.1). 
Although three trades were executed before the closing auction began at 4:45 pm, none 
of them was included in the price setting because they were too small compared to other 
trades and labelled as odd-lot (OL) trades. 
The green box in Table 6.1 highlights the orders executed simultaneously at the 
closing price, as a result of the closing auction mechanism from 4:45–5:00 pm. Closing 
auction trades moved the quoted price up to the highest intraday level at $2.96. The 
closing auction resulted in the price jumping from its lowest intraday level to the highest 
level, an increase of more than 2.4%. There was no price-sensitive market announcement 
around that time and, over the same period of time, the overall movement of the 
S&P/NZX 50 index was -0.167%. 
Just after the closing auction when the closing price was determined, two larger 
off-market orders were reported at the closing price; these are highlighted in the red box 
in Table 6.1. The number of overall traded shares in the closing auction was 21,103, 
followed by 411,677 shares traded off-market. The off-market trading volume were 









Table 6.1: Trades in WHS shares on 21 November 2016 
This Table shows trades from around 5 pm on 21 November 2016 in shares of WHS. The closing 
auction return is significantly higher than the S&P/NZX 50 index during the same period. 
Second, the volume of off-market trades reported just after market close at the closing price is 
much higher than the volume absorbed by the closing auction on that day. Third, there was no 
price-sensitive market announcement around that time that could be considered as a reason for 
the abnormal price movement on that day. 
 
 Date Open High Low Last Volume 
WHS 21/11/2016 $2.95 $2.96 $2.89 $2.96 942,510 
 
Time Price Volume Qualifiers Percentage 
Change 
16:20:54 2.90 5,968 Market Order -1.69 
16:22:42 2.91 2,500 Market Order -1.36 
16:35:36 2.89 9,204 Intraday Low -2.03 
16:35:36 2.89 13 Odd-Lot 
 
16:41:35 2.91 18 Odd-Lot 
 
16:41:36 2.91 43 Odd-Lot 
 
16:59:56 2.96 614 Intraday 
High 
0.34 
16:59:56 2.96 1,386 Market Order 0.34 
16:59:56 2.96 3,614 
 
0.34 
16:59:56 2.96 489 
 
0.34 
16:59:56 2.96 1,944 
 
0.34 
16:59:56 2.96 25 Odd-Lot 
 
16:59:56 2.96 5,031 
 
0.34 
16:59:56 2.96 1,969 
 
0.34 
16:59:56 2.96 6,031 
 
0.34 
17:01:06 2.96 411,094 Off-Market 
 






6.6  Results and Discussion 
Using an index for closing price manipulation based on the Warminger case, two years 
of trading data on S&P/NZX 50 component stocks were assessed to investigate the 
probability and intensity of closing price manipulations. The index flagged 279 
suspicious closing price manipulations. Considering that the data only covered trading 
on S&P/NZX 50 components during a two-year period of time, this analysis suggests 
that approximately 1% of closing prices may have been manipulated (i.e. 
279 (50𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 × 2𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 × 252𝑑𝑎𝑦/𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟)⁄ ). My findings are in line with Comerton-Forde 
and Putniņš (2014), who estimated that 1% of closing prices on U.S. and Canadian 
exchanges are manipulated - even though only a small fraction of these lead to 
prosecution. 
Table 6.2 shows some of the suspicious trades flagged by the manipulation index 
(a full list is provided in Appendix D). For each specific stock/date, the table shows the 
closing auction return and the S&P/NZX 50 index return over the same period of time. 
It also shows the total number of shares (volume) traded as a result of the closing auction 
and the overall volume of off-market traded reported during the adjust session at the 
closing price. Volume Difference is Off-market Trades Volume divided by Closing 
Auction Volume and shows how large the overall volume of off-market trades is 
compared to the closing auction volume. Return Difference is simply the difference 
between Closing Auction Return and NZX50 Closing Return in percentage. Suspicious 














Table 6.2: Some suspicious trades flagged by proposed manipulation index 
Volume Difference is Off-market Trades Volume divided by Closing Auction Volume and shows 
how large the overall volume of off-market trades is compared to the closing auction volume. 
Return Difference is simply the difference between Closing Auction Return and S&P/NZX 50 
Closing Return in percentage. Suspicious trades in the table are sorted from the highest return 


















1 WHS 21/11/2016 2.175 -0.167 21,103 411,677 19.53 2.342
2 TWR 16/12/2016 1.875 -0.321 51,325 3,119,732 60.78 2.196
3 ATM 12/11/2015 -2.045 0.029 14,700 130,324 8.87 2.074
4 SKC 14/03/2016 -1.893 0.061 9,779 161,666 16.53 1.954
5 SKT 15/03/2017 -1.652 0.045 8,263 42,720 5.17 1.697
6 OHE 20/09/2016 -1.656 0.014 2,101 22,000 10.47 1.67
7 SKL 1/04/2016 1.449 -0.175 25,945 183,090 7.06 1.624
8 ATM 25/08/2015 -1.429 0.19 5,950 191,062 32.11 1.619
9 KMD 11/05/2016 -1.797 -0.194 2,688 56,605 21.06 1.603
10 XRO 1/03/2016 -1.211 0.385 1,571 18,223 11.6 1.596
11 MPG 1/03/2017 1.351 -0.224 57,020 1,112,020 19.5 1.575
12 XRO 23/09/2015 -1.818 -0.265 1,162 28,329 24.38 1.553
13 OHE 12/05/2017 1.481 -0.069 3,500 17,910 5.12 1.55
14 MCY 9/08/2016 1.44 -0.106 1,195 110,009 92.06 1.546
15 VCT 1/06/2016 -1.478 0.038 1,802 20,702 11.49 1.516
16 MET 17/05/2016 1.381 -0.127 821 8,019 9.77 1.508
17 TWR 23/11/2016 -1.342 0.151 2,660 97,500 36.65 1.493
18 AIA 7/10/2016 1.638 0.155 8,036 224,915 27.99 1.483
19 STU 24/06/2016 1.28 -0.15 3,230 68,934 21.34 1.43
20 VHP 2/02/2016 -1.554 -0.13 5,367 44,633 8.32 1.424
21 ATM 20/08/2015 1.408 -0.008 35,000 195,478 5.59 1.416
22 SKL 1/03/2016 -0.99 0.385 2,326 80,760 34.72 1.375
23 VCT 18/09/2015 1.313 -0.028 15,000 128,135 8.54 1.341
24 MET 20/05/2016 -1.307 -0.005 6,280 71,444 11.38 1.302
25 KMD 22/01/2016 1.316 0.026 5,958 75,000 12.59 1.29
26 SKL 12/10/2015 1.429 0.141 8,271 46,268 5.59 1.288
27 XRO 4/12/2015 1.473 0.187 1,143 16,679 14.59 1.286
28 WHS 26/07/2017 -1.333 -0.048 2,939 50,000 17.01 1.285
29 OHE 28/10/2015 1.096 -0.164 7,800 105,597 13.54 1.26
30 TWR 13/01/2017 -1.073 0.17 292 23,000 78.77 1.243
31 MPG 24/11/2015 -1.274 -0.043 1,196 7,034,856 5881.99 1.231
32 FRE 14/06/2016 -1.385 -0.155 1,039 14,073 13.54 1.23
33 WHS 18/04/2017 -1.158 0.069 2,249 27,384 12.18 1.227
34 IFT 19/05/2016 -1.383 -0.157 37,608 204,751 5.44 1.226
35 EBO 25/09/2015 1.235 0.026 7,502 71,444 9.52 1.209
36 NZR 2/03/2017 1.132 -0.072 22,675 120,009 5.29 1.204
37 NZR 18/11/2016 1.124 -0.06 8,428 72,792 8.64 1.184
38 VHP 18/09/2015 1.156 -0.028 22,473 124,968 5.56 1.184
39 KMD 20/05/2016 -1.175 -0.005 603 35,950 59.62 1.17
40 AIR 27/01/2016 -1.254 -0.105 13,065 389,910 29.84 1.149
41 OHE 13/04/2016 1.235 0.087 22,593 122,354 5.42 1.148
42 SPK 19/09/2016 1.346 0.224 129,994 1,026,416 7.9 1.122
43 VCT 23/09/2016 1.218 0.111 4,100 35,085 8.56 1.107
44 NZX 31/03/2016 -0.971 0.13 19,244 234,586 12.19 1.101
45 NZR 28/07/2016 1.24 0.144 7,009 43,717 6.24 1.096
46 FRE 30/12/2015 -0.973 0.115 1,077 30,731 28.53 1.088
47 POT 26/09/2016 1.093 0.006 144 2,505 17.4 1.087
48 VCT 1/02/2016 -1.238 -0.161 100 8,601 86.01 1.077
49 SPK 12/12/2016 -1.051 0.025 62,074 744,066 11.99 1.076
50 KMD 5/12/2016 -1.081 -0.007 700 6,355 9.08 1.074
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Figure 6.10 shows the correlation between the calculated parameters for the 
manipulation index. Pearson's correlation coefficient (r) showed that only 
auction_volume and off-market_volume had significant positive correlation (at p-values 
< 0.01). This means closing actions that absorb higher volume of shares are usually 
followed by relatively large off-market trades. 
 
Figure 6.10: The correlation matrix for the index parameters 
This Figure shows the correlation between the calculated parameters for the manipulation index. 





In terms of the number of suspicious trades for each of the S&P/NZX 50 
components, ATM, KMD, and MPG with 19, 16, and 14 instances have the highest 
number of suspicious trades respectively. As mentioned earlier, each of these trades has 
different characteristics in term of the level of liquidity absorbed by closing action, the 
size of off-market trades relevant to the auction volume, and the price fluctuations as a 
result of the closing auction in comparison with S&P/NZX 50 overall movement at the 
same time. To be able to visualise this high-dimensional dataset in a two-dimensional 
map, I used a non-parametric visualisation technique called t-SNE (Maaten and Hinton 
2008). Figure 6.11 shows a two-dimensional map from the original dataset. Each point 
represents one instance of suspicious trade. That means stocks with more points have 
higher instances of suspicious trades. Also, the location of each point represents the 
specific characteristics of that instance of suspicious trade. Therefore spots which are 
closer to each other, shared similar characteristics. For example, suspicious trades in 
ANZ have similar characteristics and also are similar to the suspicious trade in TPW. An 
interesting observation here is that trading in some stocks can be categorised under one 
or two distinct repeating patterns (such as trades in EBO and  SKL) and some stocks like 




Figure 6.11: A two-dimensional representation from all instances of suspicious trades 
This Figure shows a two-dimensional map from the original dataset. Each point represents one 
instance of suspicious trade. That means stocks with more points have higher instances of 
suspicious trades. Also, the location of each point represents the specific characteristics of that 




As mentioned earlier, there are important features in the stock market data that are 
not available to the public. For example, the trades identifier, as described in paragraph 
25 in the Warminger’s judgment report, is pivotal in finding the relation between small 
trades executed on-market that are followed by larger opposing trades off-market. So, I 
have attempted to obtain market data from both NZX and FMA that contains historical 
trades coupled with these trader identities with full respect to any and all confidentiality 
restrictions placed upon me. With access to those data, I would be much better placed to 
tune my manipulation index and obtain a true picture of closing price manipulation on 
the NZX. 
I had two separate meetings with the NZX Surveillance team and the FMA Capital 
Markets Conduct team in Wellington in November 2017 to share my findings and request 
access to full market data, under appropriate confidentiality restrictions. From my 
understanding, this kind of academic research related to efficiency and integrity of the 
NZX is very interesting for market regulators in New Zealand. However, they were not 
in a position to provide more detailed information to me regarding the specific suspicious 
manipulated closing prices I noted because some of those might have already been 
flagged by the NZX Surveillance team and were under investigation.  
It is also important to note that these trading scenarios are very fact-specific and 
usually considered by regulators on a case by case basis. As Justice Venning highlighted 
in the judgment report, the purpose behind trades is very important for determining 
whether they were manipulative or made for legitimate and genuine purposes; this could 
be established in different ways, including being based on market data and by considering 
the context of the trading. The NZX would be concerned by any trading that appeared to 
influence the closing price or volume, to support a position that was then traded on the 
other side. This type of monitoring is an important part of the work undertaken by the 
NZX Surveillance team via its SMARTS systems. 
Although the results of my analysis suggest that approximately 1% of closing 
prices may have been manipulated in the NZX, these numbers could reflect a large upper 
bound from the market regulators’ perspective (i.e. the NZX and FMA). Generally, pre- 
and post-trade information is not a matter of public information, but is accessible to the 
NZX and FMA given their market surveillance role. Therefore, academics only have 
access to a portion of the market data that are available to the regulators. This lack of 
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breadth and depth of coverage in data could directly affect the quality and accuracy of 
academic research compared to exchanges surveillance and monitoring systems. 
However, regarding my analysis and findings in this chapter, the feedback I received 
from both the NZX and FMA suggests that my analysis is probably the best possible 
attempt at duplicating a stock market surveillance system using publicly available data. 
6.7  Conclusion 
In this chapter, I focused on plausible trade-based manipulative scenarios in relation to 
negotiated off-market trades in New Zealand. I proposed a rule-based index to measure 
the possibility and breadth of closing-price-manipulation on the NZX. To do so, I referred 
to Warminger v FMA, New Zealand’s first manipulation case to come to trial. Some of 
the information in the judgment report provides useful details and insight related to the 
machinery of exchange surveillance systems and regulators’ investigation process in the 
New Zealand context, and it became available to the public for the first time with this 
case. Insights from the Warminger case enabled academics and market practitioners to 
study this kind of manipulative behaviour by setting out and clarifying the central 
elements and characteristics of this kind of trade-based market manipulation in the New 
Zealand context.  
Based on these characteristics, I generated some principal rules as the manipulation 
indication factors. I then created a rule-based index and applied the index to analyse 
S&P/NZX 50 component stocks over a two-year period to measure the possibility and 
breadth of this kind of manipulation in New Zealand.  
I focused on trading around market close because of the importance of the closing 
price and also due to the NZX’s unique characteristics, described in the previous chapter. 
It is common for off-market trades to be executed at the closing auction price once they 
are determined and the volume of off-market trades executed just after market close is 
much higher than the volume absorbed by the closing auction. Therefore, the closing 
price has the highest impact on setting an off-market trade price. It is a plausible argument 
that an off-market trader who wants to trade a large volume at the closing auction price 
might manipulate the thin pre-close auction using relatively low volume so that their 




To the best of my knowledge, this is the first empirical analysis of manipulation in 
NZX. My analysis suggests that approximately 1% of closing prices in NZX may have 
been manipulated. These findings are in line with Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2014), 
who estimated that approximately 1% of all closing prices of stocks trading in the U.S. 
and Canadian stock exchanges could be manipulated, but only a small fraction of them 
lead to prosecution by market regulators. Based on the feedback I received from both 
NZX and FMA, my analysis is probably the best possible attempt at duplicating a stock 









 Research Summary, 
Conclusions and Future Work 
7.1  Overview 
This chapter provides a summary of this study’s conclusions based on the thesis 
objectives and research questions, and also provides some future research directions. 
7.2  What Are the Main Characteristics of Marking the Close 
Manipulation? 
One of the objectives of this study was to investigate characteristics of marking the close 
manipulation by analysing all reported prosecuted manipulation cases in the U.S. market. 
To do this, a manually collected dataset of 306 instances of closing price manipulation 
was created from 130 litigation releases by the SEC from 1995 to 2018. This dataset 
provided a unique opportunity to experimentally analyse repeating patterns and similar 
manipulative behaviours related to the key elements of closing price manipulation. This 
study’s findings were mainly in line with the current literature. 
Based on the manipulation cases analysed in this study, two key concepts were 
identified for assessing manipulative trades: the context of the trading and market data 
analytics. In the former, regulators may use evidence from letters, emails or telephone 
communications as proof of intention. In the second approach, the SEC describes factors 
they use as alerts for market manipulation based on trades and quotes.  
As described by the SEC, the main characteristics of marking the close 
manipulation that can be used as indications of manipulative behaviours are: 
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- Trading in order to drive up the closing price of a security on important dates, 
such as the month’s last trading day 
- Attempting to set the closing price higher than the closing price on the previous 
trading day 
- Placing a sequence of buy orders in the last 10−20 minutes of trading 
- Buying at prices that matched or set the stock’s intraday high 
- In more liquid stocks, manipulator trading often represented more than 75% of 
the total market volume in the last 15 minutes prior to market close 
- Prices drop on the next trading day as soon as the manipulation ends. 
Similar to the factors that the SEC used as alerts for market manipulation, Aitken et al. 
(2018) and Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2011a) developed two indices as measures for 
the frequency and severity of marking the close manipulation. The Aitken et al. (2018) 
manipulation index compares the price changes in the last 15 minutes before market close 
for each given day with the distribution of average price changes in the past 30 trading 
days. The Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2011a) manipulation index is more complex, 
with suspicious manipulation instances determined based on sudden increases in returns, 
trading frequency, bid-ask spreads before market close, and reversion to true prices in 
the morning of the next trading day. These characteristics of manipulated stocks are also 
in line with several other studies (Carhart et al. 2002; Hillion and Suominen 2004; Branch 
and Evans 2011). 
7.3  What Are the Motivations for Manipulation? 
Regarding the motivations for manipulation and the reasons behind manipulation, the 
findings of the present study suggest that fund managers, CEOs and company’s 
executives, as well as a company’s major shareholders, might want to manipulate a 
closing price of a listed company for various reasons; this is in line with the current 
literature. 
Some fund managers have manipulated the closing price of the stocks they are 
heavily invested in at the end of the month to improve their performance during the 
reporting period. Ben-David et al. (2013) found that this is common in stocks with 




CEOs and a company executives might manipulate the closing price to profit from 
positions in derivatives like options. Some studies examined the abnormal price 
movements around executive stock option grants and found evidence that CEOs and 
other executives manipulate the company’s stock price prior to their option grant date 
(Cicero 2009; Balsam et al. 2003). Chauvin and Shenoy (2001) described inside 
directors’ stock option grants as an opportunity for CEOs to manipulate the market 
without being involved in insider trading. 
A company’s major shareholders manipulate closing prices mainly to benefit 
indirectly from price fluctuations (such as avoiding margin calls). Christopherson and 
Gregoriou (2004) discussed a closing price manipulation scenario to avoid margin calls 
from a short-seller’s perspective. 
Satisfying Nasdaq listing requirements was the reason behind a substantial portion 
of manipulation cases. This was done either to facilitate a company’s listing on Nasdaq 
or to keep the stock listed on Nasdaq. These companies sought to be listed on Nasdaq 
primarily to gain access to more liquidity and improve the companies’ public profiles 
(Harris et al. 2008). 
7.4  What Are the Typical Characteristics of Manipulated Stocks?  
I found that by far the majority of manipulated stocks were relatively illiquid stocks 
traded on OTC markets. This finding is in line with recent studies (Aggarwal and Wu 
2006; Nelson et al. 2013; Massoud et al. 2016), all of which found that OTC-listed stocks 
are frequent targets for market manipulation. Based on Cumming et al. (2015), 
companies quoted on the OTC Markets cover the largest portion of litigated manipulation 
cases in the US, Canada, and the UK. 
7.5  When Manipulation Is More Likely to Happen? 
I found that manipulation can occur either over a period of successive trading days or 
just on a specific date. An interesting observation based on the manipulation cases 
examined is that the manipulation period is much shorter in larger and more liquid stocks. 
Highly liquid stocks generally have high levels of trading activity, low information 
asymmetry, and high-order book depth (Cooper et al. 1985; Withanawasam et al. 2013). 
These characteristics make them more difficult to manipulate because other market 
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participants provide liquidity and trade against the manipulator (Aitken et al. 2015a). 
This observation is in line with the literature that highly liquid stocks are difficult to 
manipulate (Comerton-Forde and Putniņš 2014, 2011a; Withanawasam et al. 2015). 
7.6  What Was the Impact of Market Regulation on HFT Participation, 
Market Efficiency, and Market Integrity in the U.S. Equity 
Markets? 
In November 2010, the SEC adopted the Securities Exchange Act Rule 15c3-5 (the Rule) 
to address specific vulnerabilities based on the U.S. markets’ new structure. This was the 
SEC’s first response to new developments in trading technology and strategies like HFT. 
The present study sought to investigate the impact of the SEC’s naked access ban on HFT 
participation, market efficiency, and market integrity by executing an event study natural 
experiment. 
In order to examine the impact of the Rule on HFT activity, the cancel-to-trade 
ratio and trade-to-order volume were used as proxies for HFT activities. Surprisingly, 
banning direct market agreements (DMAs) did not decrease HFT activities in the market. 
The study’s findings suggest that HFT activities increased over time, and the Rule change 
increased HFT participation in U.S. markets. The rule had no negative effect on HFT 
participation, perhaps because it increased latency for all market participants. HFTs 
therefore still had the advantage of routing and placing the orders much faster than their 
competitors. Furthermore, most large HFT firms are also broker-dealers and can route 
their orders and trades through required surveillance systems very quickly. 
As a proxy for market integrity, the estimated number of suspiciously manipulated 
prices for each stock was compared before and after the Rule compliance date. The 
results showed that the average number of manipulations decreased after the Rule 
compliance date, while the median remained almost the same, which indicates that the 
Rule improved market integrity by decreasing the intensity of price manipulation. This 
means the number of days with a high number of manipulated prices decreased after the 
Rule. More HFT participation in the market makes manipulation more difficult by 
providing liquidity and trading against the manipulator and decreasing adverse selection. 
The findings of this study are in line with those of Aitken et al. (2015a), who found that 
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HFT activities significantly reduced both the frequency and the severity of market 
manipulation. 
As a proxy for market efficiency, a combination of trade-based and order-based 
measures for price discovery, market volatility, and market liquidity (such as daily 
turnover, trading volume, daily trading frequency, daily return, relative bid-ask spread, 
and price volatility) was used. My findings suggest that trading cost and market volatility, 
as two important aspects of market efficiency, improved in association with the increase 
in HFT participation. Interestingly, although lower trading cost and lower market 
volatility indicated more efficient markets, trade-based measures for liquidity became 
worse. The reason behind the difference between trade-based and order-based measures 
of market liquidity likely lies in HFT firms’ sophisticated trading strategies. As part of 
their trading strategies, HFT firms submit many non-marketable resting orders, the vast 
majority of which will be cancelled or modified as a result of changes in market 
conditions. 
As the SEC anticipated, risk management controls required by the Rule resulted in 
overall improved efficiency and fairness in the U.S. financial markets. My research also 
found evidence that the improvement of both efficiency and integrity in the U.S. markets 
after the Rule compliance date was associated with increasing HFT participation in the 
market. These findings are in line with those of Jovanovic and Menkveld (2016) that 
HFT activities lead to narrower bid-ask spreads, as they intermediate trades at a lower 
cost. 
7.7  What Was the Impact of Market Regulation on the NZX Level of 
On-Market Liquidity and on Promoting Fair and Efficient 
Market? 
In an electronic limit‐order market, it is common for a portion of trades to occur off-
market. For example, approximately 30% of the ASX’s overall dollar turnover in 2011 
was conducted off-market (Berkman and Comerton‐Forde 2011). However, based on the 
NZX company research data, around two-thirds of the total dollar turnover of the NZX 
is currently conducted off-market, which is a relatively high proportion. 
In April 2018, NZX published a participant rule consultation request seeking 
feedback related to some rule changing to promote more liquidity and market integrity 
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on the NZX (NZX 2018a). The proposed rule change mainly centres around two main 
changes: introducing a new pricing structure based on a value base point change, and 
initiating a minimum value of NZD50,000 for off-market trades. These changes in the 
NZX pricing and rule structure are in line with ASX’s current trading rules and, as 
mentioned in the consultation report, are consistent with global best practice to increase 
market liquidity. By setting a minimum crossing threshold for off-market trades, the NZX 
has aimed to increase liquidity and the levels of on-market activity to achieve greater 
price discovery. This thesis investigated the possible impact of the NZX’s proposed Rule 
changing on its on-market liquidity. 
This thesis examined what proportion of off-market trades are smaller than $50,000 
and how much liquidity they could add to the NZX market as a result of this rule change. 
The results suggested that, in terms of the number of trades, more than half of domestic 
off-market trades have a value of less than $50,000. In the past 10 years, 88% of all NZX 
trades were conducted on-market. Over the same period of time, around 7% of NZX 
trades were off-market with less than $50,000 value. Therefore, based on the NZX level 
of liquidity over the past 10 years, the new rule can result in an 8% increase in on-market 
trades in terms of the number of executed trades (from 88% to 95%).  
This thesis also examined what proportion of dollar volume of trading could be 
added to the NZX on-market liquidity as a result of forcing small off-market trades to 
execute on-market. In this regard, the off-market trade value was broken down into trades 
with a value less than $50,000 and trades larger than $50,000. The findings indicated 
that, in total, only 4% of off-market trades were less than $50,000. Therefore, based on 
the overall value of NZX trades in the past 10 years, the new rule can increase on-market 
trading volume from 28% to 32%. 
7.8  What Are the Main Characteristics of the NZX? 
By analysing all S&P/NZX 50 stocks trades from 2007 to 2017, this thesis has shown 
some important, and possibly unique, characteristics of the NZX. Based on traditional 
liquidity measures like monthly dollar turnover, NZX market liquidity increased in recent 
years. NZX trading volume increased from 2 billion shares in 2010 to 3.4 billion shares 
in 2014 for S&P/NZX 50 components stocks, possibly due to the Financial Markets 
Conduct Act 2013, tax changes in 2010, and KiwiSaver scheme providers holding 
domestic stocks in their portfolios. This increase in the overall trading value was 
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associated with tighter relative bid-ask spreads as revealed by the following analysis: a 
time-weighted relative bid-ask spread was calculated following McInish and Wood 
(1992), as the difference between the best-bid and best-ask orders in the order book and 
scaled by the midpoint price, then weighted by the time it existed during continuous 
trading hours, then averaged over all stocks for each trading day.  
In order to measure algorithmic trading activity in the market, the order-to-trade 
ratio (OTR) was calculated as the total monthly volume of orders (number of shares) 
divided by the overall number of executed orders. From 2011, both trading volume and 
trading frequency increased significantly compared to previous years. The FMA 2012 
report on the NZX General Obligations Review highlighted these increases in NZX 
trading activities and linked that to the rise in algorithmic trading activities from overseas 
institutional clients as NZX provided a number of algorithmic traders access to the NZX 
trading system via DMA. The NZX Regulatory Agenda 2017 reported that algorithmic 
trading is responsible for approximately 10% of NZX trading by value and that most of 
these trades were submitted by Australian-based traders utilising DMA. As expected, this 
increase in algorithmic trading activity on the NZX was associated with higher trading 
frequency (number of executed trades) and lower average trade size in terms of value.  
Surprisingly, the findings of the present study suggest that, by considering all trades 
for S&P/NZX 50 components from July 2007 to September 2017, only 28% of total NZX 
trades by value were executed on-market and were part of the price-setting process and 
72% of all trades by value were conducted off-market. 
 NZX off-market trades can be categorised into two main groups: international 
trades and domestic trades. Most of the off-market international trades were negotiated 
during the NZX enquiry session when the market is closed overnight which is due to 
New Zealand’s time zone. Based on NZX’s trading rules, all negotiated trades during the 
enquiry session should be reported to the NZX trading system during the next trading 
day’s pre-open session. Therefore, almost all of the off-market trades reported during the 
pre-open session are international off-market trades. A large portion of domestic off-
market trades are negotiated and reported during the adjust session when the closing price 
is determined just after the market closes. The overall volume of negotiated off-market 
trades reported after market close is approximately four times higher than the volume 
absorbed by the closing auction. 
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An important area of concern related to the high level of off-market trading is that 
it is common for off-market trades to be executed at the closing auction price once that 
price has been determined (that is, large, off-market volume is often not part of the 
closing auction mechanism), and that the closing call auction does not necessarily attract 
much volume. Therefore, the volume of off-market trades executed just after market 
close is much higher – sometimes 100 times larger – than the volume absorbed by the 
closing auction. A possible concern here is that an off-market trader who wants to trade 
a large volume at the closing auction price might manipulate the thin pre-close auction 
using relatively low volume, so that their large-volume off-market order is executed at 
the manipulated closing price just after the close. 
Based on NZX trading conduct, if an off-market trade party tries to influence 
market price by trading on-market to benefit from a higher or lower price in an off-market 
trade, this could be considered manipulative as it harms price discovery. As off-market 
trades are usually conducted at or within the bid-ask spread, on-market trades determine 
the price level and spread (that is, price discovery). So, if on-market trade becomes too 
thin, price discovery cannot be trusted, which leaves room for manipulation. 
7.9  Closing Price Manipulation in the NZX 
In March 2017, the Warminger vs FMA judgment report was published as New Zealand’s 
first trade-based manipulation case to come to trial. The judgment report enabled 
empirical studies related to market manipulation in New Zealand for the first time as it 
revealed a pattern of manipulative practices based on the NZX’s unique trading 
characteristics in relation to its high level of off-market transactions. This thesis 
presented a rule-based index to measure the possibility and breadth of closing-price-
manipulation based on the principles of manipulation in the New Zealand context 
described by the FMA’s market experts and the defence expert witness. This index was 
then used to analyse trades in the S&P/NZX 50 components stocks over a two-year period 
to measure the possibility and breadth of this kind of manipulation on the NZX. 
The main characteristics that can be used as indications for suspicious manipulative 
behaviour are as follows. First, the manipulator enters multiple buy orders on-market to 
push the price to an artificial level. In Warminger’s case, his trading activity resulted in 
a 4.6% increase in the FPH share price, while the overall movement of the NZX 50 was 
only 0.014%. Second, manipulator trades accounted for a large portion of the traded 
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shares for that specific security on the manipulation day. Warminger’s buy order size was 
much larger compared to FPH’s overall on-market trading volume on 27 May 2014. Also, 
his trading accounted for 67% of the total traded volume for ATM shares on 9 July 2014. 
Third, the majority of these orders were submitted during or near the closing auction 
period. Warminger’s trades accounted for 93% of the total volume traded near and during 
the auction period for ATM shares on 9 July 2014. Fourth, these on-market trades were 
followed by larger off-market trades in the opposite direction in order to profit from 
selling large volumes at the elevated price. In Warminger’s case, his on-market trades 
that resulted in a rapid increase in FPH’s price were instrumental in convincing Goldman 
Sachs and Forsyth Barr to pay $4.35 per share in their off-market trades. The fifth 
indicator was the manipulated price reversal on the next trading day. Although 
Warminger’s trades pushed the price up from $0.69 to $0.71 during ordinary trading 
hours on 9 July 2014, the closing price for ATM shares on the next trading day was $0.68. 
This study focused on trading around market close time for two reasons. First, the 
majority of domestic off-market trade crossings are reported just after market close. 
Second, it is common for off-market trades to be priced at the closing auction price once 
that price is determined. Therefore, the closing price has the highest impact on setting an 
off-market trade price.  
Using an index for closing price manipulation based on the Warminger case, two 
years of trading data on NZX 50 component stocks were analysed in order to investigate 
this type of manipulation. As a result of this analysis, 288 suspicious closing-price 
manipulations were identified. Considering that the data only cover trading on NZX 50 
components during a two-year period of time, this analysis suggests that approximately 
1% of closing prices may have been manipulated. These findings are in line with 
Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2014), who estimated that 1% of closing prices on the U.S. 
and Canadian stock markets are manipulated — even though only a small portion of them 
were prosecuted and reported by market regulators. 
7.10  Limitations and Future Work 
The main objective of this thesis was to empirically investigate the impact of closing 
price manipulation on different aspects of market quality in both liquid (US) and 
relatively illiquid (New Zealand) markets. 
156 
 
Regarding HFT firms’ activity and algorithmic trading participation, this study 
used two popular indirect measures: cancel-to-trade ratio and trade-to-order volume for 
HFT firms’ activity in the U.S. and algorithmic trading in New Zealand markets. 
Although these indirect measures are widely used by academics and market regulators, 
they are not as accurate as direct measures that are usually based on the firm’s primary 
business or the services they use to reduce trading latency. This limitation could result in 
the level of HFT participation and algorithmic activity being misestimated. A possible 
area for future research could be to replicate this analysis based on direct measures if 
New Zealand or U.S. exchanges provide datasets that enable direct studies on the level 
of algorithmic trading and HFT participation in the markets. 
Although HFT market participation increased in the U.S. markets, there is some 
recent evidence that HFT profits are generally shrinking because of heightened 
competition between HFT firms (Serbera and Paumard 2016; Miller and Shorter 2016). 
Harris (2013) named this phenomenon the HFT arms race and addressed some tools that 
HFTs use to be faster than their competitors. These include being as close as possible to 
exchange servers, using extremely fast computers and high-speed data feeds, and even 
hard-coding software onto silicon chips to reduce processing response times. Another 
subject that could be explored is the effect of this competition between HFT firms on 
other market participants and the quality of equity markets. 
Regarding market manipulation in New Zealand, Warminger’s manipulation 
scenario mainly involved trading a relatively small on-market volume, followed by larger 
off-market trade in the opposite direction. Therefore, finding the link between on-market 
and off-market trades is crucial. However, due to the confidentiality of traders’ identities, 
these important features of the stock market data are not available to the public, including 
academics.  
In order to tune the manipulation index presented in this study and obtain a true 
picture of the prevalence of manipulation on the NZX, attempted to obtain market data 
from both the NZX and the FMA that contains historical trades, coupled with traders’ 
identities, with full respect to any and all confidentiality restrictions placed upon me. 
However, neither the NZX nor the FMA were in a position to provide me with these 
details regarding the identified suspicious manipulated closing prices because some of 
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those might have already been flagged by the NZX Surveillance Team and were already 
under investigation. 
Not having access to trade identifiers could lead to an increase in the number of 
false positives. For example, if a fund manager who owned a large portion of the shares 
of a relatively illiquid company legitimately sold the holding, the index could flag this as 
manipulation because it might have a significant price impact. Also, price fluctuation in 
a company’s shares could be due to news or a market announcement. 
To overcome this data limitation problem and to control the selection bias for 
stocks or days that systematically differed from other stocks or days, a two-stage control 
was applied in this study. In the first stage, I checked whether there was any market 
announcement related to that specific stock and whether the announcement had any 
impact on the price. If the abnormal fluctuation was the result of a market announcement, 
it should not be considered as suspicious manipulative behaviour. In the second stage, 
the price fluctuation for each stock was compared with the S&P/NZX 50 movement over 
the same period of time. This means that the abnormal returns ignored if the price 
movements were as a result of a systemic reason that also affected the overall market. 
Future research could consider more sophisticated approaches in this regard, such as 
considering the level of institutional ownership, price changes on ASX for double-listed 
stocks, and using Thomson Reuters News Analytics. 
Although the results of this analysis suggest that approximately 1% of closing 
prices may have been manipulated on the NZX, these numbers could be unrealistically 
high from the perspective of the market regulators (that is, the NZX and the FMA). 
Generally, pre- and post-trade information is not a matter of public information, but is 
accessible to the NZX and the FMA given their market surveillance role. Therefore, 
academics only have access to a portion of the market data that are available to the 
regulators. This lack of breadth and depth of coverage in data could directly affect the 
quality and accuracy of academic research compared to exchanges surveillance and 
monitoring systems. However, regarding the analysis and findings in this thesis, the 
feedback received from both the NZX and the FMA suggests that the analysis is probably 
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The following Table shows the full list of 306 instances of closing price manipulation 
obtained from 130 litigation releases in the US. All of the manipulation instances can be 
obtained from 40 independent cases. These manipulations were related to trading in 71 
independent stocks from major U.S. stock exchanges including NYSE, Nasdaq, AMEX 
and also relatively small off-exchange trading in OTC markets and pink sheets. 
No. In the Matter of: 
Release 
Date/        
File No. 








28, 2005 /    
3-12136 
NYSE 
Boulder Total Return 
Fund (“BTF”) Boulder 
Growth and Income 
Fund (“BIF”) 
June 28, 2002 
2 Sep 27, 2002 
3 Dec 31, 2002 
4 Mar 31, 2003 
5 June 30, 2003 
6 Sep 30, 2003 
7 Dec 31, 2003 
8 
John Hancock 
Financial Trends, Inc. 
(“JHFT”) 
June 28, 2002 
9 Sep 27, 2002 
10 Dec 31, 2002 
11 Mar 31, 2003 
12 June 30, 2003 
13 Sep 30, 2003 
14 Dec 31, 2003 
15 
First Financial Fund 
(“FF”) 
June 28, 2002 
16 Sep 27, 2002 
17 Dec 31, 2002 
18 Mar 31, 2003 
19 June 30, 2003 
20 Sep 30, 2003 














Sep 30, 2009 
23 Oct 30, 2009 
24 Nov 30, 2009 




Dec 31, 2009 
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May 19, 2006 
29 May 22, 2006 









23, 2011 / 3-
14676 
Nasdaq AltiGen (“ATGN”)  
Jan 31, 2008 
32 Mar 31, 2008 
33 Apr 30, 2008 
34 May 30, 2008 
35 June 20, 2008 
36 Sep 30, 2008 
37 Oct 31, 2008 
38 Feb 27, 2009 
39 May 28, 2010 
40 Sep 30, 2010 
41 
Nasdaq 
Derma Sciences, Inc., 
(“Derma Sciences” or 
“DSCI”)  
Sep 30, 2008 






Oct 31, 2008 




Mar 31, 2009 
46 









October 18, 1999 
47 October 20, 1999 
48 October 21, 1999 
49 October 22, 1999 












Fidelity First Financial 
Corporation ("Fidelity 
First") 
Dec 31, 2002 
52 April 28, 2003 
53 April 29, 2003 
54 April 30, 2003 
55 Biometrics Security 
Technology, Inc. (f/k/a 
Aug Corp.) 
("Biometrics") 
Dec 27, 2002 
56 Dec 30, 2002 
57 Dec 31, 2002 
58 
Lighthouse Fast Ferry, 
Inc. ("Lighthouse") 
April 30, 2001 
59 June 29, 2001 
60  July 31, 2001 
61 August 31, 2001 
62 Sep 28, 2001 
63 Oct 31, 2001 
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64 Nov 30, 2001 
65 Dec 26, 2001 
66 Dec 28, 2001 
67 Dec 31, 2001 
68 LNB Bancorp, 
Inc., et. al. 
May 19, 
2004 / 04 
CV 0933 
Nasdaq 
LNB Bancorp, Inc.                              
the Lorain National 
Bank  
March 13, 2000 











June 17, 2004 
71 June 18, 2004 
72 June 21, 2004 
73 June 22, 2004 
74 July 8, 2004 
75 July 20, 2004 
76 Aug 2, 2004 
77 Aug 12, 2004 
78 Aug 18, 2004 
79 Sep 9, 2004 
80 Sep 17, 2004 
81 Oct 4, 2004 
82 Oct 5, 2004 
83 Oct 6, 2004 
84 Oct 7, 2004 
85 Oct 8, 2004 
86 Oct 11, 2004 
87 Oct 12, 2004 
88 Oct 14, 2004 
89 Oct 15, 2004 
90 Oct 20, 2004 
91 Nov 4, 2004 
92 Nov 19, 2004 
93 Nov 29, 2004 
94 Dec 10,2004 
95 Dec 13,2004 
96 Feb 11, 2005 
97 Feb 14, 2005 
98 Feb 18, 2005 
99 Mar 3, 2005 
100 Mar 28, 2005 
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101 Mar 29, 2005 













 August 11, 






March 30, 2000 
104 October 19, 2000 
105 October 20, 2000 
106 January 30, 2001 
107 June 16, 2002 
108 March 8, 2000 
109 
Michael Rivers, 





First Federal Capital 
Corporation 











March 24, 2006 
111 May 9, 2006 
112 January 12, 2007 
113 January 31, 2007 
114 April 3, 2007 
115 April 25, 2006 
116 June 21, 2006 
117 March 19, 2007 




November 3, 2005 
120 February 16, 2006 
121 February 28, 2006 
122 June 1, 2006 
123 May 15, 2006 
124 July 18, 2006 
125 August 10, 2006 
126 
Hydrogen Hybrid 
Technologies, Inc.  
May 23, 2008 
127 May 30, 2008 
128 June 18, 2008, 




30, 1997 / 
39155 
NYSE 
Nelson Inc. (Thomas 
Nelson) "TNM." 
July 17, 1995 
131 July 18, 1995 
132 August 18, 1995 
133 RKC Capital 
Management, 
LLC, RKC 
May 1, 2012 
/ 2:12-cv-
00408-BCW 
OTC BB & 
pink sheets  
Global Pari Mutuel 
Services, Inc.  
September 30, 
2009 
















Meyer Sutton  
February 25, 
2004 / 04 
CV 1584  
NYSE 




August 20, 1999 
139 
David Aubel and 
Robert Raffa 
April 07, 














LSE British Biotech plc, 







 Volkswagen A.G. 







Banca di Roma SpA 






ADRs of Pohang Iron 
and Steel 













 James T. Patten  
December 
12, 2005 /  3-
11812 
Nasdaq Initio, Inc.  
July 26, 2002 
151 July 29, 2002 
152 August 2, 2002 




















Jan 31, 2006 
159 Feb 28, 2006 
160 March 31, 2006 
161 April 28, 2006 
162 May 31, 2006 
163 June 30, 2006 
164 July 31, 2006 
165 Aug 31, 2006 
166 Sep 29, 2006 
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167 Oct 31, 2006 
168 Nov 30, 2006 
169 Dec 29 2006 
170 Jan 31, 2007 
171 Feb 28, 2007 














February 28, 2007 
174 
ProElite, Inc. (PETE 
or PELE) 
9/29/2006 



























































Java Detour, Inc. 
(JVDT) 
































China Auto Logistics, 
Inc. 
February 11, 2010 














May 28, 2010 
236 January 29, 2010 
237 February 26, 2010 
238 May 28, 2010 
239 July 30, 2010 









243 February 28, 2011 
244 March 31, 2011 
245 May 31, 2011 
246 June 30, 2011 








251 February 29, 2012 
252 March 30, 2012 
253 April 30, 2012 
254 May 31, 2012 
255 June 29, 2012 
256 July 31, 2012 




259 February 28, 2013 
260 March 28, 2013 
261 April 30, 2013 















available on SEC 
report 





AMEX KFX, Inc. 
In March and  










From July 1990 
through April 1995 
266 Adrian C. Havill 
November 







and June 25, 1990 





















SMX Corp. ("SMX") 
March 2000 to 
April 2003 
269 
XtraCard Corp. (fka 
Nu-D-Zine, Inc.) 















in January 2012 
273 
LNB Bancorp, 






2004 / 04 
CV 0933 
Nasdaq LNB Bancorp, Inc. 
February 11, 2000 




Inc. , et. al. 
August 11, 






between July 1998 










First Federal Capital 
Corporation ("First 
Federal") 










Avicena Group, Inc.  
(now “Alternext”) 
Between March 
24, 2006 and 









Technologies, Inc.  




279 Northern Ethanol, Inc.  
from April 9, 2008 







May 1, 2012 
/ 2:12-cv-
00408-BCW 
OTC BB & 
pink sheets  
Global Pari Mutuel 
Services, Inc.  
From Nov 2007 
through Dec 2009 





10, 2015 / 3-
16805 
  
China Auto Logistics 
Inc.  
from September 













2004 / CV 
04-6613  
  Stan Lee Media, Inc. 
between October 
2, 2000 and 
November 24, 
2000 
285 Mike Zaman 
September 





From February 14 




286  James T. Patten  
December 
12, 2005 /  3-
11812 
Nasdaq Initio, Inc.  
from  June 2002 
through April 2003  



















  SCL Ventures, Ltd 
 From late January 






26, 2002 / 3-
10955 
Nasdaq ImmunoGen, Inc.  
From August 1995 
to December 1995 
290 
James F. Vigue 















F. Cannata, P. 
Mintz 
April 9, 2001 




















Inc. (ALPS or 
ALPNET) 







30, 2015 / 3-
16877 
OTC 
Gatekeeper USA, Inc. 
“GTKP” 
January 2010 
through July 2013 
294 

















 OTC Link 














From December 4, 












Software Services of 
America, Inc. 
(Software) 



























































The following shows a summary of all 40 independent judgment reports related to all 
marking the close manipulation cases in the US. The summary covers some key questions 
related to the principles of marking the close manipulation for each isolated instance of 
manipulation related to each case. These questions are:  
 Who manipulates the prices? 
 When do manipulations occur? 
 Why do people manipulate stock prices? 


















Appendix C:  
The following Table shows the full list of trading value for all 50 stocks from both NZX 
company research website and based on the data sourced from TRTH. The summary 
shows both on-market and off-market total traded value for each stock between 29 
September 2016 and 28 September 2017, based on the trade data available in my dataset, 
and compared the results with the data provided by the NZX Company Research website.  
 
Data provided by NZX company 
research website 











AIA 927,110,337 1,029,149,260 934,013,071 1,049,076,889 
AIR 511,940,785 475,148,330 515,859,171 479,289,846 
ANZ 92,904,464 179,100,333 93,428,338 186,910,309 
ARG 108,988,194 135,739,302 109,503,527 136,696,025 
ARV 64,664,208 81,619,005 64,804,178 82,730,932 
ATM 547,638,110 1,623,977,937 548,496,064 1,633,241,863 
CBL 40,212,674 189,370,421 40,608,383 192,418,560 
CEN 562,872,564 644,522,883 565,771,017 649,585,559 
CNU 258,448,753 631,185,463 259,439,135 640,003,250 
EBO 161,893,265 145,648,107 162,312,682 146,726,373 
FBU 1,407,307,610 3,615,140,852 1,413,136,777 3,659,311,273 
FPH 837,063,343 1,788,413,331 843,138,817 1,806,212,382 
FRE 119,914,775 159,593,052 120,249,471 164,560,013 
FSF 312,803,433 264,810,769 313,414,081 265,437,185 
GMT 147,832,228 154,920,269 148,644,918 158,522,374 
GNE 208,366,027 182,462,030 208,993,237 186,046,148 
HBL 101,572,526 54,723,415 102,109,905 54,906,123 
IFT 232,283,446 220,571,421 233,010,910 220,387,000 
IPL 44,406,933 66,421,055 44,673,637 66,674,213 
KPG 253,604,357 372,036,239 254,694,896 379,235,954 
MCY 333,798,573 302,688,154 336,025,591 307,181,699 
MEL 483,034,840 439,580,089 484,633,866 441,114,756 
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MET 171,851,467 488,544,987 172,315,565 497,512,629 
MFT 169,111,505 140,082,743 169,736,342 139,602,382 
MPG 69,383,475 131,658,015 69,797,438 133,092,770 
NZR 100,237,254 173,277,854 100,778,970 173,155,403 
OCA 55,326,088 96,135,376 55,326,088 96,373,781 
PCT 146,825,600 219,658,653 147,344,599 221,766,905 
PFI 65,647,195 60,062,034 65,895,557 60,449,066 
POT 121,442,337 91,389,232 121,001,474 91,131,863 
RBD 84,951,850 127,420,841 85,735,713 129,170,588 
RYM 672,909,677 616,141,710 674,414,324 617,502,156 
SAN 46,554,922 148,786,458 46,727,872 151,334,066 
SCL 56,993,893 77,321,738 57,270,206 79,127,040 
SKC 413,313,782 1,372,488,693 414,883,043 1,379,239,464 
SKT 409,232,820 668,770,672 412,640,369 675,541,275 
SML 53,778,647 94,510,948 53,860,707 99,933,938 
SPG 74,557,587 90,113,504 74,868,705 91,290,883 
SPK 1,379,967,324 2,666,648,852 1,385,283,475 2,698,507,804 
SUM 189,114,069 162,522,517 189,910,857 162,251,031 
TGH 84,612,788 154,477,013 84,819,470 155,558,098 
THL 107,330,645 124,804,296 107,786,887 125,167,956 
TME 199,681,776 960,152,288 200,277,827 968,546,350 
TWR 55,506,468 61,568,196 55,909,527 62,302,688 
VCT 105,896,370 61,344,752 106,110,018 61,081,698 
VGL 26,865,721 106,789,907 26,927,784 108,669,329 
VHP 81,844,303 77,920,272 82,111,448 78,319,026 
WBC 82,203,344 181,944,518 82,579,097 186,361,656 
XRO 347,358,948 611,134,092 347,940,878 755,693,355 






The following Table shows the full list of the suspicious trades flagged by my 
manipulation index. For each specific stock/date, the table shows the closing auction 
return and the S&P/NZX 50 index return over the same period of time. It also shows the 
total number of shares (volume) traded as a result of the closing auction and the overall 
volume of off-market traded reported during the adjust session at the closing price. 
Volume Difference is Off-market Trades Volume divided by Closing Auction Volume and 
shows how large the overall volume of off-market trades is compared to the closing 
auction volume. Return Difference is simply the difference between Closing Auction 
Return and NZX50 Closing Return in percentage. Suspicious trades in the table sorted 
from the highest return difference to the lowest. 
 




















1 WHS 21/11/2016 2.175 -0.167 21,103 411,677 19.53 2.342 
2 TWR 16/12/2016 1.875 -0.321 51,325 3,119,732 60.78 2.196 
3 ATM 12/11/2015 -2.045 0.029 14,700 130,324 8.87 2.074 
4 SKC 14/03/2016 -1.893 0.061 9,779 161,666 16.53 1.954 
5 SKT 15/03/2017 -1.652 0.045 8,263 42,720 5.17 1.697 
6 OHE 20/09/2016 -1.656 0.014 2,101 22,000 10.47 1.67 
7 SKL 1/04/2016 1.449 -0.175 25,945 183,090 7.06 1.624 
8 ATM 25/08/2015 -1.429 0.19 5,950 191,062 32.11 1.619 
9 KMD 11/05/2016 -1.797 -0.194 2,688 56,605 21.06 1.603 
10 XRO 1/03/2016 -1.211 0.385 1,571 18,223 11.6 1.596 
11 MPG 1/03/2017 1.351 -0.224 57,020 1,112,020 19.5 1.575 
12 XRO 23/09/2015 -1.818 -0.265 1,162 28,329 24.38 1.553 
13 OHE 12/05/2017 1.481 -0.069 3,500 17,910 5.12 1.55 
14 MCY 9/08/2016 1.44 -0.106 1,195 110,009 92.06 1.546 
15 VCT 1/06/2016 -1.478 0.038 1,802 20,702 11.49 1.516 
16 MET 17/05/2016 1.381 -0.127 821 8,019 9.77 1.508 
17 TWR 23/11/2016 -1.342 0.151 2,660 97,500 36.65 1.493 
18 AIA 7/10/2016 1.638 0.155 8,036 224,915 27.99 1.483 
19 STU 24/06/2016 1.28 -0.15 3,230 68,934 21.34 1.43 
20 VHP 2/02/2016 -1.554 -0.13 5,367 44,633 8.32 1.424 
21 ATM 20/08/2015 1.408 -0.008 35,000 195,478 5.59 1.416 
22 SKL 1/03/2016 -0.99 0.385 2,326 80,760 34.72 1.375 
23 VCT 18/09/2015 1.313 -0.028 15,000 128,135 8.54 1.341 
24 MET 20/05/2016 -1.307 -0.005 6,280 71,444 11.38 1.302 
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25 KMD 22/01/2016 1.316 0.026 5,958 75,000 12.59 1.29 
26 SKL 12/10/2015 1.429 0.141 8,271 46,268 5.59 1.288 
27 XRO 4/12/2015 1.473 0.187 1,143 16,679 14.59 1.286 
28 WHS 26/07/2017 -1.333 -0.048 2,939 50,000 17.01 1.285 
29 OHE 28/10/2015 1.096 -0.164 7,800 105,597 13.54 1.26 
30 TWR 13/01/2017 -1.073 0.17 292 23,000 78.77 1.243 
31 MPG 24/11/2015 -1.274 -0.043 1,196 7,034,856 5881.9 1.231 
32 FRE 14/06/2016 -1.385 -0.155 1,039 14,073 13.54 1.23 
33 WHS 18/04/2017 -1.158 0.069 2,249 27,384 12.18 1.227 
34 IFT 19/05/2016 -1.383 -0.157 37,608 204,751 5.44 1.226 
35 EBO 25/09/2015 1.235 0.026 7,502 71,444 9.52 1.209 
36 NZR 2/03/2017 1.132 -0.072 22,675 120,009 5.29 1.204 
37 NZR 18/11/2016 1.124 -0.06 8,428 72,792 8.64 1.184 
38 VHP 18/09/2015 1.156 -0.028 22,473 124,968 5.56 1.184 
39 KMD 20/05/2016 -1.175 -0.005 603 35,950 59.62 1.17 
40 AIR 27/01/2016 -1.254 -0.105 13,065 389,910 29.84 1.149 
41 OHE 13/04/2016 1.235 0.087 22,593 122,354 5.42 1.148 
42 SPK 19/09/2016 1.346 0.224 129,994 1,026,416 7.9 1.122 
43 VCT 23/09/2016 1.218 0.111 4,100 35,085 8.56 1.107 
44 NZX 31/03/2016 -0.971 0.13 19,244 234,586 12.19 1.101 
45 NZR 28/07/2016 1.24 0.144 7,009 43,717 6.24 1.096 
46 FRE 30/12/2015 -0.973 0.115 1,077 30,731 28.53 1.088 
47 POT 26/09/2016 1.093 0.006 144 2,505 17.4 1.087 
48 VCT 1/02/2016 -1.238 -0.161 100 8,601 86.01 1.077 
49 SPK 12/12/2016 -1.051 0.025 62,074 744,066 11.99 1.076 
50 KMD 5/12/2016 -1.081 -0.007 700 6,355 9.08 1.074 
51 VHP 27/04/2016 -1.19 -0.125 16,869 104,155 6.17 1.065 
52 ARV 12/10/2015 1.205 0.141 6,205 1,875,875 302.32 1.064 
53 SKT 31/01/2017 1.045 -0.014 7,599 100,154 13.18 1.059 
54 FRE 1/12/2016 1.226 0.169 2,000 28,010 14.01 1.057 
55 RYM 17/02/2016 1.066 0.009 9,362 70,427 7.52 1.057 
56 KMD 23/09/2015 -1.316 -0.265 5,948 86,768 14.59 1.051 
57 PCT 15/09/2016 -1.086 -0.039 79,039 1,506,442 19.06 1.047 
58 WHS 16/10/2015 1.141 0.096 554 74,884 135.17 1.045 
59 NZX 18/01/2017 -0.943 0.101 1,000 17,000 17 1.044 
60 NZR 17/08/2017 1.047 0.014 7,982 55,415 6.94 1.033 
61 EBO 6/01/2016 -0.786 0.246 387 4,965 12.83 1.032 
62 NZX 19/01/2017 -0.943 0.089 1,269 15,000 11.82 1.032 
63 AIR 12/01/2016 -1.173 -0.157 39,291 215,025 5.47 1.016 
64 TWR 27/05/2016 -1.014 -0.002 19,973 1,092,073 54.68 1.012 
65 MFT 9/08/2017 1.312 0.303 1,855 27,722 14.94 1.009 
66 PFI 8/10/2015 -1.259 -0.254 2,000 257,024 128.51 1.005 
67 GMT 8/03/2017 1.133 0.134 9,712 199,994 20.59 0.999 
68 NZX 30/09/2015 -1.01 -0.012 6,932 42,936 6.19 0.998 
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69 TWR 15/11/2016 -0.907 0.09 6,302 150,000 23.8 0.997 
70 SKT 13/12/2016 -0.99 -0.025 88,718 1,082,825 12.21 0.965 
71 GNE 3/06/2016 -1.002 -0.046 16,448 207,870 12.64 0.956 
72 KMD 22/08/2016 -0.782 0.164 19,366 266,500 13.76 0.946 
73 ANZ 29/06/2016 1.01 0.069 199 80,000 402.01 0.941 
74 EBO 19/07/2016 -0.688 0.25 753 8,069 10.72 0.938 
75 XRO 8/09/2015 -0.829 0.104 230 14,711 63.96 0.933 
76 EBO 15/12/2016 0.76 -0.168 2,157 23,266 10.79 0.928 
77 NZX 8/09/2016 0.962 0.035 27,900 750,000 26.88 0.927 
78 ARV 10/10/2016 0.87 -0.054 429 5,000 11.66 0.924 
79 ARV 20/07/2016 -0.847 0.075 565 26,000 46.02 0.922 
80 ARV 31/03/2016 1.042 0.13 6,025 34,000 5.64 0.912 
81 AIR 24/03/2016 -1.038 -0.128 52,020 406,441 7.81 0.91 
82 HBL 2/03/2016 -0.833 0.067 4,460 35,000 7.85 0.9 
83 ATM 16/12/2015 0.825 -0.073 85,525 1,002,800 11.73 0.898 
84 SKT 24/05/2017 -0.744 0.148 20,190 207,625 10.28 0.892 
85 SUM 10/02/2017 -0.949 -0.057 6,920 38,506 5.56 0.892 
86 HBL 28/07/2016 -0.746 0.144 850 69,071 81.26 0.89 
87 KPG 4/11/2016 -1.11 -0.229 2,545 160,003 62.87 0.881 
88 NZX 28/10/2015 -1.042 -0.164 3,011 20,000 6.64 0.878 
89 ARV 13/07/2016 0.762 -0.108 3,433 150,000 43.69 0.87 
90 ATM 2/12/2015 0.87 0.007 138,162 701,779 5.08 0.863 
91 KMD 8/11/2016 -0.79 0.068 2,594 157,460 60.7 0.858 
92 KMD 18/07/2017 0.901 0.045 701 158,281 225.79 0.856 
93 VHP 11/02/2016 0.798 -0.056 3,025 22,364 7.39 0.854 
94 ARG 15/09/2016 -0.885 -0.039 67,642 822,358 12.16 0.846 
95 ATM 27/11/2015 0.855 0.01 185,021 1,693,635 9.15 0.845 
96 KMD 2/05/2016 -0.763 0.08 6,340 200,000 31.55 0.843 
97 NZR 12/05/2016 0.76 -0.083 1,993 47,162 23.66 0.843 
98 ATM 25/11/2015 -0.893 -0.051 30,000 861,508 28.72 0.842 
99 KPG 23/03/2017 0.937 0.095 103,277 1,391,923 13.48 0.842 
100 SKL 2/06/2016 -0.758 0.08 15,300 200,000 13.07 0.838 
101 SUM 7/01/2016 -0.771 0.065 5,224 33,231 6.36 0.836 
102 ARV 15/05/2017 -0.846 -0.014 803 26,255 32.7 0.832 
103 SPK 31/08/2015 0.805 -0.027 164,153 6,711,756 40.89 0.832 
104 NZX 3/11/2015 -0.621 0.209 15,674 701,700 44.77 0.83 
105 WBC 21/10/2015 0.899 0.072 129 4,851 37.6 0.827 
106 ARV 4/07/2017 -0.752 0.074 39,915 371,500 9.31 0.826 
107 SKC 15/08/2016 -0.798 0.028 2,800 50,964 18.2 0.826 
108 FPH 29/02/2016 -1.046 -0.221 47,441 1,006,244 21.21 0.825 
109 MPG 29/11/2016 -0.567 0.258 32,289 352,435 10.92 0.825 
110 VHP 28/04/2017 -0.901 -0.076 28,852 368,358 12.77 0.825 
111 FRE 24/03/2017 0.839 0.021 1,233 26,050 21.13 0.818 
112 FPH 17/02/2017 0.896 0.08 72,223 424,543 5.88 0.816 
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113 GNE 25/08/2015 -0.625 0.19 22,938 419,065 18.27 0.815 
114 MPG 22/03/2017 -0.714 0.099 3,994 275,708 69.03 0.813 
115 NZX 18/07/2017 0.855 0.045 782 51,458 65.8 0.81 
116 SPK 25/07/2017 0.895 0.085 162,164 963,749 5.94 0.81 
117 POT 8/07/2016 -0.761 0.048 399 9,155 22.94 0.809 
118 ATM 23/11/2015 -0.729 0.079 66,000 505,000 7.65 0.808 
119 NZX 17/08/2017 0.82 0.014 7,620 56,686 7.44 0.806 
120 ARV 24/05/2017 -0.657 0.148 4,433 42,369 9.56 0.805 
121 GMT 15/09/2016 -0.839 -0.039 110,698 1,182,671 10.68 0.8 
122 ATM 6/04/2017 0.923 0.125 88,000 4,300,030 48.86 0.798 
123 SKL 20/06/2016 -0.8 -0.004 10,576 59,454 5.62 0.796 
124 SKC 3/08/2017 0.758 -0.037 75,290 427,303 5.68 0.795 
125 CEN 8/12/2015 -0.887 -0.093 29,550 896,595 30.34 0.794 
126 SPK 30/10/2015 1.053 0.259 45,582 3,048,843 66.89 0.794 
127 CNU 8/03/2016 1.044 0.251 38,677 283,554 7.33 0.793 
128 KMD 14/12/2015 -0.645 0.148 2,828 43,704 15.45 0.793 
129 KPG 26/07/2016 0.641 -0.149 47,830 1,200,262 25.09 0.79 
130 CNU 4/09/2015 0.806 0.018 34,468 328,461 9.53 0.788 
131 TWR 28/11/2016 -0.81 -0.024 4,500 174,214 38.71 0.786 
132 RBD 23/10/2015 -0.85 -0.066 715 5,679 7.94 0.784 
133 MPG 3/05/2017 -0.725 0.057 25,735 274,005 10.65 0.782 
134 MPG 6/07/2017 -0.648 0.131 8,891 116,175 13.07 0.779 
135 ATM 19/01/2016 0.987 0.209 14,038 125,000 8.9 0.778 
136 GNE 23/06/2016 0.688 -0.09 6,243 162,949 26.1 0.778 
137 HBL 22/12/2016 -0.676 0.099 16,304 158,939 9.75 0.775 
138 POT 8/03/2016 -0.521 0.251 416 2,195 5.28 0.772 
139 ATM 24/11/2015 -0.813 -0.043 153,000 1,250,000 8.17 0.77 
140 EBO 25/02/2016 0.921 0.153 461 2,952 6.4 0.768 
141 CNU 30/09/2015 0.755 -0.012 80,699 847,330 10.5 0.767 
142 OHE 30/09/2015 0.75 -0.012 3,000 240,843 80.28 0.762 
143 ZEL 3/06/2016 0.716 -0.046 15,355 106,000 6.9 0.762 
144 STU 15/09/2015 -0.775 -0.022 425 2,340 5.51 0.753 
145 MET 21/10/2015 -0.677 0.072 900 8,000 8.89 0.749 
146 KMD 19/02/2016 0.729 -0.016 12,077 100,000 8.28 0.745 
147 AIA 10/01/2017 0.839 0.095 15,800 616,299 39.01 0.744 
148 VCT 3/03/2016 0.909 0.172 11,893 75,000 6.31 0.737 
149 ARV 5/05/2017 -0.763 -0.031 8,000 250,000 31.25 0.732 
150 WBC 1/04/2016 -0.906 -0.175 800 7,970 9.96 0.731 
151 HBL 20/04/2016 -0.826 -0.097 4,000 53,123 13.28 0.729 
152 XRO 9/11/2015 0.603 -0.124 9,834 81,456 8.28 0.727 
153 OHE 23/11/2016 -0.574 0.151 1,450 9,695 6.69 0.725 
154 ATM 2/12/2016 -0.783 -0.059 106,529 754,954 7.09 0.724 
155 EBO 15/12/2015 -0.736 -0.013 700 16,778 23.97 0.723 
156 MPG 28/03/2017 0.719 -0.003 3,000 95,000 31.67 0.722 
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157 SPG 1/11/2016 -0.535 0.186 9,900 55,284 5.58 0.721 
158 SUM 29/07/2016 -0.629 0.087 10,894 108,889 10 0.716 
159 XRO 1/07/2016 -0.729 -0.013 7,188 38,386 5.34 0.716 
160 POT 28/03/2017 -0.716 -0.003 8,427 95,972 11.39 0.713 
161 GMT 23/01/2017 0.806 0.094 44,596 380,000 8.52 0.712 
162 KPG 24/04/2017 -0.704 0.007 81,895 720,000 8.79 0.711 
163 ANZ 31/03/2016 -0.58 0.13 593 6,000 10.12 0.71 
164 SKL 25/09/2015 0.735 0.026 1,278 10,600 8.29 0.709 
165 ATM 25/07/2016 -0.5 0.207 35,000 398,146 11.38 0.707 
166 ATM 16/02/2017 -0.766 -0.063 38,995 385,035 9.87 0.703 
167 MPG 19/11/2015 0.671 -0.029 2,720 302,555 111.23 0.7 
168 WBC 21/08/2015 -0.586 0.11 751 27,527 36.65 0.696 
169 KPG 15/09/2016 -0.733 -0.039 87,880 1,195,888 13.61 0.694 
170 RBD 7/06/2016 0.908 0.216 8,140 47,053 5.78 0.692 
171 SUM 12/05/2016 0.609 -0.083 9,625 401,150 41.68 0.692 
172 SKL 5/07/2016 -0.8 -0.109 3,782 26,637 7.04 0.691 
173 AIR 3/04/2017 -0.616 0.074 54,662 358,038 6.55 0.69 
174 MPG 15/12/2016 0.518 -0.168 1,608 103,096 64.11 0.686 
175 MEL 30/08/2016 -0.625 0.057 35,778 245,630 6.87 0.682 
176 GNE 7/03/2017 0.665 -0.014 42,366 320,591 7.57 0.679 
177 SKL 27/11/2015 -0.667 0.01 13,241 66,819 5.05 0.677 
178 SKL 13/06/2016 -0.621 0.055 8,852 46,600 5.26 0.676 
179 STU 6/07/2016 0.858 0.182 465 4,485 9.65 0.676 
180 VHP 1/11/2016 -0.488 0.186 7,000 62,199 8.89 0.674 
181 EBO 3/10/2016 0.813 0.142 5,562 34,887 6.27 0.671 
182 MEL 12/04/2016 0.755 0.084 65,000 585,936 9.01 0.671 
183 MPG 26/01/2016 0.629 -0.04 600 9,000 15 0.669 
184 MEL 13/04/2016 0.755 0.087 124,846 1,186,156 9.5 0.668 
185 TWR 15/07/2016 0.521 -0.147 1,800 17,993 10 0.668 
186 FPH 14/03/2017 -0.605 0.058 20,555 169,609 8.25 0.663 
187 CEN 10/06/2016 0.674 0.014 44,165 732,836 16.59 0.66 
188 MFT 14/09/2015 0.667 0.011 4,153 186,510 44.91 0.656 
189 ANZ 30/09/2015 0.643 -0.012 750 8,456 11.27 0.655 
190 AIR 16/03/2016 0.544 -0.11 112,258 672,246 5.99 0.654 
191 ZEL 8/12/2016 0.808 0.156 82,312 419,881 5.1 0.652 
192 ARV 31/03/2017 0.794 0.143 20,325 376,740 18.54 0.651 
193 CEN 14/09/2016 -0.601 0.048 10,000 200,036 20 0.649 
194 OHE 29/09/2015 0.602 -0.041 1,471 20,020 13.61 0.643 
195 CNU 5/08/2016 -0.683 -0.046 15,175 142,646 9.4 0.637 
196 TPW 25/09/2015 0.662 0.026 600 27,925 46.54 0.636 
197 MET 8/06/2016 0.512 -0.12 21,738 145,733 6.7 0.632 
198 SKL 13/03/2017 0.522 -0.11 9,555 60,766 6.36 0.632 
199 ARV 30/11/2016 0.688 0.059 6,656 81,000 12.17 0.629 
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200 SKL 15/05/2017 -0.641 -0.014 123 38,573 313.6 0.627 
201 ARG 18/01/2016 -0.435 0.181 30,176 225,598 7.48 0.616 
202 KPG 15/05/2017 -0.63 -0.014 105,283 1,721,392 16.35 0.616 
203 ZEL 5/01/2016 -0.552 0.062 24,068 175,684 7.3 0.614 
204 ATM 5/05/2017 0.58 -0.031 14,648 405,000 27.65 0.611 
205 MET 30/03/2016 0.701 0.09 9,883 61,672 6.24 0.611 
206 MPG 4/03/2016 -0.633 -0.022 11,416 142,000 12.44 0.611 
207 TWR 26/07/2017 -0.659 -0.048 10,000 200,000 20 0.611 
208 MPG 15/05/2017 0.596 -0.014 2,387 75,345 31.56 0.61 
209 POT 2/02/2017 -0.465 0.143 2,421 12,564 5.19 0.608 
210 TME 19/08/2016 -0.442 0.164 45,685 407,379 8.92 0.606 
211 TME 15/12/2016 0.436 -0.168 9,648 81,053 8.4 0.604 
212 ATM 11/03/2016 -0.543 0.06 8,015 308,659 38.51 0.603 
213 FRE 4/11/2015 -0.512 0.091 1,000 41,292 41.29 0.603 
214 POT 14/01/2016 -0.546 0.054 604 6,364 10.54 0.6 
215 SKC 1/07/2016 0.585 -0.013 43,319 706,552 16.31 0.598 
216 MEL 22/06/2016 0.398 -0.196 235,854 2,088,720 8.86 0.594 
217 FSF 31/07/2017 -0.461 0.131 2,000 45,000 22.5 0.592 
218 OHE 26/02/2016 0.49 -0.102 49,972 309,518 6.19 0.592 
219 HBL 30/05/2017 0.402 -0.189 15,044 125,000 8.31 0.591 
220 ATM 23/11/2016 0.741 0.151 54,774 516,031 9.42 0.59 
221 SPG 11/05/2017 0.517 -0.073 210 54,185 258.02 0.59 
222 AIR 10/05/2016 -0.632 -0.044 12,922 361,930 28.01 0.588 
223 SPG 13/12/2016 0.562 -0.025 6,742 100,000 14.83 0.587 
224 FRE 7/12/2016 0.596 0.01 2,437 30,462 12.5 0.586 
225 FBU 7/02/2017 0.726 0.144 57,435 337,617 5.88 0.582 
226 AIA 12/07/2016 -0.618 -0.037 18,025 99,459 5.52 0.581 
227 TME 28/04/2016 -0.442 0.139 6,100 61,349 10.06 0.581 
228 KMD 19/07/2017 -0.444 0.136 7,721 98,104 12.71 0.58 
229 SUM 30/09/2015 -0.591 -0.012 22,413 399,757 17.84 0.579 
230 SKL 8/12/2015 -0.667 -0.093 1,921 10,000 5.21 0.574 
231 SPK 15/09/2016 0.534 -0.039 8,835 762,223 86.27 0.573 
232 HBL 27/06/2017 0.505 -0.067 7,321 42,064 5.75 0.572 
233 ATM 25/01/2016 -0.538 0.033 19,914 300,000 15.06 0.571 
234 WBC 2/11/2016 0.484 -0.086 25 10,109 404.36 0.57 
235 AIR 13/01/2017 -0.399 0.17 46,156 398,000 8.62 0.569 
236 FPH 22/12/2016 0.665 0.099 26,683 196,945 7.38 0.566 
237 KMD 22/06/2017 0.51 -0.054 6,756 60,014 8.88 0.564 
238 OHE 1/05/2017 -0.725 -0.161 2,000 24,000 12 0.564 
239 FSF 1/06/2016 -0.524 0.038 5,897 71,336 12.1 0.562 
240 AIA 21/09/2016 0.684 0.123 79,679 414,528 5.2 0.561 
241 KPG 27/04/2016 -0.685 -0.125 86,666 639,559 7.38 0.56 
242 MFT 17/08/2017 0.574 0.014 479 8,726 18.22 0.56 
243 ARG 29/06/2017 -0.478 0.08 18,865 795,000 42.14 0.558 
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244 PCT 11/04/2017 -0.412 0.143 20,000 136,647 6.83 0.555 
245 ZEL 16/03/2016 0.445 -0.11 18,970 127,841 6.74 0.555 
246 POT 24/07/2017 0.59 0.036 12,054 64,520 5.35 0.554 
247 MPG 26/10/2016 0.463 -0.089 2,934 30,000 10.22 0.552 
248 SPK 12/02/2016 0.704 0.153 106,452 709,119 6.66 0.551 
249 STU 1/06/2016 -0.513 0.038 3,000 127,624 42.54 0.551 
250 FPH 14/06/2016 0.394 -0.155 28,821 272,813 9.47 0.549 
251 KMD 23/05/2017 0.508 -0.041 500 50,000 100 0.549 
252 XRO 6/10/2015 -0.585 -0.036 2,542 218,917 86.12 0.549 
253 KMD 25/08/2016 0.505 -0.042 6,683 70,009 10.48 0.547 
254 TME 4/08/2016 0.583 0.036 5,000 531,432 106.29 0.547 
255 EBO 26/07/2016 0.397 -0.149 594 15,430 25.98 0.546 
256 FRE 28/02/2017 -0.37 0.176 36,438 217,509 5.97 0.546 
257 TME 22/10/2015 -0.546 -0.005 13,205 100,000 7.57 0.541 
258 VCT 4/05/2016 -0.67 -0.129 1,722 49,003 28.46 0.541 
259 GNE 11/08/2017 -0.621 -0.082 97,110 1,408,443 14.5 0.539 
260 MFT 5/08/2016 -0.583 -0.046 30 19,334 644.47 0.537 
261 SPK 16/03/2016 -0.647 -0.11 24,516 400,084 16.32 0.537 
262 MPG 9/09/2016 0.45 -0.085 7,892 48,922 6.2 0.535 
263 WBC 13/04/2016 -0.448 0.087 122 25,371 207.96 0.535 
264 ZEL 22/08/2016 0.697 0.164 27,100 143,754 5.3 0.533 
265 MEL 2/08/2016 -0.627 -0.095 55,964 485,900 8.68 0.532 
266 SUM 8/07/2016 0.58 0.048 1,144 350,030 305.97 0.532 
267 TWR 8/06/2016 -0.649 -0.12 2,952 31,060 10.52 0.529 
268 IFT 14/11/2016 -0.393 0.135 68,425 436,981 6.39 0.528 
269 MEL 6/10/2015 -0.563 -0.036 130,332 702,207 5.39 0.527 
270 GMT 19/05/2016 0.368 -0.157 77,759 480,778 6.18 0.525 
271 XRO 23/06/2016 0.434 -0.09 6,375 81,327 12.76 0.524 
272 KMD 7/03/2017 0.508 -0.014 3,312 202,965 61.28 0.522 
273 TME 9/02/2016 0.513 -0.009 34,220 240,617 7.03 0.522 
274 KPG 1/06/2017 0.555 0.034 25,044 148,013 5.91 0.521 
275 XRO 19/08/2016 -0.357 0.164 1,176 10,367 8.82 0.521 
276 PFI 9/03/2017 -0.504 0.016 18,188 140,000 7.7 0.52 
277 SKC 19/06/2017 -0.429 0.086 3,394 34,896 10.28 0.515 
278 FBU 25/05/2016 -0.648 -0.136 120,348 948,469 7.88 0.512 
279 CNU 12/10/2015 -0.368 0.141 31,321 603,671 19.27 0.509 
 
 
 
